

—AFGHANISTAN—

AFGHAN PEOPLE VS. THE TALIBAN: THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM INTENSIFIES.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 31 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: AF 3/3

“...in 1996, a heavy shroud was placed on the people of Afghanistan when the Taliban captured Kabul. Since then, the Taliban has taken the peaceful and sacred scriptures of the Prophet Muhammad, and distorted them into a rulebook of terror. Through the creation of their Department of Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the Taliban has enforced a perverse rendition of Islam which gruesomely joins constant and faithful prayer, with barbaric practices of beatings, torture, rape, and executions. The Taliban’s reign of terror has riddled the country with death and sorrow. Well before the September 11th attacks, the Taliban engaged in widespread ethnic cleansing, littering the ground of Afghanistan with the mass graves of ethnic and religious minorities ... A post-Taliban scenario is one of the main things that we are here to discuss today with our mostly Afghan panel.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42260> (PDF)

http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/107/75925.pdf (PDF)

AFGHAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN RELIEF ACT OF 2001. U.S. Congress. 107th Congress, 12 December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. [Public Law 107-81].

SuDoc# AE 2.110:107-81

“...the President is authorized, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, to provide educational and health care assistance for the women and children living in Afghanistan and as refugees in neighboring countries ... In providing assistance under subsection (a), the President shall ensure that such assistance is provided in a manner that protects and promotes the human rights of all people in Afghanistan, utilizing indigenous institutions and nongovernmental organizations, especially women’s organizations, to the extent possible...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18138>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18139> (PDF)

AFGHANISTAN: A COUNTRY STUDY. Library of Congress. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, eds. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 408p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.22: 550-65/2/986

Historical setting, society, natural environment, modes of subsistence, gender, religion, government and politics, Soviet occupation, prospects for the future: "Despite Afghans' pride in independence, during the past two centuries their politics have been greatly influenced by foreign involvements. In its present condition of great political vulnerability, Afghanistan is again intimately affected by foreign powers. Yet since the founding of its tribal monarchy foreign meddling has been dominated by imperial, alien, and non-Islamic nations. In a new era of political alignments and cultural resurgence, there is opportunity for Afghanistan to revive within a community of Islamic states. Whether that possibility will materialize depends greatly on its neighbors."

Online

<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html>

AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY, AVOIDING CHAOS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 June 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 66p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-708

"Over the past half-year we have achieved great battlefield success in Afghanistan. Our servicemen and servicewomen have defeated the Taliban, and gotten al-Qaeda on the run. We haven't yet captured bin Laden ... As we reach the next stage in the war, several questions arise: What is the status of ongoing operations against the al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan? What is the humanitarian situation? What is our assessment of the loya jirga process? Perhaps the most important question, however, is one of commitment: Will we stay the course and build security in Afghanistan, or will we permit this country to relapse into chaos?"

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25671>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25672> (PDF)

AFGHANISTAN: CURRENT ISSUES AND U.S. POLICY. Library of Congress. Kenneth Katzman. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. 39p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL30588

“Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, about 2 million Afghan refugees have returned, and women have returned to schools, the workforce, and participation in politics. At the same time, there is a lack of security in many parts of Afghanistan, particularly the southeast, which was the power base of the Taliban. Security concerns are widely believed to be slowing the pace of reconstruction, as is the high degree of autonomy exercised by regional governors of the various ethnically dominated localities.”

Online

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/14834.pdf> (PDF)

AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2002. U.S. Congress. 107th Congress, 4 December 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. [Public Law 107-327].

SuDoc# AE 2.110: 107-327

“The purposes of assistance authorized by this title are—(1) ... eliminating the likelihood of violence against the United States or allied forces in Afghanistan and to reduce the chance that Afghanistan will again be a source of international terrorism; (2) ... to address the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and among Afghan refugees in neighboring countries; (3) to fight the production and flow of illicit narcotics ...; (4) to help achieve a ... fully representative government in Afghanistan that is freely chosen by the people of Afghanistan and that respects the human rights of all Afghans ... (5) to support the Government of Afghanistan in its development of the capacity to ... meet the needs of the Afghan people; (6) to foster the participation of civil society in the establishment of the new Afghan government ... (7) to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan ... (8) to provide resources to the Ministry for Women’s Affairs of Afghanistan to carry out its responsibilities for legal advocacy, education, vocational training, and women’s health programs; and (9) to foster the growth of a pluralistic society that promotes and respects religious freedom.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26777> (PDF)

