

—TERRORIST GROUPS: IDEOLOGIES, METHODS, FAILING STATES and RISING ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT—

AL QAEDA AFTER THE IRAQ CONFLICT. Library of Congress. Audrey Kurth Cronin. 23 May 2003. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2003. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RS21529

“At the heart of the analysis is the question of whether Al Qaeda can launch additional major attacks of strategic impact or whether the organization is now largely relegated to low level tactical attacks. In the wake of the Riyadh bombings, this report examines the debate about how to assess Al Qaeda’s strength and will explain the major points on which experts differ, as well as the assumptions underlying their arguments.”

Online

http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/iraq_alq.pdf (PDF)

AL-QAEDA AND THE GLOBAL REACH OF TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 3 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 71p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: T 27/5

The “extent of the al-Qaeda network” and “U.S. objectives with respect to Osama Bin Laden and other members of the al-Qaeda leadership. Weighs the narrow objective of retribution against al-Qaeda solely to the broader objective of forcefully discouraging state-sponsored or aided terrorism.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42949> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/75562.pdf (PDF)

AL QAEDA AND THE INTERNET: THE DANGER OF “CYBERPLANNING.” U.S. Department of Defense. Timothy L. Thomas. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 33, No. 1. Spring, 2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p. 112-123. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/1

“Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a “cyberplanning” tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options. Cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist Internet tool than the much touted and feared cyberterrorism option—attacks against information and systems resulting in violence against noncombatant targets.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf> (PDF)

ARE WE LISTENING TO THE ARAB STREET? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 156p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: AR 1

“On September 11, many Americans got their first glimpse of the hostility and resentment harbored by some against our people and our culture. Others have known for decades that a toxic antipathy often dominates the so-called Arab Street of Middle East public disclosure. Left unrebutted, anti-American invective invites others to translate animus into deadly action. So the war on terrorism must also be fought with words ... Over the past year, the State Department has increased the reach and frequency of both broadcast and Internet information on U.S. policy against terrorism. The new, more aggressive approach seeks to counter anti-American content polluting the global news cycle ... But there are those who believe we came too late to the battle for Arab hearts and minds and continue to lose ground to apparent unsophisticated opponents hiding in caves. Like the stereotypical ugly American tourist, critics claim we have only upped the volume, shouting the same culturally tone-deaf slogans at an audience that neither understands the language of Western thinking nor trusts the source of the message.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS39591> (PDF)

THE ATTACKS OF 9/11: EVIDENCE OF A CLASH OF RELIGIONS? U.S. Department of Defense. David G. Kibble. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 3,

Autumn 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p. 34-45.
[Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/3

“This article aims to unravel some of the religious background to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon ... It looks too at the religious background to events that have followed on from those attacks. Much of the latter part of the article will be devoted to examining any perceived ‘clash’ from the Muslim point of view in an attempt to generate a better understanding of how at least some Muslims view the West in general and America in particular. It will look, again from the Muslim point of view, at how any perception of a clash might be either ameliorated or neutralized.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/kibble.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/kibble.pdf> (PDF)

BACKGROUND: TERRORISM. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2001. 2p. [Report].

SuDoc# FEM 1.2: T 27/2

General information concerning international, domestic, biological and chemical terrorism. Past terrorist acts in the United States. Definition of terrorism. Effects of terrorism.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14923>

<http://www.fema.gov/library/terrbk.pdf> (PDF)

CAUSES OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol.8, No.4, June 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002. p.1. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.8/NO.4

“What are the factors that give rise to political violence in Pakistan, Egypt, and the occupied Palestinian territories? How do jihadi (holy war) groups in Indonesia and Pakistan use Islam to mobilize support? What strategies have the militant groups Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad employed to attract, retain, and deploy recruits in the West Bank, Gaza, Egypt, and Lebanon, and what motivates their behavior?”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002/6/index.html>

CHAOS AS STRATEGY. U.S. Department of Defense. P. H. Liotta. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p. 47-56. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/2

Puts forth the notion of the “chaos strategist” as the one of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. defense community at present and into the foreseeable future. These chaos strategists, recognizing the asymmetrical power of the United States against any foe, will increasingly rely on such tactics as attacks on physical infrastructures, contamination of food supplies, spreading of infectious diseases that cannot be controlled, promotion of intrastate and inter-ethnic conflicts in failed states, trafficking of drugs and weapons, and cyber-terrorism.

