

—HOMELAND SECURITY EFFORTS and DOMESTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM—

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ADJUDICATORY ISSUES, AND PRIVACY RAMIFICATIONS OF CREATING A DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 43p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 107-96

“How will the amalgamation of the divergent entities into the new department affect their respective administrative procedures? ... Does the Congress need to examine and amend such other related provisions as the Contracts Dispute Act to ensure the new agency has the necessary discretion to properly protect matters of national security? What steps will be taken to ensure the privacy of personally identifiable information as the new agency establishes necessary databases that coordinate with other agencies of Government?”

Online

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/80552.PDF> (PDF)

AGROTERRORISM: OPTIONS IN CONGRESS. Library of Congress. Alejandro E. Segarra. 17 July 2002. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002. 26p. [CRS Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31217

“Some experts estimate that a single agroterrorist attack using a highly contagious livestock disease could cost between \$10 billion and \$30 billion to the U.S. economy. Experts also recognize weaknesses in the ability of most nations to prevent and contain a biological attack on their agricultural resources. Limited inspection capabilities, lack of rapid diagnostic tools, inadequate coordination between inspection agencies, and little biosafety training of farmers, agronomists, and veterinarians are among the recognized weaknesses.”

Online

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31217.pdf> (PDF)

<http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/RL31217.pdf> (PDF)

AIR WAR OVER AMERICA: SEPTEMBER 11 ALTERS FACE OF AIR DEFENSE MISSION. U.S. Department of Defense. Leslie Filson. Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida: Headquarters 1st Air Force, Public Affairs Office; U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 155p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 301.2: W 19/2

“Since September 11, the air sovereignty mission has grown tenfold and has evolved into a mission of full air defense. For months after the attacks, armed fighters, aerial tankers and airborne early warning aircraft flew Combat Air Patrols over American cities and national events—24 hours a day, seven days a week. Aircraft radar detection and command and control capabilities have been radically improved throughout the country through the Herculean labors of the FAA, civilian contractors, airmen, and soldiers. The mission has come full circle. Before the Sept. 11 tragedy, air sovereignty was viewed by some as a ‘sunset mission’—an unnecessary relic of the Cold War. It was hard to envision a nightmare where commercial airliners would be used as fuel-air bombs flown by homicidal pilots. Never before were airline hijackings within the United States considered a military responsibility; they were considered a criminal act and a law enforcement issue. Many things changed that day.”

AMERICA STILL UNPREPARED—AMERICA STILL IN DANGER: THE OCTOBER 2002 HART-RUDMAN TERRORISM TASK FORCE REPORT. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 November 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 118p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-978

“The task force report is chilling to read, and its conclusion is even more disturbing. It reads, and I quote, ‘A year after September 11th, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In all likelihood, the next attack will result in even greater casualties and widespread destruction to American lives and the economy,’ end quote.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36085> (PDF)

AMERICA'S MAIN STREET: THE FUTURE OF PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on the District of Columbia. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 21 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 154p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: AM 3/16

“The purpose of our hearing today ... is to reexamine the blockading of Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House that took place nearly 6 years ago. We want to

know how and whether the safety and security of the White House has been enhanced by that closure, and whether the Secret Service still believes keeping the avenue closed is necessary. We're going to look at the various negative aspects of the avenue's closing, the adverse impacts on the District of Columbia—on traffic flow, air quality, business activity, revenue loss for the city government.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17346>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17347> (PDF)

THE ARMY AND HOMELAND SECURITY: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE. U.S. Department of Defense. Antulio J. Echevarria II. March 2001. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. 28p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146:

“The Army Staff was assigned to investigate the Army’s role in homeland security from a strategic, rather than a legal or procedural perspective. The author ... exposes potential problem areas—missions requiring more or different force structure than that already available—for further action by the Army. He also recommends that the Army consider alternative force-sizing metrics that include, as a minimum, the high-end homeland security identified in the study.”

Online

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/homeland/homeland.pdf> (PDF)

ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. U.S. Department of Defense. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II. January 2001. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Publications and Production Office, 2001. 30p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2001011337

“We can assume that our enemies and future adversaries have learned from the Gulf War. They are unlikely to confront us conventionally with mass armor formations, air superiority forces, and deep-water naval fleets of their own, all areas of overwhelming U.S. strength today. Instead, they may find new ways to attack our interests, our forces, and our citizens. They will look for ways to match their strengths against our weaknesses.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11023> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/asymetry/asymetry.pdf> (PDF)

THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMB-MAKING INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information. 104th Congress, 1st Session, 11 May 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 72p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.104-729

“Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, a message was transmitted on the Internet which said: ‘Are you interested in receiving information detailing the components and materials needed to construct a bomb identical to the one used in Oklahoma? The information specifically details the construction, deployment, and detonation of high-powered explosives. It also includes complete details of the bomb used in Oklahoma City, and how it was used and how it could have been better.’”

BALANCING SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Library of Congress. Dana A. Shea. 2 February 2004. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004. 32p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31695

“There is a lack of consensus regarding what is the best method to balance scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of classification of research results is most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists ... is a better approach ... Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is another option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either at the funding stage or before publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative.”

Online

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31695.pdf> (PDF)

BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS AND THE MODERN FACE OF TERROR: NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 14 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDocs# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-657

“After the September 11 attacks many Americans began to wonder how the hijackers were able to succeed in their plans. How could a large group of coordinated terrorists operate for more than a year in the United States without being detected and then get on four different airliners in a single morning without being stopped? The answer to this question is that we could not identify them. We did not know they were here.

Only if we can identify terrorists planning attacks on the United States do we have a chance of stopping them. And the biometrics technology, the state-of-the-art technology of today, really offers us a very new way to identify potential terrorists.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23793> (PDF)

BORDER SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims. 104th Congress, 1st Session, 10 March 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. 152p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 104/13

“Today’s hearing will focus on prevention strategies. We will address deportation issues in a subsequent hearing. Preventing the entry of illegal aliens requires screening of visa applicants overseas, examining persons arriving in the United States at airports, seaports and land borders, and securing the land borders of our Nation.”

BORDER SECURITY: HOW ARE STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS COPING WITH THE NEW LEVELS OF THREAT? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 12 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 108p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.108-72

“A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Increasing airport security in New York or Los Angeles accomplishes very little if passengers can fly into Minneapolis instead. Efforts to tighten border security traffic in Washington State may merely divert traffic to International Falls. And finally, increasing protection in the ports of Boston or New Orleans is not very effective if ships are also unloading in Duluth, and we don’t deal with the issues in Duluth.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS35720> (PDF)

BORDER SECURITY: NEW POLICIES AND INCREASED INTERAGENCY COORDINATION NEEDED TO IMPROVE VISA PROCESS: STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD. U.S. General Accounting Office. 15 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 14p. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: GAO-03-1013 T

“Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and increased agency coordination and

information sharing. In our October 2002 report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that: State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when issuing visas; and State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37638> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031013t.pdf> (PDF)

BORDER SECURITY: NEW POLICIES AND PROCEDURES NEEDED TO FILL GAPS IN THE VISA REVOCATION PROCESS. U.S. General Accounting Office. June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 54p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-03-798

“The U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. Further, State, INS, and the FBI do not have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials said they use the revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the country, but none of the agencies has a policy that covers investigating, locating, and taking action when a visa holder has already entered. This lack of written policies and procedures has contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the possibility of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37428> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03798.pdf> (PDF)

BORDER TECHNOLOGY: KEEPING TERRORISTS OUT OF THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security; Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 12 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 81p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.108-148

“There are really three primary parts of the hearing ... The first is to identify how far along the administration and the Congress have come to implement the technology systems that we have mandated specifically in the Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002; second, to examine the current Customs infrastructure and

technology policies, and identify future infrastructure and technology needs at our land ports of entry; and, third, to examine the technology and border needs in between the ports of entry...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS40428> (PDF)

BREACHES OF SECURITY AT FEDERAL AGENCIES AND AIRPORTS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 May 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 23p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 106/95

“Today’s hearing provides a timely opportunity for Congress to examine just how secure or insecure our agencies and buildings really are. We will also have a chance to look at how easily available bogus police badges are, and how they can be put to dangerous use to penetrate secure Federal agencies and our airports, and other buildings for that matter ... stolen and counterfeit police badges are readily available on the Internet and from other commercial sources, and ... can be used by criminals, terrorists, and foreign intelligence agents for illegal purposes, including penetrating our Nation’s most secure government buildings, airports, and other facilities. Legislation addressing this concern is currently pending before this subcommittee.”

BUS AND TRUCK SECURITY AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LICENSING. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 10 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 75p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. C 73/7: S.HRG.107-1029

“On October 4, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh indicted 20 people on charges of fraudulently obtaining commercial driver’s licenses, including licenses to haul very dangerous hazardous materials. In September, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested an individual linked to Osama bin Laden who had a hazardous materials driver’s license issued by the State of Michigan. While we require employment and criminal background checks for aviation employees, we do not require such background checks for truck drivers who are seeking licenses to haul hazardous materials. We could potentially look at requiring companies that are hauling hazardous materials to create security plans, including verifying the identification of their drivers picking up the hazardous material cargo.”

CARGO CONTAINERS: THE NEXT TERRORIST TARGET? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 20 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 106p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG. 108-55

“There are more than 12 million cargo containers in the worldwide inventory. These containers move back and forth among major seaports more than 200 million times a year. Every day, more than 21,000 containers arrive at American seaports from foreign countries filled with consumer goods ... in fact, about 90 percent of U.S.-bound cargo moves by container. We must ensure that these containers carry nothing more dangerous than sneakers or sporting goods, not ‘dirty bombs’ or even Al Qaeda terrorists.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34709> (PDF)

CHALLENGES TO U.S. SECURITY IN THE 1990's. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 17 March; 21 April; 9 & 27 June; 1 August 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. 187p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: SE 2/24

“...I would begin, first of all, by avoiding getting into a posture in which we tend to identify the world of Islam with the Islamic fundamentalism. We ought to be very judicious in drawing a distinction between the vast majority of the Islamic believers and Islamic fundamentalists ... Moreover, fundamental religious commitment need not always be anti-American or anti-Western. In many respects Saudi Arabia is a very religiously traditional country, much more so than, let's say, Qadhafi's Libya or Saddam's Iraq, which are less religiously oriented and yet more anti-Western ... But the worst thing we could do is to posture ourselves as the principle opponent of fanatical Islam which, to many Muslims, would have appeared as opposition to Islam itself, and that will help Islamic fundamentalists.”

CIA NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FOR FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THROUGH 2015. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 55p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.107-467

We all fear the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, but our policy cannot be one of constructing moats against imagined threats. We must have a policy that counters real threats in an effective and cost efficient manner. Some of these dangers may, in the medium- to long-term, come from intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27020> (PDF)

COAST GUARD: CHALLENGES DURING THE TRANSITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: STATEMENT OF JAYETTA Z. HECKER, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. U.S. General Accounting Office. 1 April 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 25p. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: GAO-03-594 T

“Data on the most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard’s various missions show clearly the dramatic shifts that have occurred among its missions since the September 11, 2001, attacks. Predictably, levels of effort related to homeland security remain at much higher levels than before September 11th. Other missions, such as search and rescue, have remained at essentially the same levels. In contrast, several other missions—most notably fisheries enforcement and drug interdiction—dropped sharply after September 11th and remain substantially below historical levels. Continued homeland security and military demands make it unlikely that the agency, in the short run, can increase efforts in the missions that have declined. Further, the fiscal year 2004 budget request contains little that would substantially alter the existing levels of effort among missions.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36504> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03594t.pdf> (PDF)

COMBATING DOMESTIC TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. 104th Congress, 1st Session, 3 May 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 189p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 104/52

“The number of lives claimed by the car bomb in Oklahoma City is so large it overwhelms us: over 140 deaths, with still many missing, many never to be truly accounted for because of the force of the blast. The extent of the suffering and the loss is incomprehensible. In the wake of this tragedy, there are those who would express skepticism about congressional hearings and legislation involving terrorism. They would dismiss such efforts as just politicians playing to the public sense of fear and vulnerability. Let me be very clear to those who hold such a view: government has an absolute duty to protect its citizens from terrorism and all other forms of violent crime.”

COMBATING TERRORISM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE DOD ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT. U.S. General Accounting Office. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001. 36p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-01-909

Recommends that the Secretary of Defense “take specific steps to improve implementation of the antiterrorism program and establish a management framework to guide resource allocations and measure the results of antiterrorism improvement efforts.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?recflag=&accno=A01557&rptno=GAO-01-909>
(Abstract Only)

COMBATING TERRORISM: ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL COUNTER TERRORIST EXERCISES.