AFGHANISTAN FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2002. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 20p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 107-420

Congress declares that the U.S. and the international community “should support efforts that advance the development of democratic civil authorities and institutions in Afghanistan and the establishment,” that the U.S. “should provide its expertise to

meet immediate humanitarian and refugee needs,” to “help assure the security of the United States and the world by reducing or eliminating the likelihood of violence against the United States or allied forces in Afghanistan and to reduce the chance that Afghanistan will again be a source of international terrorism” and to aid the building of an Afghan government.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19399>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19400> (PDF)

AFGHANISTAN: IN PURSUIT OF SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 16 October 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 79p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.F 76/2: S.HRG.108-320

“Afghanistan’s population is far less educated than Iraq’s. It lacks abundant oil resources that could serve as an engine for reconstruction. Many areas of Afghanistan lack even rudimentary infrastructure. The infrastructure that does exist is often in disrepair. The Afghan government will require assistance to ensure that basic necessities that we take for granted, such as electricity and safe drinking water, are increasingly available. These challenges must be undertaken amidst the uncertain process of establishing a broadly supported constitution and electoral process. We must also continue to support efforts to improve education and expand the role of women in Afghan society ... Our hearing today is intended to assess reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and to review what else can be done to advance our political, economic, and security goals in that country.”

AFGHANISTAN: IS THERE HOPE FOR PEACE? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 6, 25, 26 & 27 June 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 165p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.104-583

“Since 1989, and with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, [Afghanistan] has tragically suffered from a series of internal conflicts that have made the return of peace and prosperity extremely difficult.”

AFGHANISTAN: TERRORISTS AND DRUG LORDS THREATEN THE REGION. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 1, No. 4, June 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995. p.10. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.1/NO.4

“After the Afghan war against invading Soviet troops, the conflict soon degenerated into fighting along regional, tribal, and ethnic lines...the fighting resulted from a breakdown of state institutions and the widespread arming of the population.”

AFGHANISTAN: THE ANATOMY OF AN ONGOING CONFLICT. U.S. Department of Defense. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 31, No. 1. Spring 2001. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2001. p.85-98. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 31/1

“International peace efforts have failed because they have focused on the symptoms of the problem rather than on the roots of the conflict. Instead of working for an inclusive political settlement, they have concentrated on cease-fires and power-sharing among the warring factions which are parts of the problem. During the past eight years, several power-sharing arrangements have been mediated without long-term solutions. The strongest partner in the coalition usually saw its party establishment as the core element of the "state" and its militia as the "national army." This was the case during the Rabbani-Masoud government in Kabul. Of the eight divisions based in Kabul and nearby areas, seven were dominated by Masoud's men and commanded by his cronies. Now that Kabul is under Taliban control, the militia considers its administration the embodiment of the "state" and its militia, which includes thousands of foreign citizens, as the national army. The Taliban has not shown the flexibility or desire to negotiate on its monopoly of leadership. Any lasting solution in Afghanistan will need to include a verifiable end to foreign intervention, disbanding factional militias, restoration of the state under international supervision, and a "Marshal Plan" of some sort to rebuild the national economy.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01spring/jalali.htm>

AFGHANISTAN'S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: IS ENOUGH AID REACHING AFGHANISTAN? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 10 October 2001; 15 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 103p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-235

“After four years of relentless drought, the worst in three decades, and the total failure of the Taliban government in administering the country, 4 million people have abandoned their homes in search of food in Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan and elsewhere, while those left behind eat meals of locusts and animal fodder; 7.5 million people inside the country are threatened by famine or severe hunger as cold weather approaches, according to the United Nations.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22523>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22524> (PDF)

AMERICA'S YOUTH RESPOND TO AFGHAN CHILDREN'S FUND: REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON AMERICA'S FUND FOR AFGHANISTAN CHILDREN. Office of the President (George W. Bush). Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2001. [White House Website].

SuDoc# N/A

“And my answer is, there's evil in the world. But we can overcome evil. We're good. We're good-hearted people, and the boys and girls of America are showing the world just that. We don't fight a religion -- no, we fight evil. We respect the Muslim culture. We know Islam is a religion that teaches love and peace and compassion. No, our struggle is against evil people -- evil people that claim they're religious, but are not. And I also want the boys and girls to know that while you're helping, our government is doing everything we can to make America safe. We're doing everything we can to find anybody who wants to hurt you, to bring them to justice. We're doing everything we can to respond to any act that may take place in our country.”