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02summer/liotta.htm>

THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF JIHAD IN ISLAM. U.S. Department of Defense. Michael G. Knapp. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 1, Spring 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p. 82-94. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/1

“The word “jihad” means “struggle” or “striving” (in the way of God) or to work for a noble cause with determination; it does not mean “holy war” (war in Arabic is *harb* and holy is *muqadassa*). Unlike its medieval Christian counterpart term, “crusade” (“war for the cross”), however, the term jihad for Muslims has retained its religious and military connotation into modern times. The word jihad has appeared widely in the Western news media following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but the true meaning of this term in the Islamic world (it is sometimes called the “sixth pillar” of the faith) is still not well understood by non-Muslims ... This article will trace the development of jihad through early Islamic history into the present day, and will focus on how jihad in concept and practice has been appropriated and distorted by Muslim extremists as part of their violent campaign against the West and their own governments. Jihad as a centerpiece of radical thought is illustrated by examining the doctrines of prominent extremist groups such as Hamas and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Misuse of the term by prominent extremist leaders, such as by Osama bin Laden and others in the quote above, is also addressed.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/knapp.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/knapp.pdf> (PDF)

COPING WITH TERRORISM. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 4, No. 6, October 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998. p.1. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.4/NO.6

“As the sole remaining superpower, the United States is seen by some terrorist groups in the Arab world as the enemy of tradition and hierarchy, the apostle of globalization and social forces that undermine traditional Islamic societies ... As long as those groups see themselves as victimized by the United States and all it stands for, they are unlikely to engage in political dialogue, making that option difficult for a target state to initiate.”

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERESTS ABROAD. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 February 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 255p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.104-510

“The most active terrorist groups have greatly expanded the geographic scope of their operations over the last 2 years. Organizations such as Lebanese Hizballah and the Egyptian group al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya have developed transnational infrastructures that they use for fund-raising, logistical support, and cooperation with other terrorist groups. These operations allow them to strike when and where they choose.”

DEMOCRITIZATION AND FAILED STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF UNGOVERNABILITY. U.S. Department of Defense. Robert H. Dorff. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1996. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996. p.17-31. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 26/2

“Communication technology was in no small part responsible for the demise of many centralized political and economic regimes; it simply became impossible to control information and ideas, and to manage political and economic intercourse within highly centralized and hierarchical systems. Subnational, transnational, and decentralized groups (such as organized crime, ethnic, and religious groups discussed above) can now compete with many formal governments for the loyalties of individuals. Developments in weapon technologies have further empowered such groups, providing them with the improved means to wage war against formal government authority and to conduct devastating terrorist campaigns against innocent populations designed to erode their faith in and support of their governments. And some technologies, by their very design, are nearly impossible for governments to monitor and control ... economic changes have also played a significant role in increasing ungovernability. The globalization of the world economy and financial markets, in part a result of the application of modern

communications and information technologies, has opened up borders and limited the effectiveness of national economic policies in ameliorating domestic problems. The widening gap between the haves and the have-nots, both within and across countries, has provided fertile soil for sowing seeds of dissatisfaction and fostering a search for simple alternatives. The latter, unfortunately, often have even more devastating consequences than the problems they were intended to solve.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/dorff.htm>

DRUG TRADE AND THE TERROR NETWORK. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 3 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 121p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/17

“For drug policy, the September 11th attacks on our country immediately highlighted the dark synergies between narcotics trafficking and international terrorism ... The Afghan drug trade has given direct financial support for the Taliban regime to harbor international terrorists and at least indirectly assist Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network to grievously attack the United States of America. The Taliban have controlled as much as 96 percent of the opium-growing area in Afghanistan and have consistently collected a 10 percent so-called ‘religious tax’ on the narcotics trade, despite the fact that drugs are against traditional Islamic law. Reports also suggest that the Taliban have actively participated in the drug trade by controlling trafficking groups within Afghanistan. Their total drug revenue could be more than \$50 million per year.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS24294> (PDF)

EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS AND THEIR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 2 November 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 35p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-297

“There is a certain conventional wisdom gaining some currency among experts that state sponsorship of terrorism has disappeared and that instead the U.S. faces some loosely knit independent actors who are not beholden or answerable to any foreign government. Thus we have a Saudi national, who once lived in the Sudan, based out

of Afghanistan, mounting terrorist attacks on U.S. installations in Africa. Now, who is to blame?”