U.S. General Accounting Office. June 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999. 60p. [Briefing Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD-99-157 BR

The numbers, types, scenarios, and participating agencies involved in federal counterterrorism exercises conducted from June 1995 to June 1998, to assess the level of preparedness of counterterrorism units and plans.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17896> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: ASSESSING THREATS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 July 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 111p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/12

“Using fear and panic as weapons, terrorists seek to amplify and transform crimes against humanity into acts of war. The growing and changing threat of terrorism requires an ongoing public discussion of the appropriate strategy, priorities and resources to protect public health and national security. That discussion brings us here this afternoon. At this point in the evolution of our post cold war response to the new realities of a dangerous world, we should have a dynamic, integrated assessment of the threat posed by foreign and domestic-origin terrorism. We should have a truly national strategy to counter the threat. And to implement that strategy, we should have a clear set of priorities to guide Federal programs and funding decisions.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15083>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15086> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: COORDINATION OF NON-MEDICAL R&D PROGRAMS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 March 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 99p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/9

Current coordination efforts and non-medical research areas in need of greater emphasis to counter terrorism, such as detectors, protective gear, and decontamination equipment.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS9768>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS9769> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: FEDERAL AGENCIES' EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY. U.S. General Accounting Office. September 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997. 112p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD-97-254

“The threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and property is a high-priority U.S. national security and criminal concern. The bombings of the New York City World Trade Center, a federal building in Oklahoma City, and a U.S. military facility in Saudi Arabia, among others, prompted increased emphasis on the need to strengthen the federal government’s ability to effectively combat terrorism, both at home and abroad.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS12749> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: IN SEARCH OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 27 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 159p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/14

“According to our witnesses this morning, the fight against terrorism remains fragmented and unfocused, primarily because no overarching national strategy guides planning, directs spending, or disciplines bureaucratic balkanization ... Terrorists willing to die for their cause will not wait while we rearrange bureaucratic boxes on the organizational chart. Their strategy is clear. Their focus is keen. Their resources

efficiently deployed. Our national security demands greater strategic clarity, sharper focus, and unprecedented coordination to confront the threat of terrorism today.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17320>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17321> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES, PARTS I AND II. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 & 21 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 206p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/19

“How prepared are we for the next act of terrorism? Long before the events of September 11, 2001, panels of experts and special commissions identified critically needed actions to improve counterterrorism preparedness and response. The General Accounting Office, GAO and others, called for timely, integrated threat assessments and a comprehensive national strategy to combat terrorism as early as 1998 ... In the wake of the airline and anthrax attacks last year, air travel has been made somewhat safer, border security strengthened, and medical stockpiles are being augmented...But there are signs the passage of time and pictures of a war being fought on the other side of the world may be inducing a false sense of security here at home. All checked baggage on airlines is not yet being screened. Seaports remain avoidably vulnerable...Medical surge capacity to treat mass casualties is not available in most communities. Inconsistency and blind spots continue to plague disease surveillance efforts...In the war against terrorism, time is not our ally. As we speak, a clock ticks down toward the all but certain hour a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon will be used against us. We are in a race with terrorists to shut them down before that happens.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29629> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: SELECTED CHALLENGES AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS. U.S. General Accounting Office. September 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001. 209p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: 01-822

“Current framework for leadership and coordination of federal agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil, and proposals for change; the progress of the federal government in developing and implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically; the federal government’s capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident; the progress of the federal government in helping state and local emergency

responders prepare for a terrorist attack; and the progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for combating cyber-based attacks.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01822.pdf> (PDF)

<http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/gao-01-822.pdf> (PDF)

COMBATTING TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Indian Affairs. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 29 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 95p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 2/11: S.PRT.108-37

“As the Federal Government begins to build homeland security capacities to meet the threat of terrorism, it should be clear that State, local and tribal governments have a critical role to play as well in homeland security. At the Federal level, it is well known that tribal governments serve as a primary instrument of law enforcement and emergency response for more than 50 million acres of land that comprise Indian Country. What is less obvious to many of those charged with implementing the Homeland Security Act is the extensive nature of infrastructure located on or near tribal lands that is critical to our Nation’s security. For example, dams, hydroelectric facilities, nuclear power generating plants. Many of them are located in or near tribal lands. Oil and gas pipelines, energy resources, transportation corridors or railroads, and highway systems, communication towers, proximity of Indian lands to military reservations, installations and population centers. These factors must be considered and considered seriously.”

CONDUCTING RESEARCH DURING THE WAR ON TERRORISM: BALANCING OPENNESS AND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 157p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SCI 2: 107-90

“The hearing will focus on several overarching questions: (1) What elements of a particular research project or publication trigger concern about the ‘sensitive’ nature of the work or findings? (2) When a research project or publication is thought to include ‘sensitive’ elements, who should determine who is allowed to engage in the work and which findings will be published in the open literature? (3)...Does science truly require openness and are there differences in the need for openness in different scientific communities? (4)...Why and in what ways do today’s threats demand a different kind or level of scientific vigilance than those of the past?”

CONFRONTING THREATS TO SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps,

Narcotics and Terrorism. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 22 June 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 33p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG. 106-234

“Latin America accounted for 110 of the 273 (40 percent) international attacks conducted by terrorist groups according to 1998 Department of State Statistics. Of these attacks, 87 were directed against U.S. interests in Latin America. Almost all the anti-U.S. attacks in Latin America happened in Colombia or were connected to Colombian terrorist groups. Of the 87 anti-U.S. attacks in the region, 77 were bombings of multi-national oil facilities in Colombia, in which U.S. businesses have an interest. An oil pipeline-bombing incident in October killed 71 people and injured more than 100.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS4146> (PDF)

CONSULAR IDENTIFICATION CARDS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 19 & 26 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 197p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 108/31

“In the past few months, increased attention has been directed to the law enforcement and national security implications of local acceptance of consular identification cards ... Historically, foreign governments have issued these cards to enable their citizens abroad to seek consular assistance when they needed help ... the Mexican Government redesigned their consular identification card known as the Matricula Consular and began promoting it for local acceptance in the United States...To date, more than 402 localities, 32 counties, 122 financial institutions and 908 law enforcement agencies accept the Matricula for identification purposes.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS35785> (PDF)

COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS USED TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES FROM CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES NOT DETECTED: STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. CRAMER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS. U.S. General Accounting Office. 13 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 6p. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: GAO-03-713 T

“We recognize that weaknesses in inspection processes for entrants into the United States raise complex issues, and we are currently performing an evaluation of those processes, which will be reported to Congress in the coming months. Although BCBP

inspects millions of people who enter the United States and detects thousands of individuals who attempt to enter illegally each year, the results of our work indicate that BCBP inspectors are not readily capable of detecting counterfeit identification documents. Further, people who enter the United States are not always asked to present identification. While current law does not require that U.S. Citizens who enter the U.S. from Western Hemisphere countries provide documentary proof of U.S. citizenship, this does provide an opportunity for individuals to enter the United States illegally.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37067> (PDF)

COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 June 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 38p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG. 106-848

“And the face of terrorism itself has changed significantly over the last quarter of a century. The Soviet bloc, which once supported terrorist groups, no longer exists. While some states like Iran continue to support terrorist groups, other groups like the terrorists financed and led by Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden are not state-sponsored. These groups have varying motives and are more difficult to track and deter. These new terrorist groups have demonstrated the desire and capability to reach large portions of the globe. Bin Laden was responsible for the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa, and according to press reports, U.S. intelligence agencies discovered and thwarted his plans to attack other U.S. embassies and a military base in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a growing share of terrorist attacks are intended to kill as many people as possible ... the World Trade Center bombing killed 6 and injured about 1,000 people. But the terrorists’ goal was to topple the twin towers, killing tens of thousands of people. More recently, terrorists have expressed growing interest in more lethal means, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10958>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10959> (PDF)

COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF TERRORISM: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 15 June 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 60p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-867

“The motives of terrorists seem to be changing, and we have to be concerned about the possibility that terrorist groups will resort to, what we call, catastrophic terrorism acts, which are designed to kill not hundreds, but perhaps tens of thousands of Americans.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10303>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10304> (PDF)

COUNTERTERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. 105th Congress, 1st Session, 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 45p. [Special Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AP 6/2: S.HRG.105-383

Clinton Administration’s strategy, objectives, international cooperation, training strategy, prevention of terrorism, congressional involvement, reducing vulnerabilities through preparation, source of terrorism, domestic terrorism, FBI roles and responsibilities, working technology, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Activity, prosecution of crimes, Olympic lessons learned, Internet excerpts, intelligence collection, evidence development, translation centers, integrated force training, organized crime, defense budget, counterterrorism support, enactment of laws.

CRUISE MISSILE AND UAV THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 June 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 75p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG. 107-558

“During the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, United States and coalition troops found an American manual on how to operate a remotely-controlled unmanned helicopter in an al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27064> (PDF)

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 105th Congress, 1st Session, 6 February 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 133p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG. 105-201

“International terrorist groups have developed large transnational infrastructures, which in some cases literally circle the globe. These networks may involve more than one like-minded group, with each group assisting the others. The terrorists use these infrastructures for a variety of purposes, including finance, recruitment, the shipment of arms and material, and the movement of operatives. With regard to finance, we have seen increasingly complicated channels for soliciting and moving funds, including the use of seemingly legitimate charitable or other nongovernmental organizations as conduits for the money.”

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 January 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 177p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.105-587

“...the threat to US interests and citizens worldwide remains high...there has been a trend toward increasing lethality of attacks, especially against civilian targets...Perhaps most worrisome, we have seen in the last year growing indications of terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons...Among specific countries, Iran remains a major concern...Iraq, Sudan, and Libya also bear continued watching, both for their own activities and for their support of terrorist organizations.”

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 2 February 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 53p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.106-580

“Increasingly, where attacks occur does not fully reflect the origin of the threat. The far-flung reach of Usama bin Ladin (UBL) from his base in Afghanistan is reflected in a continuous flurry of threats by his organization on almost every continent ... his transnational network and the devastating example of his 1998 attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania make him the primary threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS5941>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS5942> (PDF)

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 7 February 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.107-2

“The proliferation of ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction; new and more threatening types of international terrorism; regional threats to U.S. interests; asymmetric threats designed to circumvent U.S. strengths and target our vulnerabilities; the evolving foreign counterintelligence threat; narcotics trafficking and international criminal organizations.” Also “the proliferation of encryption technology, the increasing sophistication of denial and deception techniques, the need to modernize and to recapitalize the National Security Agency, and other shortfalls in intelligence funding.”

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 348p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.107-597

“To say the least, the post-Cold War period has been one of difficult transition. Even before September 11, we had a rocky history of intelligence failures—among them, the bombing of Khobar Towers, the Indian nuclear test, the bombing of our East African embassies, the first attack on the World Trade Center buildings, and the attack upon the USS COLE. Examined individually, each of these failures, tragic in their own way, may not suggest a continuing or systemic problem. But, however, taken as a whole and culminating with the events of September 11, they represent a disturbing series of intelligence shortfalls that I believe expose some serious problems in the structure of and approaches taken by our intelligence community.”

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 348p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.107-597/CORR.

“While the intelligence community has been aware of the great threat posed by bin Laden and his terrorist organization, it is a priority of this Committee to ascertain what more the intelligence community could have done to avert the September 11 tragedy. We must identify any systemic shortcomings in our intelligence community and fix those as soon as possible. We owe it to the American people to do all that we can to prevent a recurrence of September 11.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23811> (PDF)

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 11 February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 239p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.108-161

“We must also confront the acute threats from what is less traditional and often referred to as ‘asymmetrical.’ As we are all painfully aware, our country faces a great and continuing threat from international terrorism, especially the group of mass murderers of the al-Qa’ida network. As we will hear from our witnesses today, while our intelligence agencies and our military forces have won some very tremendous and important victories against al-Qa’ida during the last year and a half, there is much, much left to do. As we have all recently heard, plans to attack us and our interests abroad are continuously in motion. We are on high alert...our intelligence agencies have too often failed to provide the timely, the cogent and the comprehensive analysis that our national security requires.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42906> (PDF)

CUSTOMS AND INS: INFORMATION ON INSPECTION, INFRASTRUCTURE, TRAFFIC FLOW, AND SECURITY MATTERS AT THE DETROIT PORT OF ENTRY. U.S. General Accounting Office. 22 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002. 25p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: 02-595 R

“The Detroit area has two land-border crossings: the Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario. Daily, thousands of cars and trucks cross over the bridge or use the tunnel. Fiscal year 2001 traffic volumes over the bridge averaged approximately 10,800 passenger vehicles and 240 trucks each day ... Immediately after September 11, Customs and INS increased the number and thoroughness of inspections and questioned all bridge and tunnel travelers. This effort resulted in truck wait times of over 10 hours in the first few days ... Balancing enforcement of border security and facilitating travel and commerce is a major challenge for Customs and INS inspectors assigned to our borders.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02595r.pdf> (PDF)

DEALING WITH FOREIGN STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM: VISA BACKLOGS AND TRACKING SYSTEMS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 26 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 92p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SCI 2: 108-9

“Since the most recent terrorist attacks ... strengthening the visa process as an anti-terrorism tool has taken on greater significance—especially since all 19 of the hijackers entered the U.S. on visas. The State Department has acknowledged the

resulting delays and the backlog, and high-level Administration officials have described the current backlog situation as a 'crisis'."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34523> (PDF)

DEFEATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIC ISSUE ANALYSES. U.S. Department of Defense. John R. Martin. January 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 108p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002014098

"The war on terrorism will require a restructuring of the military; it is less apparent that the military will have to grow significantly. In particular, the homeland defense mission will require a heretofore missing emphasis that will necessitate quantitative and qualitative changes in the active and reserve components. The defense establishment needs to place a high priority on defining the requirements; apportioning them appropriately; and developing the forces necessary to fight the war on terrorism, defend the homeland, maintain strategic balance and adapt and accelerate transformation. Any expansion of the war requires a clear-cut rationale—both international and domestic."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18654> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/terror/terror.pdf> (PDF)

DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE: THE PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS [PSI] BACKLOG POSES A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 24 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 41p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 107-767

"There are no common standards for investigating and adjudicating a personnel security clearing in a timely manner ... Each year thousands of classified programs and projects are carried out by the U.S. Government. These activities generate millions of items of classified documents and information used by the military, civilian and contract employees. This classified information is not only in the form of documents. An enormous inventory of classified equipment and components must be safeguarded. Increasingly, classified data is being processed, transmitted and stored electronically, posing serious new problems of protection."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25077>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25078> (PDF)

DEPLOYMENT AND USE OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Aviation. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 11 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 139p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. T 68/2: 107-52

“...today our subcommittee must carefully examine several vital questions relating to aviation and airport security. First, why has Federal policy and rulemaking relating to airport security technology failed? Second, why is it so difficult for the Federal Government to acquire the best air security technology? Third, why is the Federal Government negligent in deploying the best aviation security technology? Fourth, why has the best aviation security technology for detection and oversight been tested and not fully deployed?”