Online

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011016-4.html>

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND DIPLOMACY IN THE 1980'S. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 97th Congress, 1st Session, April 1981. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 133p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: AF 3

“This study was prepared by the Library of Congress for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, chaired by Hon. Lee H. Hamilton. It has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The study assesses the effectiveness and implications of United States sanctions undertaken as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It analyzes in some detail sanctions invoked by the United States and other countries. There is also considerable discussion of the significance of these sanctions to future U.S. trade and diplomacy.”

CRISIS IN THE SUBCONTINENT: AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 96th Congress, 1st

Session, 15 May 1979; 26 September 1979. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980. 41p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: C 86

“...we are discussing an area of the world beset by great uncertainties. The region, with the exception of India, seems to be erupting. A revolution we did not expect took place in Iran ... In Pakistan the uncertainty of Mr. Bhutto's fate has been tragically resolved, yet tensions continue to exist. In addition we now have renewed tension with Pakistan over the nuclear issue. Similar tensions with India now appear to have been, at best, postponed. To add to these specific uncertainties we have the overlay of a resurgent Islam, the nuances of which, much less the overt details, are not clear and are not likely to be clear for some time.”

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 21 February; 14 June 1989. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 127p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: AF 3/5

“The questions remaining are political ones: self-determination for the Afghan people, the return of the refugees in safety and dignity and the restoration of Afghanistan to its rightful place as a fully sovereign, independent Nation-state ... Major steps are being taken in that direction right now in Rawalpindi where a consultative council or Shura is being held with over 500 Afghans representing various factions in an effort to select an interim government and work out a selection process for the future. It is important to note that the process envisages not just selection of an interim government, which we understand would last for approximately eight months, but it also anticipates establishing procedures for selecting what we might call a constituent assembly. We support this process as an expression of the views of the Afghan people. We have no candidate or group which we support, nor any political blueprint for how the successor Afghan government should be organized. We are confident, however, that it will be neither Communist nor messianic Islamic.”

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, FEBRUARY 1988. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 & 25 February 1988. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. 121p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: AF 3/3

“In seeking to gauge the strength of the fundamentalist, it is necessary to bear in mind that Afghan society is primarily tribal in character. In Iran, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's power has rested on solid Shiite institutional foundations. Shiism requires the faithful to pay substantial taxes to the mosques, which has enabled the Islamic

Republican Party in Iran to build grass-roots political machines. By contrast, Sunni Islam is more loosely organized, and in predominantly Sunni Afghanistan, Sunni religious leaders have little or no institutional base, though they enjoy widespread popular respect. Their status depends on a cooperative relationship with the tribal maliks.”

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE “OTHER” SOUTH ASIA: AFGHANISTAN, BANGLADESH, NEPAL, AND SRI LANKA. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 11 August 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. 43p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: AS 4/32

“Each of the four countries under review this morning faces daunting social and economic problems, though here too some have been more successful than others in the beginning to address these challenges. Population pressures, woefully low literacy rates, disease, malnutrition, un- and underemployment, environmental degradation, the rise of fundamentalism, illicit narcotics, ethnic and religious intolerance that fuel civil conflict, gender inequities—the list of problems to be overcome is nearly endless.”

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, MAY 1990. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East; Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 9 May 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 428p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: B 22/4

“Indicators of Gaza’s economic decline include the doubling of child labor among children eight to fourteen years of age. This trend is particularly alarming in light of the fact that approximately one half of the population of both territories is fourteen years of age and younger. Other indicators include a rise in the number of children in United Nations supplementary feeding programs, from 8500 in December of 1987 to 23,000 in December of 1988. In addition, there is an unprecedented rise in the number of refugees requesting food rations. For the first time since the beginning of Israeli rule, there is hunger inside the Gaza Strip. The need for peace between Israelis and Palestinians is urgent.”

ENVIRONMENTAL TRIAGE IN AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. David A. Taylor. *Environmental Health Perspectives*. Vol. 111, No. 9. July 2003. Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences; Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. p.A470-A473. [Article].

SuDoc# HE 20.3559: 111/9

“A triple blow—four years of drought, nearly a decade of neglect under the Taliban, and the pounding of three major wars since 1980—has left Afghanistan with near total loss of its wetlands, severe and widespread erosion, and an urgent water crisis, UNEP found. Rural Afghans ‘have seen many of their basic resources—water for irrigation, trees for food and fuel—lost in just a generation,’ says UNEP...”