THE FATE OF THE STATE. U.S. Department of Defense. Martin Van Creveld. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol.26, No.1, Spring 1996. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996. p.4-18. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 26/1

“As a recent article in the *Atlantic Monthly* has pointed out, in much of sub-Saharan Africa the state has already collapsed, often before it was able to properly establish itself. Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire all have been torn by civil war or, at the very least, disorder on a scale that approximates it. On the Mediterranean littoral the position of Egypt and Algeria is scarcely better, confronted as those states are by the formidable challenge of Islamic fundamentalism, which in recent years has led to the deaths of thousands and which shows no sign of abating ... modern technology, in the form of nuclear weapons on one hand and unprecedented means for communication and transportation on the other, has not resulted in the establishment of unshakable totalitarian dictatorships ... The net effect has been to make governments lose power in favor of organizations that are not sovereign and are not states ... Some of these organizations stand above the state—for example ... the United Nations, which since the Gulf War has begun to play a role akin to that of the medieval popes in authorizing or prohibiting a state from waging international war. Others are of a completely different kind, such as international bodies, multinational corporations, the media, and various terrorist organizations some of which can barely be told apart from gangs of ordinary criminals. What they all have in common is that they either assume some of the functions of the state or manage to escape its control. All also have his in common: being either much larger than states or without geographical borders, they are better positioned to take advantage of recent developments in transportation and communications. The result is that their power seems to be growing while that of the state declines.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/creveld.htm>

THE GLOBAL REACH OF AL-QAEDA. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 18 December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 32p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-390

“At today’s hearing, we will be examining the following: No. 1. The impact of U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial actions, the impact of those actions on the al-

Qaeda organization; No. 2. The global reach and threat of al-Qaeda cells, including the possibility that al-Qaeda terrorists have obtained materials useful in creating weapons of mass destruction; and No. 3. What can be done to build on the success of U.S. policies in fighting al-Qaeda terrorists and those that support them?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19421>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19422> (PDF)

GUERRILLA WARFARE: CAUSE AND CONFLICT. U.S. Department of Defense. Walter R. Thomas. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1981. 83p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 5.413: 81-3

“...guerrilla warfare always has had a demoralizing and destabilizing influence on structured military forces. Guerrillas are the bane of the professional soldier ... Guerrillas are the faceless death encountered where hazard no longer should exist—the already conquered terror that approaches stealthily again and again after it has been judged fairly subdued in combat ... Whether private armies, mercenaries, terrorists, militants, liberationists, revolutionaries, freedom fighters, irregulars, gangs, or gunmen, all such groups seem to have two guerrilla characteristics—they advocate a cause and introduce a conflict into a world already disordered.”

HATRED, VIOLENCE, AND THE WORK OF THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 7, No. 6/Vol. 8, No. 1, October/December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001. p.5. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.7/NO.6/& V.8/NO.1

“In support of the national endeavor to respond to the terrorist threat, the Institute of Peace will seek to expand activities in a broad range of areas where we have already done substantial work.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/pdf/pw1201.pdf> (PDF)

HAWALA AND UNDERGROUND TERRORIST FINANCING MECHANISMS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 14 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 49p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. B 22/3: S.HRG.107-660

“One system which bin Laden and his terrorist cells use to covertly move funds around the world is through Hawalas, an ancient and formerly widely unknown

system of transferring money. Today's hearing will examine Hawalas and how they have been exploited by Osama bin Laden. Although most Americans have never heard of a Hawala, that system almost certainly helped Al Qaeda terrorists move the money that financed their attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25707> (PDF)

HIZBOLLAH: TERRORISM, NATIONAL LIBERATION, OR MENACE? U.S. Department of Defense. Sami G. Hajjar. August 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 59p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146:

"In this monograph, the author advances the thesis that the conditions that give rise to acts of terrorism must be dealt with as urgently as combating those responsible for such acts. In the case of Hizballah, those conditions are essentially political. The situation contributing to the rise of Hizballah involves the political, economic, and social circumstances of the Shiite community of Lebanon as the country began to experience civil strife in the mid-1970s. The immediate cause for the creation of the organization was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, resulting in the prolonged occupation of south Lebanon."