DOES AMERICA NEED A NATIONAL IDENTIFIER? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 16 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 190p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: AM 3/17

“Technology is one of America’s greatest strengths. In recent weeks, some have called for using that technology to combat terrorism by developing a national identification system. Proponents of such a system argue that a high-tech national identifier system would allow authorities to spot terrorists before they attack ... Those who oppose such a system are concerned about the impact a national identifier system would have been on the very precepts of America’s freedoms.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25016> (PDF)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: APPLICABILITY OF THE MI-5 MODEL TO THE UNITED STATES. Library of Congress. Todd Masse. 19 May 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003. 15p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31920

“At the political level, one fundamental difference between the British and United States’ system of democratic governance is that while Britain does not have a written constitution which specifies the rights of individuals, the United States does. Moreover, the British system focuses national political power in a unitary Parliament, while in the United States power is shared through federalism. Such differences have

important consequences for how individual rights and freedom are weighed against a nation states' obligation to provide security for its population.”

Online

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf> (PDF)

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: THE CANADIAN APPROACH. U.S. Department of Defense. Sean M. Maloney. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn 1997. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1997. p.135-152. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 27/3

“The application of military force by a democratic government within the confines of its borders, and in some cases against its citizenry, has long been a controversial and politically sensitive topic. Though that is not a new type of operation for either the American or the Canadian military establishments, the nature of the threats each is being asked to confront has evolved. The threats now include (in addition to natural disasters and minor urban unrest) cult groups armed with weapons of mass destruction, agents of narco-parastates in Latin and South America, organized and armed urban unrest, and the violent potential of private paramilitary groups. It is safe to assert that threats to North American domestic security will increase in nature, scope, and number in the next century. This in turn will presumably prompt more debate on and calls for an increase in the military’s role in containing and neutralizing those threats.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/maloney.htm>

DOMESTIC TERRORISM. National Governors’ Association. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, 1978. 209p. [Report].

SuDoc# D 14.2: T 27

“This report contains a review of definitions of terrorism, a discussion of international and domestic trends in terrorism, and identification of terrorist groups which, according to newspaper reports, are active in the United States. The report summarizes Governors’ state legislated authorities related to terrorism management, and abstracts federal legislation related to terrorism. The report also identifies sources of assistance provided by federal agencies ... This report does not attempt to point out specific methods of managing terroristic incidents...”

DRIVER’S LICENSE SECURITY ISSUES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Highways and Transit. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 5 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 168p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. T 68/2: 107-93

“We are now more concerned about the immigrant status of the applicant and whether they might be on a terrorist watch list at the FBI or the CIA. In short, we are now more aware of issues the States and the Federal Government did not coordinate and share as effectively as they might have before September 11th.”

EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION CONTROLS TO DETER TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 17 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 76p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-651

“Strengthening the security of our borders is an indispensable part of this Nation’s effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact laws that meet the serious security threats we face from abroad, and we must do so without obstructing the entry of the more than 31 million foreign nationals who legally enter the United States each year.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23268>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23269> (PDF)

ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 February 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 93p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.106-1063

“Today we will address the issue of enhancing border security. On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressay was arrested after attempting to enter Port Angeles, WA. He was found with nitroglycerin and other potential bomb-making material. He was successfully apprehended, but he will not be the last one to try.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15365>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15366> (PDF)

ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 104p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: B 64/4

“...the ramifications of moving our emphasis away from cargo inspections at the border toward inspections at the point of origin. In theory this would speed cargo through the ports of entry and eliminate what could be substantial delays as well as allow Customs inspectors to focus their inspection efforts on high risk cargo shipments. As the sheer volume of cargo shipments increases, it is clear that dramatically increasing preclearances will be required ... we will examine the related issue of expediting the movement of travelers ... Both Customs and the INS are moving forward with the modernization of computer databases and automated systems ... several proposals have been made to consolidate the various agencies responsible for border management ... Congress needs specific information about what problems would be solved by the agency merger, what activities would be enhanced, and what difficulties caused by the merger would have to be overcome.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34097> (PDF)

ENSURING THE RELIABILITY OF TRACE EXPLOSIVE DETECTORS. U.S. Department of Commerce. National Institute of Standards and Technology. *NIST Update*. 27 May 2003. Gaithersburg, Maryland: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003. 1p. [Article].

SuDoc# C 13.36/7: 2003/May 27

“In an effort to enhance homeland security, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) chemists are developing new ways to ‘see’ collections of micrometer-sized particles of explosive materials. The techniques will help ensure that equipment for screening airport passengers, baggage and cargo operates reliably.”

Online

http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/update/upd20030527.htm

FBI BOMB DATA CENTER: 1999 BOMBING INCIDENTS. U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003. 26p. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/7-7: 999

“In June of this year, the FBI added Usama Bin Laden to its Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list for his alleged role in the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998 ... In August, U.S. and Canadian authorities thwarted Alfred Heinz Reumayr’s alleged plans to bomb portions of the Trans Alaska pipeline System in an apparent attempt to manipulate petroleum financial markets and cause general mayhem and financial terror ... In December, as Millennium concerns began to heighten, U.S. Customs Service agents intercepted Ahmed Ressam, a 34-year-old Algerian, and his explosives-laden rental vehicle on a ferry at a U.S.-Canadian border crossing near Seattle, Washington ...

Ressam admitted he planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the Millennium celebrations.”

FBI BOMB CENTER 1998 BOMBING INCIDENTS. U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999. 26p. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/7-7: 998

“Law enforcement is a difficult enough challenge without the added risk of improvised explosive devices. The damage wrought by bombs is extremely ominous, striking random, innocent victims, as seen in the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998. Specifically, 291 persons were killed and approximately 5,000 more were injured in Nairobi, Kenya. Although Kenyan citizens sustained the majority of these casualties, there were also 12 U.S. citizens killed and six injured. The bombing incident in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania killed ten Tanzanians, including seven local Embassy employees. In addition, there were 77 persons injured, including one U.S. citizen.”

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY: CHALLENGES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 129p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 107-794

“The threats facing our nation are interrelated, but they are not the same, and each of them requires a somewhat different strategy. The agencies entrusted with protecting our borders and ports of entry—chiefly the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (including the U.S. Border Patrol), and the U.S. Coast Guard—must often make difficult choices when deciding how to use limited resources to meet these varied threats. How much emphasis should be placed on preventing terrorist attacks? How much on stopping the smuggling of narcotics and preventing illegal aliens from entering the country? Law enforcement at the border requires a strategy that can meet all of these threats.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30780>

FINANCIAL WAR ON TERRORISM: NEW MONEY TRAILS PRESENT FRESH CHALLENGES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 57p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49: S.HRG.107-880

“Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the U.S. Government, in conjunction with our international partners, launched a global war against terrorist

financing networks. Since the brutal attacks, \$112 million in terrorist assets have been frozen worldwide in over 500 accounts; \$34 million of those assets are frozen in the United States. Under actions taken by the administrator, more than 230 individuals, entities and organizations are currently designated as supporters of terrorism. This includes 112 individuals ranging from organization leaders such as Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants, to terrorist operatives. The list also includes 74 other companies and charitable organizations identified as supporting terrorism.”

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: WORKFORCE PLANNING COULD HELP ADDRESS STAFFING AND PROFICIENCY SHORTFALLS: STATEMENT OF SUSAN S. WESTIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE. U.S. General Accounting Office. March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-02-514 T

“Foreign language skills are increasingly needed to support traditional diplomatic efforts and public diplomacy programs, military and peacekeeping missions, intelligence collection, counterterrorism efforts, and international trade.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS38374> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02514t.pdf> (PDF)

FOREIGN TERRORISTS IN AMERICA: FIVE YEARS AFTER THE WORLD TRADE CENTER. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 24 February 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 179p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.105-703

“Examining the extent of and policies to prevent foreign terrorist operations in America.”

GOVERNMENTWIDE SPENDING TO COMBAT TERRORISM: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE VIEWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 11 March 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 24p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: SP 3

“Events like the World Trade Center bombing and the release of poison gas in a Tokyo subway crystallize our fears and galvanize our determination to confront terrorism ... We ask how priorities are set, how risks are measured and how responses are designed to augment, not duplicate or replace existing local, State and Federal

capabilities. These are not easy questions. By its very nature terrorism is unpredictable, even irrational, and may confound standard methods of risk analysis.”

THE HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION AND THE HOMELAND DEFENSE. U.S. Department of Defense. Ian Roxborough. September 2001. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. 41p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2001043684

“The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, popularly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its chairs, has recently produced a series of reports. The Commission believes that recent changes in the security environment mean the rise of new threats, in particular the likelihood of an attack on American soil resulting in thousands of casualties. As a consequence, the commission calls for major changes in the organization of national security institutions in order to respond adequately to these new challenges. This monograph discusses the assumptions underlying the diagnosis and threat assessment made by the commission ... this notion that globalization is likely to produce a backlash from Third World, and particularly Islamic societies, has very little to support it. The monograph argues that the work of the commission is based on poor social science and that there is the risk that this has produced an inaccurate diagnosis of the causes of conflict in the 21st century. The commission believes that fundamentally we are moving into an era of global cultural conflict. This is speculative, and there is little in the way of hard evidence to support such an assertion.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14778> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/hartrud/hartrud.pdf> (PDF)

HEARING ON E-CONGRESS—USING TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 May 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 47p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. H 81/3: T 22/2

“Today we are here to talk about how technology can help the Congress operate in the event of an emergency. This committee is charged with ensuring that the essential infrastructure of Congress continues under any circumstances. This sounds simple, and when everything is going well, it largely goes unnoticed, but it involves tremendous effort, planning, coordination, staff, computers, phones, communications, voting procedures, physical space, security, access to external/internal information, services, and the list goes on and on. This committee learned this well when we moved thousands of the police off site as our Capitol was attacked with a biological weapon.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31249>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31250> (PDF)

HEARING ON SECURITY UPDATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 34p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. H 81/3: SE 3

“The purpose of this hearing today is to step back a moment from the hurried pace that we have all been proceeding under the past year to address the new security realities and the way the systems operate here in the U.S. Capitol since September 11, 2001, and to take measure of how far we have come and where we want to focus our time and resources as we move forward beyond the first anniversary of that terrible day for our nation.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41157>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41158> (PDF)

HOMELAND DEFENSE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 25 September 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 38p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-604

“We are making progress on a number of things; for example, authorizing the use of roving or multi-point wiretaps in intelligence investigations under FISA ... Update the money laundering, RICO and wiretap laws to make terrorism offenses predicates for exercising authorities under those laws ... make certain that we do all we can for the families of the police and firefighters and other law enforcement and public safety personnel on whom we depend and many of whom have made the ultimate sacrifice ... We have to make sure that our definition of ‘terrorism’ fits the crime ... We have to review the penalty structure for terrorism crimes ... Review immigration authorities and see how they can be improved; increase Federal agents and capabilities along our northern border.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22550>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22551> (PDF)

HOMELAND DEFENSE: EXPLORING THE HART-RUDMAN REPORT. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 3 April 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 32p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-239

“We are poised to begin a new era, and all of the recent commission reports have emphasized the changing nature of the challenges to the security of our Nation and our people and our interests abroad. Although we’re considered by most to be the sole superpower in a complex world, capable of projecting power around the globe, the security of our citizens, both at home and abroad, is threatened. Terrorist organizations and state that support terrorism have recognized the need to attack the U.S. in an asymmetric fashion, spending time and resources to locate seams in our protection before striking. From the tragedy of the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, to the horrific destruction of the Federal building in Oklahoma City, the last decade has witnessed an increase in the scale of devastation sough by terrorists within our borders. As deadly and devastating as these two attacks were, imagine the level of carnage if those responsible had been more technically proficient or had weapons of mass destruction. And as the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa and the USS Cole demonstrate, Americans abroad remain tempting targets for terrorism.”

HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 80p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AG 8/3: S.HRG.107-918

“Protecting our borders and keeping our residents safe from harm is our Government’s highest priority and represents an increasingly big challenge to all of us. President Bush’s proposal for a new Department of Homeland Security included a call for the transfer of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, APHIS, but recently the administration has indicated it is agreeable to some of the provisions that they worked out with the House in terms of transferring some of APHIS’ functions regarding Plum Island and some border security.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31545> (PDF)

HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 86p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. EN 2: S.HRG.107-776

“On the present and future roles of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration National Laboratory in protecting our homeland security.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26028>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26029> (PDF)

HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 16 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 38p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. L 11/4: S.HRG.107-583

“Examining the President’s proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security, focusing on its impact on public health preparedness programs, and on the collective bargaining rights of certain union workers.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25811>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25812> (PDF)

HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 & 11 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 335p. [Special Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AP 6/2: S.HRG.107-410

“While the President has advanced a plan since September 11th which the Congress has begun to fund, there is still significant work to be finished before we have in place the necessary protection and capacities to respond to both the threat of acts of terrorism and the consequences of such acts. In particular, we need a statutory structure that will enable the various agencies of both the states and the federal government to coordinate and build a federal, state and local capacity to fully respond to acts of terrorism, including acts involving weapons of mass destruction. We must do more to ensure that states and localities have the needed resources, training and equipment to respond...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19465>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19466> (PDF)

HOMELAND SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 16 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 99p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49: S.HRG.107-875

“Specifically, we are interested in the President’s proposal to remove Customs functions from the Department of Treasury and integrate them into the new Department of Homeland Security ... In fiscal year 2001, the Customs Service processed over 25 million formal entries of cargo ... a 65 percent increase from only 5 years earlier. The cargo that was processed hit a value of over \$1 trillion. Customs collected about \$20 billion in duties, taxes, and fees on that cargo. That makes Customs duties the second most important source of revenue to the U.S. Government, after income taxes. Moreover, Customs’ job has grown beyond the collection of duties, a complicated process in itself. Customs must enforce a multitude of commercial and other laws on behalf of itself and over 40 other Federal agencies.”

HOMELAND SECURITY: TRACKING INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION—PROGRESS AND ISSUES SINCE 9/11. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce. Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness and Subcommittee on Select Education. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 24 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 146p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. ED 8/1: 107-79

“We are here today to learn about the implementation of the Student Exchange and Visitor Information System, otherwise referred to as SEVIS, what issues are still outstanding in having it fully operational and what the interactions between all the players, that is, institutions of higher education, INS, and the State Department, have been ... Clearly, security for the citizens of the United States must be our priority ... having said that, we also want to ensure that students from around the world continue to have access to the best postsecondary education system available. We also want to continue the sharing of cultures and ideas, which makes the world in which we live safer and overall by removing many stereotypes and misconceptions.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26164> (PDF)

HOW MUCH ARE AMERICANS AT RISK UNTIL CONGRESS PASSES TERRORISM INSURANCE PROTECTION? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 206p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49/20: 107-57

“It is clear that the current lack of terrorism coverage acts as a chill factor restraining our economy, which is struggling to recover from recession. Businesses, particularly in cities and near targets, seeking to build are being required to carry terrorism insurance ... there is little or no terrorism coverage available and hence some new construction is being stopped before it can even start. This is causing the loss of new jobs at a time when creating jobs should be one of our highest priorities.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23252> (PDF)

IMMIGRATION POLICY: AN OVERVIEW. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 4 April 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 72p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-249

Immigration and Naturalization Service strengths and weaknesses, current and future challenges.

IMPLEMENTING THE SAFETY ACT: ADVANCING NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 17 October 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 180p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: SA 1/3

“As part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, Congress enacted the SAFETY Act to provide incentives for the development and deployment of antiterrorism technologies by creating systems of risk management and litigation management. The SAFETY Act seeks to ensure that the threat of liability does not deter manufacturers or sellers of antiterrorism technologies from developing and commercializing technologies that could save lives. The act creates certain frameworks for ‘claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism’ where qualified antiterrorism technologies are deployed. The act does not limit liability for harms caused by antiterrorism technologies when no acts of terrorism have occurred.”

IMPROVING SECURITY AND FACILITATING COMMERCE AT THE NORTHERN BORDER. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources; Select Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 19 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 142p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: SE 2/25/2003

“The State Department is now warning there are other soft targets around the world in danger. It’s a real threat to our national security that brings us here today. We may be thousands of miles away from Morocco or Saudi Arabia, but the terrorists persist. So we’re here to talk about the things we can do to make sure we can be ready if anything does happen. As we sit around the great falls, it represents extraordinary power. There’s also marks on the northern border and the huge vulnerability. U.S.-Canadian border is 5,525 miles long, in some areas it’s pretty remote. Securing is not an easy task. Unlike the southern border, where we’ve poured resources into security for years, we considered security around the northern border less of a priority because it was not necessary.”

IMPROVING SECURITY AND FACILITATING COMMERCE AT THE NORTHERN BORDER.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 10 December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 149p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: SE 2/25

“The attacks of September 11th have only heightened our sense of urgency in dealing with the terrorist threat as well as the problems of narcotic interdiction and illegal immigration. At the same time, long delays at border crossings and a sharp reduction in commercial and commuter traffic resulting from the increased security measures put in place after September 11th have raised concerns about the effect of these policies on trade, tourism and travel ... Congress has been considering numerous proposals to deal with these problems, and our subcommittee is open to exploring all of them.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27485> (PDF)

IMPROVING SECURITY AND FACILITATING COMMERCE AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 31 January 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 305p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: SE 2/26

“We will focus on what new resources are needed for the Federal Government to most effectively administer the border crossing, as well as what new policies could be pursued to ease the burden placed on commerce, travel, and tourism. We will also explore how the new emphasis on preventing terrorism may affect the ability of these agencies to carry out their other vital missions.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS28993> (PDF)

THE INESCAPABLE GLOBAL SECURITY ARENA. U.S. Department of Defense. Max G. Manwaring. April 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 41p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146:

“Global political violence is clashing with global economic integration. More often than not, the causes and consequences of the resultant instabilities tend to be exploited by such destabilizers as rogue states, substate and transnational political actors, insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, ethnic cleansers, militant fundamentalists, and 1,000 other ‘snakes with a cause’—and the will to conduct terrorist and other asymmetric warfare. The intent is to impose self-determined desires for ‘change’ on a society, nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global community—and, perhaps, revert to the questionable glories of the 12th century. In these conditions—exacerbated by the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and by the devastating U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan subsequently—the United States has little choice but to reexamine and rethink national and global stability and security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.”

Online

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/global/global.pdf> (PDF)

THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY. U.S. Department of Defense. Thomas E. Copeland. August 2000. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000. 143p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2001034905

“The technological threats most often discussed in public—cyber-terrorists, hackers, and asymmetrical attacks—are not as yet as significant as some of the dominant policy debates suggest. We have seen very little evidence of cyber-terror attacks. Although the information revolution has created vulnerabilities and expanded the scope for criminal activity, most hackers are juveniles who thus far have done little damage against relatively unimportant targets, using fairly simple tactics like denial-of-service. As a type of asymmetrical threat, terrorism in the past has benefited from technological advances like the jetliner and television. But while terrorists certainly make use of the latest technologies, they still rely primarily on tried-and-true tactics and weapons. Terrorists face serious challenges in acquiring the technological tools, expertise, and access needed to successfully attack critical information systems. Thus the information revolution has not yet brought new kinds of terrorist threats, but it has increased the power available to traditional terror groups and other opportunists.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11783> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2000/inforev/inforev.pdf> (PDF)

INFORMATION SECURITY: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY IMPLEMENT REFORM LEGISLATION: STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. DACEY, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY ISSUES. U.S. General Accounting Office. 6 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002. 34p. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: 02-470 T

Efforts by the Federal Government to implement the Government Information Security Reform provisions enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. Describes improvement efforts regarding the protection of federal agency computer systems and the benefits of those improvements. Evaluates the actions of the Office of Management and Budget, twenty-four of the largest federal agencies, and those agency's inspectors general to implement the reform provisions.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS38394> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02470t.pdf> (PDF)

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT R&D FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 May 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 114p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: H 75/18

“Our purpose ... is to examine the nexus between intellectual property and procurement. The underlying issue is whether current intellectual property laws and practices prevent the Federal Government from gaining access to the very best and most up-to-date technological advances ... If the government's intellectual property laws are inhibiting agencies from gaining access to advanced R&D needed for homeland security, that is something we need to know about ...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34866> (PDF)

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Library of Congress. Richard A. Best. 6 October 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. 16p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: IB10012

“Priority continues to be placed on intelligence support to military operations and on involvement in efforts to combat transnational threats, especially international terrorism. Growing concerns about transnational threats are leading to increasingly close cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This relationship is complicated, however, by differing roles and missions as well as statutory charters.”

Online

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/25374.pdf> (PDF)

INTELLIGENCE TO COUNTER TERRORISM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS. Library of Congress. Richard A. Best. 27 May 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. 19p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31292

“...the Intelligence Community gave no specific warning of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although all observers grant that terrorist groups are very difficult targets and that undetected movements of small numbers of their members in an open society cannot realistically be prevented, serious questions remain. An extensive investigation by the two intelligence committees of the September 11 attacks was undertaken in 2002. Although the final report is not yet public, the committee members found that the Intelligence Community, prior to 9/11, was neither well organized nor equipped to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the U.S.”

Online

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21217.pdf> (PDF)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1985. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science. Subcommittee on International Operations. 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 5 & 21 March; 25 June 1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 339p. [Hearing & Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IN 8/67/985

“This committee has been working diligently with the Department of State on all of the associated problems of international terrorism and the protection of U.S. diplomats abroad. One of the key points which this committee is interested in is the streamlining of the chain of command with respect to the Department’s response to international terrorism and security-related problems. In addition to the overall responsibilities of the Office for Combating Terrorism, we will also focus our attention on the Title II antiterrorism training assistance program. This program, which is administered by the Office for Combating Terrorism, was authorized by the Congress two years ago in order to assist friendly foreign governments to combat terrorism and to better coordinate their efforts with the United States.”

THE INTERVENTION DEBATE: TOWARDS A POSTURE OF PRINCIPLED JUDGMENT.

U.S. Department of Defense. John Garofano. January 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 95p. [Online Report].

“Despite a decade with which to absorb and adapt to the implications of the end of the Cold War, the United States has not settled on a basic disposition towards the use of force. A debate continues between two main camps, force proponents and force conservers, defined by diverging views on the costs, risks, and effectiveness of using U.S. military force for traditional and emerging challenges. Realists and idealists, Democrats and Republicans can be found in each of these two groups. The debate was temporarily submerged in the unity that emerged following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Yet by the end of that month, the administration’s stand on the force-conserving side of the debate was already shaping U.S. strategy by eschewing operations that could lead to nation-building and humanitarian operations ... The two poles in the debate may be summarized as follows. Force proponents consider military power merely the first among equally valid instruments of national power, suitable for shaping the security environment as well as for responding to direct challenges to important or vital U.S. interests ... Force conservers, on the other hand, believe that recent administrations have wasted precious resources on idealistic and perhaps politically-driven adventures. Such activities, argue these critics of the frequent use of force, weaken the country’s ability to defend against the threats that truly matter and will inevitably arise.”

Online

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/debate/debate.pdf> (PDF)

ISSUES AT THE NORTHERN BORDER. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 28 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 114p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: IS 7/2

“The attacks of September 11 have emphasized the necessity of dealing with the terrorist threat as well as the problems of narcotics interdiction and illegal immigration. At the same time, long delays at border crossings resulting from the increased security measures put in place after September 11th have raised concerns about the effect of these policies on trade, tourism and travel ... Congress has been considering numerous proposals to deal with these problems.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS24878> (PDF)

ISSUES AT THE NORTHERN BORDER. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 29 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 116p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: IS 7/3

“The immense flow of trade and travel between the United States and Canada requires that our two nations continue to work together to enhance the protection of our vital interests at this critical time. Trade and travel between the United States and Canada has jumped dramatically since the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. The Port of Champlain alone now clears approximately 400,000 trucks and nearly 1 million vehicles a year. Champlain is also on a major highway that connects the large metropolitan areas of Montreal and New York City and points beyond...In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the U.S. Customs Service immediately implemented a level one alert for all personnel and ports of entry. This is our highest state of alert calling for sustained, intensive anti-terrorist operations. We remain at level one alert today.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25267> (PDF)

JOHN ALLEN MUHAMMAD, DOCUMENT FRAUD, AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE PASSPORT EXCEPTION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 13 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 61p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 108-18

“The report to the Senate Committee concludes that 1) people who enter the United States are not always asked to present identification; 2) security to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the United States from Canada is inadequate at the border park they visited; and 3) immigration inspectors are not readily capable of detecting counterfeit documents.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42199> (PDF)

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/87092.PDF> (PDF)

JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence; House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, December 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 775p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/5: 107-351

“This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint Inquiry that was approved and filed with the House of Representatives and the Senate on December 20, 2002. With the exception of portions that were released to the public previously (e.g., the additional views of Members, the GAO Anthrax Report, etc.), this version has been declassified by the Intelligence Community prior to its public release. That review was for classification purposes only, and does not indicate Intelligence Community agreement with the accuracy of this report, or concurrence with its factual findings or conclusions.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34039>

<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>

JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: ERRATA. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence; House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, December 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 17p. [Report-Errata].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/5: 107-351/ERRATA

“This is an errata print, which is necessary because the report (H.Rept. No.107-792 and S. Rept. No.107-351) inadvertently failed to include these recommendations. To correct this error, these recommendations should be included following: III. Findings and Conclusions.”

KEEPING THE NATION'S CAPITAL SAFE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 July 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 56p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.105-640

“We have an open Capitol to our Nation, and that is as it should be. This is the people's place, where the people's business is conducted. Nearly 18,000 visitors a day pass through this Capitol Building of which we are but the current trustees ... We may need to tighten security, but let us not close the Capitol.”

LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS AT THE BORDER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: DRUG SMUGGLING, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 14 April 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 106/17

“One of the most dangerous threats to our national security is the risk of a terrorist crossing our northern border undetected. This happened in 1997 when Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer crossed the northern border and attempted to blow up the New York subway system. In this case, the terrorist was caught before the crime was carried out. Next time, we may not be so fortunate. Since 1995, there have been at least 13 other cases of terrorists crossing the border from Canada, two in Blaine, Washington alone. In 1998, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service acknowledged the present of 50 terrorist organizations in Canada and outlined their activities: fundraising in aid of terrorism, smuggling, providing logistical support for terrorist acts and providing transit to and from the United States, ‘one of the world’s pre-eminent terrorist targets.’”

LOSS OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence; Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 June 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 49p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.106-895

“Testimony on the most recent of what appears to be an endless stream of security lapses that will soon touch just about every one of our most significant national security agencies.”

THE NATIONAL CAPITAL URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN. National Capital Planning Commission. October 2002. Washington, DC: National Capital Planning Commission, 2002. 97p. [Final Report].

SuDoc# NC 2.2: C 17/2

“At present, security measures around federal facilities protect the occupants inside the building, but frequently disrupt access and movement for those on the surrounding streets and sidewalks. In addition, the protective barriers and closed streets that block potential evacuation routes and emergency access present their own security risks. The commercial, cultural and social vitality that makes Washington one of the world’s greatest urban centers depends upon the openness and access that have defined the city from its beginning ... The Plan provides design solutions for building perimeter security intended to protect against threats resulting from unauthorized vehicles approaching or entering sensitive buildings. Included in this category of threats are bomb-laden vehicles ... This Plan does not address bombs carried by pedestrians, air attack, or chemical and biological weapon terrorism.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27088> (PDF)

http://www.ncpc.gov/publications_press/udsp/Final%20UDSP.pdf (PDF)

THE NATIONAL CAPITAL URBAN DESIGN AND SECURITY PLAN. National Capital Planning Commission. July 2002. Washington, DC: National Capital Planning Commission, 2002. [Draft Report].

SuDoc# NC 2.2: C 17

“The Urban Design and Security Plan responds to the alarming proliferation over the last decade of ugly and makeshift security barriers that negatively impact the historic beauty of the Nation’s Capital ... Our goal has been to seamlessly integrate building perimeter security into consistent, coherent, and welcoming streetscapes that are truly worthy of the Nation’s Capital. If we are to be a free and open society our public realm must express those values and at the same time offer the protections mandated by today’s security concerns.”

A NATIONAL ID CARD: BIG GOVERNMENT AT ITS WORST OR TECHNOLOGICAL EFFICIENCY? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 September 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 167p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: C 17/2

“Today the subcommittee will examine several recent steps taken by Congress and the Clinton administration toward establishing a national ID card. These measures which include a medical ID requirement for uniform driver’s licenses containing Social Security numbers, and a national data base of all newly hired employees...”

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 February 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 163p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.G 74/9: S.HRG.106-671

“We are now aware that several nations, which may not be impressed with our overwhelming missile forces, are working hard to build long-range ballistic missiles. North Korea is one example ... it has made impressive progress in developing a multi-stage ballistic missile capable of flying to intercontinental ranges ... Iran has tested a medium-range ballistic missile and has begun developing longer-range weapons. These developments reflect not just a determination by rogue states to acquire ballistic missiles, but the increasing availability of the technology required to develop these weapons.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS7812>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS7813> (PDF)

NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF SIX IRAQIS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 8 October 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 102p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.105-993

“Today’s hearing will examine two national policy concerns which, on rare occasion, can come into conflict—the need to protect U.S. national security information and the need to ensure America’s credibility in dealing with people who have helped us in fighting wars, terrorism, or rogue regimes.”

THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN CAPITAL CRISIS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia; House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 29 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 67p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.107-133

“The amount of knowledge and experience that is literally going to walk out the door by the end of the decade is unquantifiable. Perhaps even more concerning, government service is not longer a career path of choice for young Americans for a variety of reasons. There is no governmentwide plan to reshape our workforce so that it can respond to the problems of today and the challenges of tomorrow.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17070>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17071> (PDF)

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A GLOBAL AGE. Office of the President (George W. Bush). December 2000. Washington, DC: The White House; U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 67p. [Report].

SuDoc# PR 42.2: SE 3

“...new threats that pose strategic challenges...These include the potential use and continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, threats to our

information/cyber security, international migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, and the ability to disrupt our critical infrastructure. As a result, defense of the homeland against WMD terrorism has taken on a new importance, making coordinated Federal, state, and local government efforts imperative.”

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY. Office of the President (William J. Clinton). December 1999. Washington, DC: The White House, National Security Council, 1999. 49p. [Report].

SuDoc# PREX 1.19: N 21/SE 2/999

“The United States has made concerted efforts to deter and punish terrorists, and remains determined to apprehend and bring to justice those who terrorize American citizens. We make no concessions to terrorists. We fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists, eliminate foreign terrorists and their support networks in our country, and extend the reach of financial sanctions to international terrorist support networks. And we seek to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries overseas, counter state support for terrorism, and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS3917> (PDF)

<http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf> (PDF)

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Office of the President (George W. Bush). July 2002. Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, 2002. 76p. [Report].

SuDoc# PR 43.14: H 75

“We must rally our entire society to overcome a new and very complex challenge. Homeland security is a shared responsibility. In addition to a national strategy, we need compatible, mutually supporting state, local, and private-sector strategies ... The National Strategy for Homeland Security is a beginning ... It creates a comprehensive plan for using America’s talents and resources to enhance our protection and reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. We have produced a comprehensive national strategy that is based on the principles of cooperation and partnership.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20641> (PDF)

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS. Office of the President (George W. Bush). February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003. 83p. [Report].

“Protecting America’s critical infrastructures and key assets represents an enormous challenge. Our Nation’s critical infrastructures and key assets are a highly complex, heterogeneous, and interdependent mix of facilities, systems, and functions that are vulnerable to a wide variety of threats. Their sheer numbers, pervasiveness, and interconnected nature create an almost infinite array of high-payoff targets for terrorist exploitation. Given the immense size and scope of the potential target set, we cannot assume that we will be able to protect completely all things at all times against all conceivable threats. As we develop protective measures for one particular type of target, our terrorist enemies will likely focus on another. To be effective, our national protection strategy must be based on a thorough understanding of these complexities as we build and implement a focused plan for action.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS28728> (PDF)

http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf (PDF)

THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL BORDER PATROL AT THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN BORDERS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 27 April 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 49p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.106-441

“...according to the INS, there still are an estimated 250,000 or more new illegal immigrants in the United States each year. The majority come across our borders surreptitiously or otherwise. This is an intolerably high amount...”

THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: ACHIEVING ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE IN THE FACE OF NONTRADITIONAL THREATS. U.S. Department of Defense. Robert D. Steele. February 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 60p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146:

“The old threat paradigm emphasized strategic nuclear and conventional forces associated with a government, with static orders of battle, linear in development and deployment over time. They were employed in accordance with well-understood rules of engagement and doctrine, were relatively easy to detect in mobilization, and were supported by generally recognizable intelligence assets. The new threat paradigm, in contrast, is generally nongovernmental (or a failed state), nonconventional, dynamic or random and nonlinear in its emergence, with no constraints or rules of engagement ... new craft of intelligence requires that four quadrants of knowledge be fully developed, in an integrated fashion. Only one of

these quadrants is secret. The first exploits the lessons of history; the second develops web-based means of sharing the burden of achieving global coverage; the third harnesses the full distributed intelligence capabilities of the entire Nation; and the fourth utilizes spies and secrecy to great effect.”

Online

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/craft/craft.pdf> (PDF)

THE NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 31p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-486

“What are the threats that America faces, and how should we deal with them? Are they different from what they were just on the 10th of September, and not just how, not just in the short run how we deal with them, but over the long haul ... and how serious is the risk of an aberrant reaction by China, and then by India, Pakistan, and other Asian countries in response if we build a national defense that the Chinese feel threatens their deterrent capability? How should we deal with North Korea?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20923>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20924> (PDF)

NEW WORLD COMING: AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY. Office of the President (William J. Clinton). 15 September 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 1999. 150p. [Report].

SuDoc# PR 42.8: SE 1/W 89

“Notable among these new threats is the prospect of an attack on U.S. cities by independent or state-supported terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. Traditional distinctions between national defense and domestic security will be challenged further as the new century unfolds, and both conventional policies and bureaucratic arrangements will be stretched to and beyond the breaking point unless those policies and arrangements are reformed.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS16080> (PDF)

http://www.nssg.gov/NWR_A.pdf (PDF)

NEW YORK CITY'S 'SANCTUARY' POLICY AND THE EFFECT OF SUCH POLICIES ON PUBLIC SAFETY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND IMMIGRATION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 27 February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 69p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 108-4

“We will examine New York City’s policy on the NYPD’s disclosure of immigration information to the INS. New York’s Executive Order, or E.O. 124, barred line officers from communicating directly with the INS about criminal aliens ... Two Federal provisions, both of which were passed in 1996, preempted this executive order. In particular, section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act bars States and localities from prohibiting their officers from sending immigration information to the INS.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42203> (PDF)

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/85287.PDF> (PDF)

NONIMMIGRANT STUDENT TRACKING: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 2 April 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 58p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 108/8

“The student visa conveys a particularly valuable status to an alien terrorist because in the absence of an effective tracking system, an alien student can remain in the United States almost indefinitely ... Of the 19 identified hijackers, three were present in the United States on student visas. At least two of those terrorists gained skills to carry out those attacks at an American flight school.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42202> (PDF)

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/86265.PDF> (PDF)

NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 3 October; 5 December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 95p. [Special Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AP 6/2: S.HRG.107-341

“A country cannot and will not be secure unless it has secure borders. We are a free country with substantial traffic, and freight, and people coming across our border, and

we don not want to change that. By the same token, we want to make sure that we keep out of this country those who are not supposed to come in, and especially that we are vigilant in trying to determine and detect those who are suspected terrorists who we want to prevent from coming into our country.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18882>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18883> (PDF)

NOVEL SPECTROSCOPIC METHOD CAN DETECT TERRORIST THREATS. U.S. Department of Commerce. National Institute of Standards and Technology. *NIST Update*. 27 May 2003. Gaithersburg, Maryland: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003. 1p. [Article].

SuDoc# C 13.36/7: 2003/May 27

“Described at a recent technical conference, the technology has potential applications in homeland security such as detection of explosives in the mail or other non-metallic portable containers.”

Online

http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/update/upd20030527.htm

THE OLYMPICS AND THE THREAT OF TERROR. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 June 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 26p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.104-843

“Examining the threat terrorism poses to the Olympics and steps taken by federal law enforcement and military officials to maximize security at the upcoming Olympic Games.”

PASSPORTS AND VISAS: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE FRAUD. U.S. General Accounting Office. May 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996. 10p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD-96-99

“The posts we visited did not routinely comply with State’s own internal control procedures ... Other shortcomings were the lack of security over controlled equipment and supplies and the failure to report and reconcile daily activities...”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96099.pdf> (PDF)

THE PHASE ONE REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21st CENTURY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 5 October 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 70p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 999-2000/20

“One finding in particular stands out as a strong reminder that our geographical position between two vast oceans is no longer a guarantee of sanctuary. The Commission’s first main theme is that, and I quote, ‘America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us ... Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.’”

PHONY IDENTIFICATION AND CREDENTIALS VIA THE INTERNET. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 62p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/5: 107-133

The ease with which persons can obtain counterfeit identification and credentials, and how such counterfeiting is and should be prevented.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18208>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18209> (PDF)

POST-HEARING QUESTION FROM THE MAY 8, 2003, HEARING ON BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. General Accounting Office. 7 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 2p. [Questions].

SuDoc# GA 1.41: GAO-03-985 R

“In the case of federal watch lists, we identified indicators (such as the number and variability of the lists and the commonality of their purposes) of opportunities to consolidate and standardize. Consequently, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security determine the extent of watch list consolidation needed to accomplish its mission and that such consolidation be done as part of the department’s efforts to develop an enterprise architecture.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37619> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03985r.pdf> (PDF)

PREPARING FOR ASYMMETRY: AS SEEN THROUGH THE LENS OF JOINT VISION 2020. U.S. Department of Defense. Melissa Applegate. September 2001. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. 38p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002005523

“What is most worrisome about these various asymmetric approaches is that they offer potential adversaries relatively low cost opportunities to achieve disproportionate results. What adversaries seek is a set of capabilities that we are either unwilling or unable to counter in the timeframe that matters ... In other words, if asymmetric approaches are successful, we will find it hard to fight the way we want to and we may not be able to fight at all, the result being military irrelevancy or impotency ... Operational planning, supported by the intelligence community, has focused on the defensive capability to combat asymmetry. Terrorism, the proliferation of mass casualty weapons and technologies, foreign information operations, and cyber attack capabilities, for instance, are all priority intelligence missions; operational response options to these threats continue to proliferate at the Service and joint levels.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS16221> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/preparng/preparng.pdf> (PDF)

PREVAILING IN A WELL-ARMED WORLD: DEVISING COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES AGAINST WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. U.S. Department of Defense. Henry D. Sokolski. March 2000. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000. 172p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2001035410

“On July 19, 1999, the Congressionally-mandated Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction determined that ...our government lacked the long-term ... ‘strategies which capitalize on America’s enduring military, economic, political, and diplomatic strengths to ... leverage against proliferators’ clear vulnerabilities in these areas’ ... The commission identified what these leveraged strategies’ general goals should be: dissuading nations from proliferating, encouraging hostile regimes to give way to more peaceable ones, keeping our friends secure, and strengthening international support, of strict standards of nonproliferation. What it did not do was discuss what devising such strategies would entail. This edited volume is designed to prompt such a discussion.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11986> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2000/prevail/prevail.pdf> (PDF)

PREVENTION OF TERRORISTIC CRIMES: SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESS, INDUSTRY, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. U.S. Department of Justice. Washington, DC: Private Security Advisory Council to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1976. 29p. [Manual].