Online

<http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2003/111-9/spheres.html>

<http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2003/111-9/EHP111pa470pdf.pdf> (PDF)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: LACK OF STRATEGIC FOCUS AND OBSTACLES TO AGRICULTURAL RECOVERY THREATEN AFGHANISTAN’S STABILITY. U.S. General Accounting Office. June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 92p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-03-607

“As a result of the weak coordination, the Afghan government and the international community have not developed a joint strategy to direct the overall agricultural rehabilitation effort. Meanwhile, inadequate assistance funding, continuing terrorist attacks, warlords’ control of much of the country, and the growth of opium production threaten the recovery of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of food security and political stability in Afghanistan.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37502> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03607.pdf> (PDF)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: OBSERVATIONS ON POST-CONFLICT ASSISTANCE IN BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND AFGHANISTAN: STATEMENT OF SUSAN S. WESTIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE. U.S. General Accounting Office. 18 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: GAO-03-980 T

“Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—as well as in Iraq—is part of a broader, long-term assistance effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and democracy-building measures. While the post-conflict situations in these countries have varied, they have certain conditions in common—most notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance operations take place.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37670> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-980T> (PDF)

THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 3, No. 1, December 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996. p.5. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.3, NO.1

“The Taliban militia—founded by fundamentalist refugee students in Pakistan in 1994—had taken control of all but 6 of Afghanistan’s 33 provinces ... Afghanistan serves as a land bridge between the Middle East and the former Soviet Union and South Asia, and ... adjacent countries have an interest in seeing Afghan refugees on their soil return home.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/1996/1296/afghan.html>

THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 7 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 55p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: AF 3/4

The future of Afghanistan and the various Afghan peoples after the fall of the Taliban. The role of the United States in the future of Afghanistan as a sovereign nation. Specifically, some of the logistical and infrastructure issues facing Afghanistan’s transition to a new form of government and a new national ideology.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42885> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/76058.pdf (PDF)

THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 May 1988. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. 74p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: AF 3/4

“On April 14, in an historic undertaking, the Soviet Union and the United States became guarantors of the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan. These diplomatic instruments provide for the rapid and total withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the safe return of the 5 million Afghan refugees who have been forced to flee their homeland. The Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, if it is faithfully and fully implemented, will put an end to one of the most brutal acts of

international aggression since the end of the Second World War ... The signing of the Geneva Accords was also a significant diplomatic achievement for the government of Pakistan which conducted the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations ... Pakistan has demonstrated remarkable statesmanship throughout this lengthy conflict by steadfastly opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, by providing shelter and assistance to over 3 million Afghan refugees within its borders and by resolutely seeking to achieve a negotiated settlement that would bring about a full withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan.”

THE INSTITUTE COVERS THE GLOBE: AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 8, No. 5. August 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002. p.6. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.8/NO.5

“Two former U.S. ambassadors offer insights into the relationship between Afghanistan and neighboring countries.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002/8/crises.html>

LESSONS LEARNED: A GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM PLATOON IN AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Department of Defense. Jacqueline L. Dominguez. *MIPB: Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. Vol. 29, No. 4, October-December 2003. Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 2003. p.32-35. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.84: 29/4

“This article will discuss nine ... of our hardest lessons learned while being deployed to Kandahar Airfield (KAF), Afghanistan. Our platoon relationship while deployed was mainly direct support to the infantry battalion responsible for the perimeter defense. Throughout the deployment we worked with six various infantry battalions that included Canadians and Marines. The battalions rotated every three to four weeks; that made liaison and operation a continual battle...”

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 7 February 2002; 31 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 120p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-801

“Well, for the past 4 months, the eyes of the world have, indeed, been on our forces as they have done their duty. Led by General Franks, they have used innovative techniques and revolutionary technologies to destroy the heart of the al Qaeda network, to topple the Taliban, and to liberate the Afghan people from tyranny. We

have seen our Armed Forces conduct not only combat sorties but humanitarian food drops—reflecting America’s compassion for the suffering Afghan people alongside our determination to bring terrorists to justice.”

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: FOREIGN PLEDGES OF MILITARY & INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. Library of Congress. David J. Gerleman, Jennifer E. Stevens, and Steven A. Hildreth. 17 October 2001. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001. 10p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31152

“This report tracks public and media statements pledging foreign official support of military operations against the Al Qaeda network and the Taliban regime that supports it. It does not track foreign pledges of support for humanitarian assistance, law enforcement (and associated intelligence gathering), or the freezing or seizure of financial assets controlled by terrorists.”