Online

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/hizbala/hizbala.pdf> (PDF)

ILLICIT DIAMONDS, CONFLICT AND TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF U.S. AGENCIES IN FIGHTING THE CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 13 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 85p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.107-384

"We have learned that members of al Qaeda network may have bought large quantities of these illegal conflict diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone in advance of September 11 last year, anticipating the United States would seek to cut off its sources of funds ... It is now clear that ending the trade in conflict diamonds is not only the just, right, and moral thing to do, it is also in our immediate national interest to do so ... American consumers who purchase diamonds ... must be assured they are buying a diamond from a legitimate, legal, and responsible source."

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES: ARE PROCEEDS FROM COUNTERFEITED GOODS FUNDING TERRORISM? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 16 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 131p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IN 8/25

Report of a congressional delegation that visited the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay: "... Members and staff viewed warehouses full of confiscated counterfeit American items. One of the most disturbing items was a counterfeit Microsoft CD-ROM flight simulation program that was being marketed by depicting the September 11 attack with Osama bin Laden on the front cover of the CD. The delegation was told that this item, along with numerous others, was confiscated in raids of businesses owned by individuals with established links to Hezbollah and Hamas. The delegation was told of several examples of arrests made in the region for similar offenses ... Today, we will explore evidence that terrorists are becoming more creative with the financing of operations, especially when it concerns intellectual property crimes."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41846> (PDF)

http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/88392.pdf (PDF)

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PIRACY: A GROWING PROBLEM WITH LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 13 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 115p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 108/9

"...a lucrative trafficking in counterfeit and pirate products—music, movies, seed patents, software, tee-shirts, Nikes, knock-off CDs and 'fake drugs' accounts for much of the money the international terrorist network depends on to feed its operations ... Large, violent, highly organized criminal groups are getting rich from the theft of America's copyrighted products."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42208> (PDF)

<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/85643.pdf> (PDF)

INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL TERRORISM: ITS LINKS WITH ILLICIT DRUGS AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE IRA AND OTHER GROUPS IN COLOMBIA. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 24 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 117p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: T 27/6

“If the United States and its allies are to be successful in combating this growing threat, our efforts cannot be limited to isolated regions or single targets. Instead, we must combat an array of widely dispersed components simultaneously ... One of the most disturbing developments is the emergency nexus of organized crime, terrorism, and drugs. Nowhere is this destructive combination more advanced than in Colombia.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42862> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/78947.pdf (PDF)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND DRUG TRAFFICKING: PRESENT TRENDS IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Affairs; Committee on the Judiciary. 99th Congress, 1st Session, 13, 14, & 15 May 1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 426p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.99-372

“New developments and trends in terrorism are most disturbing. The advent of state-sponsored terrorism—that is, the use of terrorist attack as a type of surrogate warfare—poses new challenges. So does the increasing coordination among terrorist groups and the rising tide of religious fanaticism, especially among Shiite extremists. Recent revelations of links between major drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups threatens to provide well-organized, highly skilled terrorist organizations a consistent source of financing.”

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 99th Congress, 1st Session, 24 June; 15 July; 30 September 1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 443p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IS 4

“Islamic activists or fundamentalists believe that dependence on or imitation of the West has been responsible for a failure of political systems—and relative military impotence throughout much of the Moslem world ... U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the recent involvement in Lebanon, is viewed as governed by America’s special relationship with Israel. The more militant fundamentalists view contemporary Middle Eastern politics in terms of a Judeo-Christian conspiracy or alliance against the Moslem world. If many Americans carry stereotypes of Moslems as terrorists, many Moslems see Westerners as perpetrators of a Crusader mentality toward Islam, which they believe informs a policy of American neocolonialism, both by government and by multinationals ... They believe that modern states in the

Moslem world are doomed to failure so long as they look to the West and fail to root their identity and sociopolitical development directly in Islam.”