SuDoc# J 1.2: T 27

General guidelines for counterterrorism measures that businesses and organizations can easily implement.

PRIVACY VS. SECURITY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on the District of Columbia. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 159p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: P 93/21

“In London, a camera system initiated to combat IRA terrorism has sprouted into a network with an estimated 2 ½ million cameras. The average Londoner is caught on film about 300 times a day, and no terrorists have been caught by the cameras’ use.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29636> (PDF)

PROFILING FOR PUBLIC SAFETY: RATIONAL OR RACIST? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Aviation. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 102p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. T 68/2: 107-64

“Frankly, passenger profiling is a very complicated issue. No one disputes the need to have some kind of profiling in order to stop terrorism or at the very least deter terrorists from completing their fatal objectives. But the dispute about how to profile, especially by race or color, is a highly combustible topic.”

PROTECTING POLICYHOLDERS FROM TERRORISM: PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 24 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 183p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49/20: 107-48

“...we must temporarily reinsure the marketplace to safeguard against the cascading financial crisis. In recent weeks, several alternatives to solve the problems were merged from one plan to establish a Government backstop for reinsurance designed to spread the risk across the industry. Another approach using quotas would distribute reinsurance costs for between industry and Government, and other solutions include allowing companies to build taxpayers reserves, limiting liabilities from damages as we presently do for accidents to nuclear reactors and facilitating the issuance of catastrophic bonds.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19253>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19254> (PDF)

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD. U.S. Department of Defense. February/March 2001. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board, 2001. [Report].

SuDoc# D 1.107: 2002019142/V.1-2

“There is a new and ominous trend in these threats to the United States homeland. Whereas the nation’s historic focus has been on defense of the border, these new threats are not amenable to such perimeter defenses. They require layered approaches that include both perimeter defenses and defense against ‘insider’ threats. The trend toward reliance on the civilian and commercial infrastructure exacerbates the difficulty of such protection.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19979> (PDF)

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/protecting.pdf> (PDF)

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19991> (Part II PDF)

<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/dio.pdf> (Part II PDF)

RECOVERY AND RENEWAL: PROTECTING THE CAPITAL MARKETS AGAINST TERRORISM POST 9/11. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 12 February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 304p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49/20: 108-2

“Today we are here to examine the physical problems that may exist in a future terrorist attack on the United States and what actions and efforts we should take and

what legislation will be necessary to accomplish that end. Also ... we not only should take into consideration the physical effects of a terrorist attack on our economy and our markets, but also what economic disasters could befall the United States, and to start looking at some of the necessary actions to prevent that or to provide the legal authority for appropriate action.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33957> (PDF)

REWARDS PROGRAM FOR TERRORISM INFORMATION. U.S. State Department. February 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1993. 1 folded sheet. [Pamphlet].

SuDoc# S 1.2: R 32

“Under the Rewards Program, U.S. Government rewards of up to \$2 million are offered for information that prevents or resolves acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property overseas or leads to the arrest or conviction of terrorist criminals involved in such acts. U.S. associations representing airlines and pilots offer up to \$2 million more when U.S. air carriers are targeted.”

RISK TO HOMELAND SECURITY FROM IDENTITY FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims and Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. 25 June 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 77p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 107/86

“There are three documents frequently used to establish false identities that must be made more secure. We can do a great deal to protect our homeland security if we tighten up the laws governing issuing of driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, and birth certificates. Many of us were shocked to hear how easy it was for members of al-Qaeda to obtain driver’s licenses in three different States that allowed them onto U.S. airlines on September 11...Each State has different standards for driver’s licenses. Some even allow illegal aliens to obtain driver’s licenses.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42475> (PDF)

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/80452.PDF> (PDF)

THE ROLE OF CHARITIES AND NGO’S IN THE FINANCING OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 August 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 53p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. B 22/3: S.HRG.107-988

“Examining the scope of the current problem; steps the administration has taken to curb the diversion of charitable funds to terrorist organizations; ways to curtail the flow of money from foreign and U.S.-based Islamic charities to terrorist organizations; and what additional tools are necessary for law enforcement to identify and cut off terrorist financing networks.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41006>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41007> (PDF)

THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN PREVENTING THE ENTRY OF TERRORISTS INTO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 12 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 106p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-611

“The purpose of this hearing is to determine the extent to which gaps in our visa and admission system have frustrated efforts to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks. More importantly, we would like to determine the extent to which these vulnerabilities will expose us to future attack.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22798>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22805> (PDF)

SAFETY OF U.S. DIPLOMATS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. 10p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: D 62/27

“We meet this afternoon to inquire into the problems raised by terrorist attacks upon the persons of U.S. Ambassadors and other diplomatic personnel serving abroad. The rising incidence of kidnappings of diplomatic personnel has created a crisis for the conduct of normal relations between the countries of this hemisphere. Unless something is done to remedy this situation, international relations may come to be dictated by the whims and self-designated necessities of guerrillas, terrorists, and other extreme radical elements.”

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space. 107th

Congress, 2nd Session, 25 June 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 497p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SCI 2: 107-68

“...to examine how science and technology can be best utilized to defend our nation against the threat of terrorism. The hearing will focus on a comprehensive study by the National Academy of Sciences...on science and technology to counter terrorism ... The two co-chairs of the study—entitled ‘Making the Nation Safer: Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism’—will testify at the hearing.”

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY’S PRIORITIES AND PLANS FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 8 February 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 64p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-420

“One of the most significant challenges facing the Department is working with Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union to prevent nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or from being misused.”

SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM ON U.S. MILITARY BASES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism. 28 June 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 151p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/25

Hearing on force protection policies and practices of the U.S. military base commanders. The perspectives of base commanders on the potential terrorist threat to their facilities.

SECURITY FAILURES AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 21 June 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 125p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.106-1123

“We’ve implemented more than 21 major security initiatives ... We required mandatory FBI background checks on foreign nationals from ... sensitive countries visiting or assigned to departmental facilities, and all non-sensitive country foreign nationals who will have access to sensitive technology in areas; Eliminating the reinvestigation backlog and security background checks for current employees and contractors holding clearances; We developed air-gaps between classified and unclassified cyber systems, to prevent classified materials from downloading to unclassified systems; ... We strengthened the cyber-security programs, which purged the departmental websites of sensitive information, enforced new restrictions on

remote access, and enhanced the Department's technical capability to protect its classified, sensitive, and unclassified information systems from espionage and other foreign intelligence collection activity; and We conducted comprehensive cyber security appraisals and practices at all weapons labs and headquarters.”

“SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” AND OTHER FEDERAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION: HISTORY AND CURRENT CONTROVERSY.

Library of Congress. Genevieve J. Knezo. 2 July 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. 49p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31845

“This report summarizes (1) provisions of the Patent Law; Atomic Energy Act; International Traffic in Arms Control regulations; the USA PATRIOT Act ...; and the Homeland Security Act ..., that permit governmental restrictions on either privately generated or federally owned scientific and technical information that could harm national security; (2) evolution of federal definitions for ‘sensitive but unclassified’ (SBU) information; (3) controversies about White House policy directives on federal SBU and ‘Sensitive Homeland Security Information’ (SHSI); and (4) policy options.”

Online

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31845.pdf> (PDF)

STATE DEPARTMENT DOMESTIC SECURITY LAPSES AND STATUS OF OVERSEAS SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 11 & 17 May 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 129p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: D 71/2

“In 1998, a person ... grabbed highly classified documents from an office in the Secretary of State’s suite. That man and the documents have not been found ... Last year, a Russian spy was discovered outside the Main State building listening to a bugging device planted in a seventh floor conference room. Of course, last month saw the revelation of a missing laptop computer that contained highly classified information. That laptop has not been found...Again, in 1999, we were told that a computer software program written by citizens of the former Soviet Union was purchased by the State Department on a sole-source contract and installed in posts throughout the world without the proper security and vetting procedures. That program had to be removed from each and every post. To this day, we have not received an explanation of just why and how that happened.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS9948>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS9949> (PDF)

THE STATE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 & 19 September 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 182p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.106-801

“The House-Senate International Education Study Group hosted a briefing on the crisis in Federal language capabilities. As the subject of that briefing suggests, it is feared by some that the deficiencies among Federal agencies and the departments which have national security responsibilities in our government are serious enough to be called a crisis.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11959>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11960> (PDF)

THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE. U.S. Department of Defense. David Jablonsky. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 32, No. 4, Winter 2002-2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.4-20. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/4

“The terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated the hostility that had developed toward this mixed grand strategic approach. Those events also indicated a potential for the strategy of isolationism to reemerge. It is a vision that still resonates despite a half century of worldwide engagement, particularly in its conception of a remote and powerful America that can withdraw from dangerous and corrupting global influences. More terrorist attacks on the US homeland, particularly of a catastrophic nature, could enhance this outlook if the American people focus on the paradoxical fact the US global involvement designed to promote world order and international stability is the principal cause for such attacks ... The multilateral approach is just one of several characteristics required for a grand strategy in an age of terror. To begin with, a grand strategic vision must manage public expectations. Crisis and consequence management must be tied to deterrence in order to prevent the acknowledgement of inevitable terrorist attacks on the US homeland from slipping into national resignation. The will not be helped by the current call for a ‘war’ against terrorism—a term that not only elevates the status of common criminals, but raises the expectations for decisive military action against an easily identifiable foe, creating the impression that the primary US effort will be military.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/jablonsk.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/jablonsk.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC LEADER READINESS AND COMPETENCIES FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.

U.S. Department of Defense. Thomas J. Williams. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.19-35. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/2

“General Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently noted how al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have ‘made lots of adaptations to our tactics and we’ve got to ... try to out-think them and to be faster at it.’ As the heart of the issue is whether and how the operational art and leadership attributes differ, it at all, in symmetric versus asymmetric approaches to warfare.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/williams.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/williams.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE: A COMPILATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 26 September 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 114p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.PRT.107-43

“As Congress works to ensure that the awful events of September 11th will never be repeated, it is instructive for us to review several recent studies of the issue. In recent years, a number of major commissions and distinguished witnesses before Congress have highlighted the emergence of both nation-states and sub-national groups with the desire and the capability to employ asymmetric means, including weapons of mass destruction, to strike at the United States homeland. Their reports and statements have underscored the real vulnerability of the United States in responding to such attacks and mitigating their consequences. The Committee on Foreign Relations has reprinted the executive summaries and key excerpts from some of the leading reports on emerging threats to U.S. national security.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15541>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15542> (PDF)

STRENGTHENING AMERICA: SHOULD THE ISSUING OF VISAS BE VIEWED AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL OR SECURITY MEASURE?

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Civil Service, Census and Agency Organization. 107th

Congress, 2nd Session, 15 July 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 51p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: V 82/2

“Today we will examine one of the most vital components of the President’s proposal to establish a new Department of Homeland Security. Our homeland security starts abroad and nothing is more important than who gets approved for a visa to enter this country. The issuance of visas can no longer be thought of as a mere diplomatic function. We’re in a war on terror and our embassies and consulates must be our Nation’s first line of defense.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33019> (PDF)

TECHNICAL DIGEST: JOINT AND NATIONAL NEEDS. U.S. Department of Defense. Dahlgren, Virginia: Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, 2003. 216p. [Report].

SuDoc# D 211.2: T 22/2

“In the emerging world of the third millennium, we see that globalism has combined with terrorism to bring a new threat and a new set of requirements that we must address technologically as a DoD laboratory. We must find ways to defend our forces, while deployed or while stationed in the continental United States (CONUS), from sudden surprise attack by seemingly neutral or uninvolved players. We must do this in an environment in which our forces are not given free reign to use weapons at will. We call this demand ‘Force Protection.’ Efforts to defend our civilian population and infrastructure we call ‘Homeland Defense.’ Joint and national efforts are key to meeting these two demands.”

TECHNOLOGY AGAINST TERRORISM: STRUCTURING SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 142p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 3.T 22/2: 2 T 27/2

“As terrorist tactics change, it will become increasingly important to be proactive rather than reactive in developing technologies to protect the public. Future threats should be anticipated to the degree possible so that means for dealing with them will be developed in a timely manner. This report concludes an examination of the role that technology may play in the effort to combat terrorism. It is the second of two reports, which together constitute an assessment of the role of technology in combating terrorism ... This report covers a number of remaining areas and provides updated information on research progress in a number of fields. It discusses four principal topics that were not previously dealt with in detail: the terrorist threat from

biological agents; interagency and international cooperation in R&D aimed at counterterrorism; the application of an integrated systems approach for aviation security; and the role of human factors in security.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS3622> (PDF)

http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1992/9235_n.html (PDF)

TECHNOLOGY AGAINST TERRORISM: THE FEDERAL EFFORT. U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 106p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 3.T 22/2: 2 T 27

“Some promising areas of work in counterterrorist technologies are suffering from low or intermittent funding ... Solving airline security problems will require not only technical equipment, but a systems approach that makes intelligent use of the technologies available. Immediate attention should be given to developing combined approaches to airline security that could be applied with current or near-current technologies as soon as possible ... Improvements could be made in hiring, training, pay, motivation, and management of security personnel ... Passenger screening by profiling could be greatly expanded, using interviews, as is done on El Al (Israel’s airline) flights, and, in fact, is done on U.S. carriers in some locations. These efforts would be labor-intensive and costly, but could be introduced reasonably rapidly ... with today’s or next year’s technology, a more effective and imposing system can be devised by combining several different ways of doing the same thing, rather than relying on only one technique.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS28665> (PDF)

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_2/DATA/1991/9139.PDF (PDF)

TECHNOLOGY AGAINST TERRORISM: THE FEDERAL EFFORT (SUMMARY). U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 10p. [Report Summary].