Online

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf> (PDF)

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM NEWS PHOTOS. U.S. Department of Defense. *DefenseLINK*. 28 November 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003. [DoD Website].

SuDoc# N/A

Numerous images of the soldiers, equipment, and landscapes of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Online

<http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Operations/OperatiEndurinFreedo/>

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 6 December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 59p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-236

“We have to facilitate the creation of the regime...that adequately represents all the Afghans, women as well as men, Pashtuns and Tajiks and Uzbeks and Hazaras. They all have to be part of the deal, and we have to help lay that foundation so the Afghan Government does not slide back into warlordism and anarchy that existed in the past ... So what we are going to want to talk about is...where the administration thinks we have arrived in terms of a new government, and also a question that cannot

remain unanswered very long, is what sort of security framework are we prepared to try to help put in place.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19070>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19071> (PDF)

PROSPECTS FOR JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 8, No. 4. June 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002. p.4. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3.P 31: 15-2/V.8/NO.4

“Since the Afghanistan war began last fall, the U.S. Institute of Peace has tried to apply the lessons of its rule-of-law work to the challenge of building a viable justice system in post-war Afghanistan ... At the request of members of the UN negotiating team, the Institute produced a report, with recommendations, for use at the December 2001 Bonn negotiations between Afghanistan’s warring factions. These negotiations resulted in the ‘Bonn Agreement’ that established the country’s interim government.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002/6/afghanistan.html>

RADIO FREE AFGHANISTAN ACT OF 2001; THE FREEDOM CONSOLIDATION ACT OF 2001, INTERNATIONAL DISABILITY AND VICTIMS OF LANDMINES, CIVIL STRIFE AND WARFARE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2001; HUNGER TO HARVEST RESOLUTION: A DECADE OF CONCERN FOR AFRICA; THE EXPORT EXTENSION ACT OF 2001; RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2001; COMMENDING DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI ON THE 10th ANNIVERSARY OF NOBEL PRIZE; AND RECOGNIZING RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY’S SUCCESS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 1 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 93p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: AF 3/2

The markup texts of these laws, resolutions and statements of the United States Congress.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42886>

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/75927.pdf (PDF)

REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN'S NATIONAL ARMY. U.S. Department of Defense. Ali A. Jalali. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.72-86. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/3

“This article looks at the challenges facing the creation of a new national army in Afghanistan as well as the opportunities for responding to these challenges. It reviews the experience of the past as well as the recent war-instigated social and political transformation to identify conceptual frameworks for building a national military establishment in Afghanistan.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/jalali.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/jalali.pdf> (PDF)

REBUILDING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 8, No. 2. February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002. p.9. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3.P 31: 15-2/V.8/NO.2

“...parties to the peace talks agreed that the interim administration in Afghanistan will establish, with the help of the United Nations, a Judicial Affairs Commission to rebuild the country's domestic justice system. This measure was incorporated into the meeting's final peace agreement.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002/2/rebuilding.html>

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN: AN UPDATE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 12 February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 67p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-37

“...we cannot abandon our commitments or lose sight of our goals in Afghanistan. The international community will take notice of our staying power in Afghanistan. If we are able to help Afghanistan transition into a secure democracy, we will bolster our ability to attract allies in the war against terrorism. Our commitment to Afghanistan is also a demonstration of how we will approach post-conflict Iraq. American credibility is on the line in these situations, and we must understand that failure to follow through could have extremely negative consequences on the war on terror.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34002>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34003> (PDF)

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 8 March 1982. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. 136p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: AF 3

“The Afghans resisting the Soviet occupation forces call themselves Mujahadeen, an Arabic loan word in Dari which translates as ‘fighters for the cause of liberty’ or ‘freedom fighters’ ... it must be understood that the burden of fighting is being borne primarily by units inside Afghanistan who may or may not have links with the groups in Pakistan. These units operate primarily in those regions which they inhabit, inspired by their own perception of the nature of the threat to their cherished, age-old way of life. The manner of organization is indigenous, effective, and generally democratic. Allegiance to one’s leader is rooted in centuries of custom and tradition and is not lacking in discipline.”

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 May 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 129p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: AF 3/2

“It is past time that our Government insist that the U.N. talks on Afghanistan include legitimate representatives of the Afghan people, the mujahedin, the freedom fighters ... millions of Afghans have been forced to flee their homes and have become refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Thousands of others have been indiscriminately killed and maimed. The Soviets have followed a scorched earth policy in Afghanistan, resulting in the destruction of entire villages, crops, herds of livestock, and even the earth itself, irrigation systems and things of that kind. Because of this inhuman policy, many Afghans are facing starvation.”