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN AFRICA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 20 May 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 122p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IS 4/2

“Revivalism has been precipitated by the perception or experience of failure or crises (political, economic, sociomoral) domestically and internationally in the Muslim world, the failures of Arab nationalism and socialism as witnessed in the faltering economies and high unemployment which erupted in the ‘food riots’ and public protest of the late 1980s. Disaffection and disillusionment, self-criticism and doubt turn many to new alternatives. Islam has provided a faith and vision of history to fall back upon both in reassessing their lives and for guidance. Islamic activists place the blame for the crises in their lives and societies on regimes with their westernized secular elites and their western allies. Islam is declared the solution though its meaning varies. Activists call for a return to their Arab/Islamic heritage as a source of identity, solidarity, morality, and social justice. Islamic organizations thus become reform/protest movements that challenge the legitimacy of regimes and call for a moral reconstruction of society.”

THE MEDIA, DIPLOMACY, AND TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 99th Congress, 1st Session, 30 July 1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 152p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: M 46/5

“The subcommittee meets today to investigate the role of the media and diplomacy particularly during a crisis situation such as a terrorist attack, or hijacking, or a hostage situation such as we experienced recently in Beirut ... Is it the Middle East particularly that has been and no doubt will continue to be the center stage for terrorism, especially those actions directed against the United States. Radical factions in Libya, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere have all demonstrated their readiness to use terrorism as a means of promoting their causes. As the face of warfare continues to change from the conventional to the symbolic warfare of terrorism, the media is caught in a historic dilemma. How to cover acts of war against the United States in which their role is itself a critical dimension. It is that dilemma that we meet to discuss today. Is there a line to be drawn between the pros and cons of aggressive media coverage of crises; and if so, do we lose, what do we lose, and what do we gain.”

NARCO-TERROR: THE WORLDWIDE CONNECTION BETWEEN DRUGS AND TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 13 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 60p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-885

“...some reports maintain that Al Qaeda earned cash by protecting Afghanistan’s shipments of opium bound for the West. There are indications that bin Laden served as a middleman for the Afghan opium producers, using income derived from this role to run terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30281> (PDF)

NARCO-TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM—A DANGEROUS MIX. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 20 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 113p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.108-173

“Terrorist organizations developed relationships with illicit narcotics traffickers. In areas such as Afghanistan, a fundamentalist regime became wholly dependent on opium production at the time it became the host of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda ... The connection between Middle Eastern terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas, and Latin American drug trafficking has been reported in the Tri-Border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which has long been characterized as a regional hub for radical Islamic groups which engage in arms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, money laundering and movement of pirated goods ... Recently, in April 2003, the FBI and DEA disrupted a major Afghanistan-Pakistani heroin smuggling operation with the arrest of 16 individuals, in which heroin was being shipped to the United States, profits from the sale of heroin were laundered through Afghanistan and Pakistani-owned businesses in the United States, and then sent back to finance terrorists.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41668> (PDF)

NATURE AND THREAT OF VIOLENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS IN AMERICA. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. 104th Congress, 1st Session, 2 November 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 297p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 104/51

“The question arises as to what motivates people to become involved in the types of organizations under discussion. There are a number of social psychological theories, but none seems to explain all the behavior that some of us have observed over the years. The self-educated intellectual longshoreman Eric Hoffer in his little classic, ‘The True Believer,’ stressed frustration and boredom as reasons for joining and related these to experience of failure ... Since we seem to be dealing here with folks who feel that all channels through which grievances are redressed have been closed for some time, we should understand that a small number of them are quite willing to translate their dogmatic beliefs into violent action. The question is, what do we who are committed to a belief in the open society do about it when the extremist becomes a terrorist?”

NONSTATE ACTORS IN COLUMBIA: THREAT AND RESPONSE. U.S. Department of Defense. Max G. Manwaring. May 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 37p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002017599

“The first step in developing a macro-level vision, policy, and strategy to deal with the Colombian crisis in a global context is to be clear on what the Colombian crisis is, and what the fundamental threats implicit (and explicit) in it are. Political and military leaders can start thinking about the gravity of the terrorist strategy employed by Colombia’s stateless adversaries from this point. It is also the point from which leaders can begin developing responses designed to secure Colombian, hemispheric, and global stability. In this monograph, then, the author seeks to explain the Colombian crisis in terms of nonstate threats to the state and to the region—and appropriate strategic-level responses.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19566> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/actors/actors.pdf> (PDF)