SuDoc# Y 3.T 22/2: 2 T 27/SUM.

“In 1989, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, together with its Subcommittee on Aviation, requested the Office of Technology Assessment to investigate the status of research on technological means

to protect ourselves against terrorist threats ... This report is the first of two in response to these requests.”

TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE THREAT, POLICY, AND LAW. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 21 & 22 April 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. 174p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.103-581

“Examining the scope of current threats of terrorism to the United States and its allies, focusing on explosives and explosives regulation, and related extradition, international law, and immigration issues.”

TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING: RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING EXPLOSIVES AND NARCOTICS DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES. U.S. General Accounting Office. April 1997. Washington, DC ; Gaithersburg, Maryland: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997. 40p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD-97-95

“While various technologies can be used to detect both explosives and narcotics, relatively little equipment has been deployed at airports and U.S. ports of entry. Recent events, such as recommendations of a presidential commission on aviation security, raise questions as to how well U.S. government agencies responsible for developing technologies to detect explosives and narcotics are working together.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11344> (PDF)

TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING: TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETECTING EXPLOSIVES AND NARCOTICS. U.S. General Accounting Office. September 1996. Washington, DC; Gaithersburg, Maryland: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996. 28p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD/RCED-96-252

“A system is available today for screening checked baggage that has been certified by FAA as capable of detecting various types and quantities of explosives likely to be used to cause catastrophic damage to a commercial aircraft ... However, the certified system is costly and has operational limitations...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31723> (PDF)

TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING: THREATS AND ROLES OF EXPLOSIVES AND NARCOTICS DETECTION TECHNOLOGY. U.S. General Accounting Office. March 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996. 22p. [Briefing Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD/RCED-96-76 BR

“The intelligence community believes that the threat of terrorism within the United States has increased. Although no specific aviation threat is known, experts believe that aviation is likely to remain an attractive target for terrorists. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), terrorist attacks could come from groups that are difficult to infiltrate and control.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25896> (PDF)

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS. Library of Congress. Raphael Perl. 12 May 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. 17p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: IB10119

“A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely-organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists. Another trend is toward terrorism that is religiously- or ideologically-motivated. Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups, or groups using religion as a pretext, pose terrorist threats of various kinds to U.S. interests and to friendly regimes. A third trend is the apparent growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organizations, which may involve combinations of military training, funding, technology transfer, or political advice.”

Online

<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/crsterrorperle.pdf> (PDF)

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, 2000. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 999

“This special retrospective issue of *Terrorism in the United States* provides both a summary of terrorism-related activity in 1999 and a broad overview of U.S.-based terrorism during the past three decades. It discusses notable cases, trends, emerging threats, and the development of the FBI response to terrorism during the past 30 years. Appendices summarize terrorist incidents in the United States during the past decade and provide background information on currently designated foreign terrorist organizations and terrorist renditions (1987-1999), as well as a series of graphs depicting terrorist-related activity in the United States during the past two decades.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS2826> (PDF)

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf> (PDF)

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, 1999. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 998

“The year 1998 demonstrated the wide range of terrorist threats confronting the United States. Terrorists in Colombia continued to target private American interests, kidnapping seven U.S. citizens throughout the year and carrying out 77 bombings against multinational oil pipelines, many of which are used by U.S. oil companies. On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked in nearly simultaneous truck bombings that left 224 persons dead, including 12 U.S. citizens (all victims of the Nairobi attack). The bombings also wounded over 4,500 persons. In the United States, the FBI recorded five terrorist incidents in 1998. Within the same year, 12 planned acts of terrorism were prevented in the United States.”

Online

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror98.pdf> (PDF)

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, 1998. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 997

“During calendar year 1997, the FBI recorded two terrorist incidents (neither of which resulted in injuries) and two suspected acts of terrorism on U.S. soil (both of which resulted in injuries). Within the same year, 21 potential acts of terrorism were prevented in the United States—the highest number of preventions recorded since 1985, when 23 planned acts of terrorism were prevented. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government brought several high-profile terrorists to justice in 1997. On June 2, 1997, Timothy McVeigh was convicted of the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. On August 14, McVeigh was sentenced to death for carrying out the most deadly act of terrorism in U.S. history.”

Online

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terr97.pdf> (PDF)

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, 1997. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 996

“United States soil was the site of three terrorist incidents during 1996. The pipe bomb explosion during the Summer Olympic Games in Centennial Olympic Park that killed two and the robberies and bombings carried out in April and July 1996 by members of the group known as the Phineas Priesthood underscored the ever-present threat that exists from individuals determined to use violence to advance particular causes. The FBI successfully prevented five planned acts of domestic terrorism in 1996. These preventions thwarted attacks on law enforcement officials, prevented planned bombings of federal buildings, and halted plots to destroy domestic infrastructure.”

Online

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.pdf> (PDF)

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1995. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 995

“...Terrorists in the United States continued a general trend in which fewer attacks are occurring in the United States, but individual attacks are becoming more deadly. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was one of the largest explosions ever investigated by the FBI ... Recipes for large explosives are available for any extremist willing to research them. It is likely that the United States will continue to face the threat of ‘spectacular terrorism’ for the foreseeable future ... America and Americans have also been a favorite choice of target for terrorists. Reprisals for U.S. legal action against domestic and international terrorists increase the likelihood that Americans will be the target of terrorist attacks either in the United States or overseas.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1994. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1995. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 994

“During the period of 1990 through 1994, in addition to the 28 incidents of terrorism in the United States, there were 5 suspected terrorist incidents and 16 prevented incidents of terrorism. Because the occurrence of terrorism in the United States is relatively infrequent and continually changing and evolving relative to world events, it is difficult to predict what impact current trends will have on terrorism in the United States in the future. Although there have been no incidents of terrorism in the United States during 1994, this is probably not indicative of a trend toward overall

decrease in terrorism; rather, it reflects the fact that terrorism is transforming and can, at times, intensify in direct relation to changes in political, social, and economic situations occurring around the world. In essence, the terrorist threat is ever present. As long as violence is viewed by some as a viable means to attain goals, terrorism will be used.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1994. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 993

“One year and six days after a massive bomb exploded in the parking garage under the World Trade Center complex in New York City, four men stand convicted of numerous charges related to this crime. The attack, which killed six innocent people and injured more than one thousand, is considered to be the greatest act of international terrorism ever to take place on American soil ... The bombing of the World Trade Center was the second international terrorist attack to occur in the United States since the end of 1983. The takeover of the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in New York City in April, 1992, was the first in the ten-year period from 1983 to 1993. Thus, in less than one year, there have been two acts of international terrorism conducted in the United States.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1982-1992. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1993. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 992

“When this publication was being prepared, the United States had been relatively free of terrorism. Since the end of 1983, there had been only one act of international terrorism inside the United States, and the level of domestic terrorism had been reduced significantly. The record of the past decade gave reason for optimism. However, on February 26, 1993, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York issued a cruel reminder that the United States is not immune from terrorism within our borders ... For the past decade, the United States has responded to the threat of terrorism in an informed and confident manner. This has been an important factor in our counterterrorism success...”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1992. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 991

“Terrorism inside the United States continued at a low ebb and none of the five incidents recorded were associated with international terrorism. Despite this positive

trend, an assessment of the potential terrorism threat inside the United States cannot ignore world developments and their relationship to the United States. An unfortunate reality is that there remains a segment of the world community which views terrorism as a legitimate means of pursuing government policy or realizing group ideologies. Recognizing this, we in the United States must maintain our strong, pro-active position against terrorism.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1991. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 990

“In 1990, the United States was faced with a unique phenomenon. Despite a recent decline in terrorist incidents in the United States and without any specific information of planned terrorist activity, we were faced with the real prospect of terrorism. The Persian Gulf crisis and its well-publicized impact on the threat of terrorism presented both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge was clearly to prevent terrorism from occurring. The opportunity was for all aspects of U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, the American people, and Government to work together to meet the threat of terrorism inside the United States. While the reasons why terrorism did not occur may be many, one fact is clear: throughout the United States, there was outstanding coordination and communication in the campaign against terrorism.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1990. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 989

“Contained in this publication are: 1) a review of 1989 terrorist activity in the United States; 2) an examination of trends for the five-year period 1985-1989; 3) several brief articles which provide insight into current terrorism issues; and 4) an assessment of the current terrorism threat in the United States. This information will provide an overview of the terrorism threat in the United States, as well as the FBI's counterterrorism efforts.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1988. U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington, DC: Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1989. [Report].

SuDoc# J 1.14/22: 988

“During 1988, the FBI recorded a total of 7 terrorist incidents occurring within the United States and Puerto Rico. As in previous years, the majority of the terrorism occurred in Puerto Rico. Of particular interest in 1988 was the increase in terrorism motivated by environmental concerns. Of the 7 incidents recorded, 2 were attributed

to an environmental group, and 2 appear to have been at least partially inspired by an environmental cause. In 1988, the FBI also recorded 3 terrorism preventions. These preventions can be attributed to the cooperation and coordination among the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence communities.”

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE THREAT AND POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 104th Congress, 1st Session, 27 April; 24 May 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 259p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.104-757

“Examining the nature and extent of the threat of terrorism in the United States, and proposed legislation to enhance and extend the penalties for terrorist acts, add the crime of conspiracy to certain terrorism offenses, increase the ability of the Federal Government to deport suspected terrorists, and add new restrictions on providing material support to terrorists; and on the administration’s counterterrorism intelligence gathering proposals, focusing on whether there is a need for increased wire-tap and infiltration authority for federal law enforcement.”

TERRORISM—LOOKING AHEAD: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS. U.S. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 104th Congress, 2nd Session; Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 7 December 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 41p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/18: T 27

“The seminar participants begin the session with a discussion of the mission and responsibilities of their respective agencies. From there, a number of current policy approaches are presented. Assessments are made of legislative proposals that have been before Congress, and of laws currently in place. The seminar participants offer a wide range of possible programmatic, legislative and policy options to combat terrorism or that might alter the environment that produces terrorist activity. A number of measures go beyond the usual solutions that have been offered in the past ... The terrorist threat poses unique problems for intelligence collection, and the Committee recognizes that changes in government counterterrorist programs may place new demands upon the Intelligence Community to support other governmental agencies.”

THE TERRORISM THREAT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES: OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS. U.S. Department of Defense. James M. Smith and William C. Thomas, eds. March 2001. U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001. 284p. [Collection].

SuDoc# D 305.2: 2001039608

Policy perspective, strategic context, changing nature of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, threat of cyber attacks, domestic prevention, combating international terrorism, antiterrorism through counterproliferation, intelligence, military response to domestic weapon of mass destruction attack, international attack response, preparation for the future fight against terrorism.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13594>

<http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/terrorism.htm>

TERRORIST DEFECTORS: ARE WE READY? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 4 February 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 52p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.102-841

“The Committee hopes to explore a number of important questions today. Specifically, What is the U.S. Government doing to persuade people, particularly those in communities abroad that support terrorism, to provide useful information to U.S. and other law enforcement personnel that will prevent acts of terrorism or support the prosecution of more terrorists? How should our treatment of terrorist defectors differ, if at all, from the treatment of other kinds of political defectors? ... Is the witness protection program the appropriate program for terrorist defectors? Do we have trained personnel working in the program who are familiar with other languages and cultures?”

TERRORIST RISK INSURANCE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 24 & 25 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 198p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. B 22/3: S.HRG.107-805

“On how the insurance industry should respond to risks posed by potential terrorist attacks and the extent to which the Government should play a role alongside the industry to address these risks, in light of September 11, 2001, and how these decisions will affect insurance coverage and premiums on property and casualty reinsurance contracts as they come up for renewal.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27030> (PDF)

TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 May 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 50p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 999-2000/52

“One of the chief goals [of the Panel] is to illuminate the rapid emergence of ... ‘new terrorism’, different in kind and potentially vastly more destructive than the terrorism that we knew during the Cold War or during the last decade.”

TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 January 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 76p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 106/85

“Established terrorist organizations and states that sponsored terrorism were behind most international terrorism in the 1970’s and 1980’s. But in recent years, ad hoc groups of terrorists, sometimes loosely linked, and often claiming to act on behalf of Islam, have been the most dynamic element in international terrorist attacks against the United States. These are deviants and fanatics who are betraying the tenets of Islam, just as other terrorists who have sometimes used Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions to justify violence, have distorted and abused their faiths. Islamic extremists were behind the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, a conspiracy to blow up the UN, the Holland Tunnel and Federal buildings in New York, another conspiracy in 1995 to bomb American passenger aircraft over the Pacific, and two bombings against American military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Many of these extremists fought in the Afghan war against the former Soviet Union or received training in Afghanistan. Some, but not all, of these terrorists are linked to Usama Bin Laden, the Saudi Arabian fugitive who has been indicted along with others for the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam on August 8, 1998.”