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Library of Congress. Edward F. Bruner, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke. 15 October 2001. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001. 6p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RS21048

“Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite, specialized military units that can be inserted ‘behind the lines’ through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them clandestine. SOF units are expected to plan an important role in U.S.

military operations in Afghanistan and possibly elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military campaign against terrorists.”

Online

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6208.pdf> (PDF)

THE TALIBAN AND AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION. U.S. Institute of Peace. November 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998. [Special Report 39].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 20/2001043793

“The Taliban have further angered the international community by sheltering Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden, who was linked by the U.S. government to the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998. Later in the same month, U.S. cruise missiles attacked training sites in Afghanistan associated with bin Laden. The Taliban insist that bin Laden had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks that killed more than 300 people and wounded another 5,000, but they have only belatedly indicated a willingness to help clarify his possible role ... International human rights groups and aid missions have withdrawn from the country because of the harassment and killing of aid workers ... Against this backdrop, five panelists convened to consider the situation in Afghanistan and its possible ideological, sectarian, and economic impacts throughout the region. This summary offers the views presented about Taliban policies, how key regional actors are affected by the current situation, and options for international action.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14791>

http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr_afghan.html

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/sr_afghan.html

TALIBAN AND THE DRUG TRADE. Library of Congress. Raphael F. Perl. 5 October 2001. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001. 5p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RS21041

“In a sustained anti-terrorism campaign, drug markets, illicit drug products, and major drug ‘players’ could become legitimate targets for interdiction, law enforcement, military, and paramilitary operations. Indeed, British press reports indicate poppy fields, supply lines, storehouses, and producers may become targets in efforts to prevent Taliban funding of terrorist campaigns.”

Online

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf> (PDF)

THE TALIBAN: ENGAGEMENT OR CONFRONTATION? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 20 July 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 43p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-868

“The Taliban are still abusing women ... They still in Afghanistan host Osama bin Laden ... Afghanistan is still permitting the operation of terrorist training camps ... They are still exporting heroin ... They are still promoting Islamic fundamentalism into Pakistan ... Afghanistan is not just a state of concern. It is a rogue plain and simple ... The center of terrorism from around the world that we are very concerned about has shifted into Afghanistan and the region around it.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10607>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10608> (PDF)

TERRORISM, AFGHANISTAN, & REGIONAL INSTABILITY. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 5, No. 1. December 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998. p.8. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.5/NO.1

“Afghanistan, a far-away country of seemingly little strategic importance to the United States, has gained public attention in recent months as home to suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden ... Afghanistan poses a threat not just to the United States, but to the world: In addition to harboring terrorists, it is the world’s second-largest producer of heroin, and its civil war could destabilize the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, or South Asia, according to experts in the region.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/1998/1298/tari.html>

UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN: CURRENT ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 19 June; 16 October 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 192p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: AF 3/6

“The purpose of today’s hearing is to listen to a variety of policy and academic experts, as well as those who are playing an important role in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, in order to help us better understand the dynamics of our

government's strategies in securing what is proving to be the greater battle for peace in Afghanistan ... It appears we still have quite a way to go before that goal is accomplished. Concerns about persistent insecurity and the slow political and economic reconstruction process are prevalent throughout Afghanistan, as well as among friends of that country. Recent violent attacks have been directed not only at military targets, but at foreign aid workers, who are there serving the needs of the Afghan people ... We are concerned that some of those attacks represent a resurgence of support for the Taliban—not only from internal sources, but also from Pakistan.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS43434> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/87793a.pdf (PDF)

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS43436> (Part II PDF)

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East; Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 7 March 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 162p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 75/21

“Unfortunately, putting Afghanistan back together again is likely to take a long time. Even if we knew how to do it, we probably do not have the ability to sustain our interest long enough to get the job done. And if we remain up to our elbows in Afghan internal affairs, so will everyone else. All this foreign interference just makes it infinitely more difficult for the Afghans to sort things out among themselves.”

WHAT NOT TO LEARN FROM AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Department of Defense. William R. Hawkins. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.24-32. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/2

“America is fortunate that Osama bin Laden chose to locate in Afghanistan, a country without ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction—or for that matter, even a conventional army of any size.” Discusses the limited applicability of methods used in Afghanistan to military clashes with better established, trained, and armed combatants.

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02summer/hawkins.htm>