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY: TERRORISM IN THE MIAMI AREA. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 6 & 7 May 1976. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 55p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: T 27/4/pt.8

“It is also difficult to get information. The CIA is allowed to give information to the FBI in regard to espionage, sabotage, et cetera, occurring inside the United States. However, the FBI is not allowed to forward that information to local law enforcement. The FBI office in Miami, while they are very cooperative and have put forth a great effort in the investigation of these crimes, they do not have the manpower, sufficient manpower in that office to fully support the information and fully follow up the information and investigate the leads that they get. If they don’t have the manpower to follow up and do the investigations that they need to do, and they aren’t allowed to pass on the information to us so that we can help them with these investigations, then we end up with the situation as we currently have in Miami

of a complex international situation involving bombings, homicides, conspiracies, and which creates a terroristic-type atmosphere in the community.”

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY: TERRORIST BOMBINGS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. 1975. 108p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: T 27/4/pt.7

“Terrorist bombings used to be a rare thing in our country. In recent years, however, there have been hundreds of such bombings, which have taken many human lives and resulted in tens of millions of dollars’ worth of damage. Many organizations are involved in these acts of terrorism. Some of them, like the Weather Underground and the Symbionese Liberation Army, have achieved national notoriety. There are many more organizations which are not as well known but just as fanatical and just as deadly. All of them, no matter what their size, are conspiratorial, tightly disciplined, and very difficult to penetrate.”

THINKING ASYMMETRICALLY IN TIMES OF TERROR. U.S. Department of Defense. Colin S. Gray. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.5-14. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/1

“We cannot predict specific asymmetric threats (unless we have excellent intelligence) and therefore we cannot protect everything at risk ... Although we are not likely to perform well at the identification of very specific dangers, we should be able to identify, and therefore plan how to protect against, the kind of threats that would do us major harm ... We need to be especially alert to the possibility that asymmetric threats can wreak their greatest damage through ill-judged measures of response that we ourselves choose to undertake ... We need to identify and think hard about threats to which we lack obvious responses.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02spring/gray.htm>

THREAT OF TERRORISM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 11 September 1989. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 113p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.101-458

“The problem with terrorism is its episodic nature. During the periods of relative calm, terrorism is viewed by large governments, including our own, as a minor

annoyance, especially when compared with grander visions of geopolitics. And it is often difficult to get policy levels of governments focused on the problem at all. But when an incident occurs, particularly one dominated by media coverage, terrorism takes on virtual strategic significance. When terrorists strike, governments go on hold, paralyzed by an unfolding human drama which was televised for all to see. There are far too few tools available to combat terrorism for, in principle, the Government is required to protect every possible target and cope with every tragedy. By contrast, the terrorist has the luxury of choosing the time, the target and the tactics. His ability to thwart defensive measures is greater than the government's ability to anticipate his actions."

THREAT POSED BY THE CONVERGENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 13 December 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 66p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 106-148

The ways in which organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism are linked; what this means to law enforcement; and how law enforcement should tackle these separate yet entwined dilemmas.

THREATS TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 16 May 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 42p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.106-1009

"In order to address these increased risks, the FBI's International Operations Section has designed a briefing program to inform employees about security related to international assignments. One of our responsibilities is to respond to extraterritorial terrorist incidents ... the likelihood and potential of assaults on FBI employees overseas increases ... The same thing happens with the anti-government groups and militia efforts that have been occurring domestically. These incidents reflect the types of threats that are more and more being encountered by agents in our domestic terrorism investigations."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15598>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS15599> (PDF)

THREATS TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 February 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 61p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 997-98/40

“Terrorism is a growing threat to our governmental infrastructure, to international business and to our citizens both at home and abroad. There is a new character to this terrorist threat. It is the possibility that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction. It is the growing international scope of terrorists organizations and terrorist activities and third, it is the vulnerability of our critical governmental infrastructure, the telecommunications and control systems that regulate everyday life to interference by terrorist organizations. Now, there is a widespread awareness of the foreign terrorist threat in the United States today and in the government, but progress in marshalling efforts to protect us against these terrorists’ threats remains, a lot remains to be done. The roles of the different government agencies involved in combating terrorism—Defense, Intelligence and Law Enforcement—must be better defined and effective counter-terrorism programs must be put into place.”

THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. 105th Congress, 1st Session, 13 February 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 81p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 997-98/11

“Since a challenge to the United States is foolhardy, what are the contemporary dangers? First, terrorism, which has now become the weapon of choice of the weak. There are powerful incentives to make use of terrorism, most notably the belief that the United States might be induced through terrorist actions as occurred in Saudi Arabia to withdraw its forces. There was a hope at the time of the incident at the Khobar Towers barracks that this one incident, or perhaps one further incident, might lead us to pull back into the United States. But more important that the incentives, the capabilities available to terrorists are expanding ... On the civilian side, our vulnerabilities are growing. Our power systems are dependent upon, for their distribution of power, upon computers. Water systems, sewage systems, our financial systems, all of these make for fertile targets, as it were, for potential terrorists and criminals.”

“... TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE...”: *PAPERS FROM THE CONFERENCE ON HOMELAND PROTECTION*. U.S. Department of Defense. Max G. Manwaring. October 2000. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000. 279p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2001011864

“Protecting the territory and interests of the United States and its citizens from ‘all enemies both foreign and domestic...’ and ‘to insure domestic Tranquility...’ are the

principle tasks of government. The primary reason to emphasize homeland defense is the change in the type, degree, and number of threats to the United States. Now, in addition to traditional regional security issues, an array of 'nontraditional' threats—including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation; a hundred different varieties of terrorism; ethnic and religious conflict; organized crime; drug trafficking; and criminal anarchy—challenges U.S. well-being. These threats to U.S. national security are exacerbated by 'nonmilitary' threats and menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away. They include trade war, financial war, new terror war (e.g., the improving sophistication of using nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction [WMD]), and cyber war. All these threats challenge the United States at home and abroad, and blur the conventional dividing lines between military, political, economic, and informational security affairs."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS11418> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2000/tranquil/tranquil.pdf> (PDF)

TRACKING INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION—POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDENTS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce. Subcommittee on Select Education; Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 31 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 207p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. ED 8/1: 107-36

"We learned on September 11 that not every student that is coming to America is coming here for the right reasons ... What we want to do today is learn what the gaps are in the system and ... understand what we need to change..."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS21776> (PDF)

UNITED STATES DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Military Procurement. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 93p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/37

"The proposed budget which you see for 2003 of \$379 billion sounds large, but when you compare it with the needs, which is homeland security, emergency requirements, past unpaid bills, increased bills for the current emergency and food, fuel, transportation and personnel call-ups, plus the increased ops-tempo, you see only about \$10 billion available for new requirements and increased procurement."

U.S. BORDER PATROL'S IMPLEMENTATION OF "OPERATION GATEKEEPER." U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 August 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 289p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: B 64/2

"It is the obligation of the Federal Government to secure the borders of the Nation from illegal entry and unauthorized invasion. It is the right of all Americans, especially those who live, own property, or work near the border, to expect to be secure from such illegal entries and invasions. It is not a question of being anti-immigration."

U.S. BORDERS: SAFE OR SIEVE? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 30 January 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 125p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49: S.HRG.108-24

"The Millennium bomber drove across the U.S. border in December, 1999. He had links to Al-Qaeda and bomb-making materials similar to those used at the embassy bombings in Africa and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Almost 3 years later, GAO's agents crossed the same border. They expected tight security, expected to be stopped. They expected that lessons were learned. They were surprised by the lack of enforcement...This hearing will further investigate what the state of play is, and perhaps what we can do to accelerate solutions."

U.S. ENERGY SECURITY: OPTIONS TO DECREASE PETROLEUM USE IN THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science. Subcommittee on Energy. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 1 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 127p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SCI 2: 107-43

"The attacks of September 11th underline the Nation's vulnerability to terror attacks; the economic repercussions of the attacks will be felt for some time. The U.S. economy is highly dependent on imported oil; around 56 percent of U.S. petroleum demand comes from overseas with around 20 percent coming from the Middle East. A disruption of petroleum supplies, as witnessed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, could have a devastating effect on the already weakened worldwide economy."

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 21 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 98p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/13

“America’s national security for the next decade and beyond”, groundwork for the consideration of the fiscal 2002 defense budget.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 21 June 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 136p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/22

“Future adversaries may use advanced conventional capabilities to deny us access to a range of new weapons that allow them to expand the deadly zone to include our territory, infrastructure, space assets, population, friends and allies, we may find future conflicts are no longer restricted to their regions of origin.”

U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: RECENT POLICY HAS INCREASED COSTS TO CONSUMERS BUT NOT OVERALL U.S. ENERGY SECURITY.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 5 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 288p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.PRT.108-18

“Crude oil prices have continued to climb and recently reached a 12-year high of nearly \$40 per barrel. Several global political events and economic forces were major factors pushing prices upward over this period: The steady erosion of large crude oil supplies that had built up immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; Saddam Hussein’s 1-month suspension of Iraqi oil exports in April 2002; labor strikes in Venezuela in late 2002 that virtually shut down crude oil production and exports to the United States; U.S. industry’s practice of keeping relatively limited crude oil inventories; and increasing speculation and concern over impending war with Iraq.”

U.S. STRATEGY TO COUNTER DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. James B. Motley. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983. 136p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 5.409: 83-2

“It is not unlikely that terrorist organizations will have access to nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and biological weapons of mass destruction. For those dedicated to political terrorism and willing to use superviolent weapons for their cause, numerous scenarios may be constructed about the extreme vulnerability of US nuclear power plants, computers, water systems, and liquefied natural gas and other energy systems.”

USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO SECURE AMERICA'S BORDERS: INS PROBLEMS WITH PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 11 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 69p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 107-43

“...this hearing is so vital because the mission of the INS to provide immigration services to alien citizens and businesses and to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws is absolutely dependent upon information technology. With poor information technology, we are making Immigration inspectors, Border Patrol officers and investigators work too hard.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42923> (PDF)

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/75673.pdf> (PDF)

VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL PROPERTY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. General Accounting Office. June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 43p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-03-748

“The Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia’s CCTV system was implemented, among other things, to facilitate crowd management during large demonstrations; however, officials indicated that the system could also be used to help combat terrorism. The system is used on an as-needed basis for such things as crowd control and when the national terrorism threat level is set to high alert (code orange).”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37480>

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-748> (PDF)

VULNERABILITIES TO WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE: INSPECTORS GENERAL VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND TRADE PROGRAMS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 15 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 238p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: W 28/21

“In addition to the threat posed by unauthorized intrusion into DoD information systems, a wide range of other security issues confront the DoD. Those threats include terrorism against U.S. personnel and facilities, conducted by either conventional or

non-conventional means, and the disclosure or theft of sensitive military technology. The terrorist attack on the USS COLE in Yemen and security breaches at the FBI, the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency and DoD graphically demonstrated that security vulnerabilities need to be matters of utmost concern. Recent audits have indicated that the DoD needs to improve security measures to guard against both internal and external threats. We have not audited force protection issues, but we have reviewed a number of other areas where unacceptable vulnerability exists.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19229>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19230> (PDF)

THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM: WORKING TOGETHER TO PROTECT AMERICA. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 4 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 85p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.108-137

“Today’s hearing will focus on the war against terrorism and coordinated efforts to disrupt and disable terrorist organizations and to protect our country from terrorist attacks.” Includes testimony from Attorney General John Ashcroft, Homeland Security Department Secretary Tom Ridge, and FBI Director Robert Mueller.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS40412> (PDF)

WAR ON TERRORISM: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 8 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 60p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 108/21

“Clearly, the Government has not pursued ending all immigration, but we do need to be more creative than the terrorists in finding loopholes in our immigration laws, closing those loopholes and not creating new immigration loopholes.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34343> (PDF)

WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING: TERROR HITS HOME. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. 103rd Congress, 1st

Session, 9 March 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. 116p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 103/28

“During the past few weeks, Americans have come to realize that the scourge of international terrorism does indeed have a domestic face. They have seen it in the television reports from New York City as a result of the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center Twin Towers. They have just seen it in the recent assassination of CIA workers just outside Washington by a Pakistani national, who then escaped to Pakistan, and they have seen it in the increasing reports and allegations that Middle East terrorist groups may be receiving financial support and political direction from centers here in America. According to some Federal law enforcement officials and terrorism experts we’ll hear from today, we may well see more, not less, of the domestic connection for extremist political groups determined to attack this country.”

WORLDWIDE THREAT FACING THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 105th Congress, 1st Session, 6 February 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 46p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.105-160

Arms proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, and threats to the United States National Military Information System.

THE WORLDWIDE THREAT TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 74p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-765

Testimony from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency “on the threats to United States interests” ... “agencies’ support to Operation Enduring Freedom and the extent to which this operation reveals any deficiencies in our ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence to warfighters and policymakers ... assessment of the extent to which Operation Enduring Freedom has disrupted the ability of the al Qaeda network to conduct operations against U.S. interests both here at home and throughout the world ... current military capability of the Iraqi regime including its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction ... what countries are exporting technologies that could help create weapons of mass destruction or the means to deliver them.”

WORLDWIDE THREATS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 2 February & 22 April 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 109p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.106-436

“...reviewing the growing international terrorism threat, including cyberterrorism, both at home and abroad. The bombings at our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania last year served as a grim reminder of the damage that can be inflicted by terrorist activity.”

WORLDWIDE THREATS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 3 February, 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 82p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.106-834

The dangers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, China and North Korea, and Usama Bin Laden and his associates in terrorism.