OUR NEW OLD ENEMIES. U.S. Department of Defense. Ralph Peters. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 29, No. 2. Summer 1999. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1999. p. 22-37. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 29/2

“Those myths of the lost golden age are most seductive in turbulent times. In the ferocity, confusion, and competition of the moment, we need to believe that things were not always so hard or so unfair, that there was a time of greater kindness and justice, when man’s better qualities prevailed—and that such an epoch might return,

if only we take the correct actions. Whether a radicalized mullah aching to turn back the clock to the days of the great caliphs, or a weekend militiaman in the American Midwest longing for the surety of a misremembered childhood, the impulse to believe that times were better once upon a time is universal ... In periods of great change, human beings respond by turning to religion and resuscitating tradition. In the age of science, the frightened turn to belief ... The media create instant myth. An illusion of America arrives, courtesy of lurid television serials, exaggerating Western wealth, ease, and sexuality. There is no mention of the sufferings of our ancestors on the long road to contemporary prosperity, or even of the workaday lives of average Americans today. It is as if our riches have fallen from the skies. It is an unbearable spectacle to those who have not. At the same time, those who watch from abroad, appetites growing, find themselves less and less able to compete with the American juggernaut ... When nations and their underlying cultures fail to qualify in today's hyper-competitive world, they first complain. Then, if there is no turnaround, they kill."

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/peters1.htm>

AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 26 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 50p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/18: T 27/7

"...since the early 1990s, the terrorist threat has evolved, and the most dangerous attacks against the United States and our friends have come from radical fundamentalist groups, such as al-Qaida. Most of them are self-supporting, in that the bulk of their funding has been raised through supporters, diversion of legitimate charitable giving, criminal activities, and front companies. The 1998 attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen, and the September 11 attacks burned into the world's consciousness the broad reach and vicious mentality of al-Qaida ... Al-Qaida is probably the terrorist group with the broadest international reach but there are regional-based groups that continue to pose a threat to American lives and American friends."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS32091> (PDF)

http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/86080.pdf (PDF)

PATRIOT ACT OVERSIGHT: INVESTIGATING PATTERNS OF TERRORIST FINANCING. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and

Investigations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 173p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49/20: 107-53

“In their effort to blend in, the terrorists responsible for the September 11th attack opened bank accounts, used money orders, wire transfers and credit cards. We also know that the terrorists also relied on fraud and ID theft ... They obtain drivers licenses, hazardous materials licenses and open bank accounts ... We will also hear from law enforcement and industry on this issue and explore potential new patterns that they may have identified as terrorist financing schemes.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22155>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22156> (PDF)

THE PLAGUE OF IDEAS. U.S. Department of Defense. Ralph Peters. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2000. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 30/4

“Several years ago--an antique age by technology's present measure--Americans enjoyed a brief infatuation with books and films about horrific diseases that, once unleashed, might ravage middle-class neighborhoods. While sober attention must be paid to even the least chance of new pandemics, whether sparked by global-man's intrusion on remote territories, or spread by adept madmen or the decay of biological warfare facilities in the former Soviet Union, the alarmists missed the epoch-defining symptoms erupting in front of their faces: For the first time in history, thanks to a dynamic constellation of communications tools, ideas can spread to the world's masses more quickly than epidemic disease.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/peters.htm>

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 2002. U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2003. 28p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 2002

“During the year, there were increased anti-U.S. demonstrations and incidents around the world to protest Israeli military action in response to Palestinian terrorism and to denounce related U.S. policy. There were 116 demonstrations directed against U.S. interests, of which 102 were peaceful and 14 were violent ... The incidents occurred

with greatest frequency in March and April, when Israeli Defense Forces undertook military operation (codename Operation Defensive Shield) with the expressed goal of destroying terrorist infrastructure in Palestinian-controlled territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The violent demonstrations were directed primarily against U.S. businesses, specifically fast food restaurants ... on April 18, in Udayri, Kuwait a vehicle carrying several Arab men overtook and fired on two U.S. Marines traveling in an unmarked vehicle ... Of the 118 incidents that involved U.S. citizens and interests, 97 specifically targeted Americans.”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/26707.pdf> (PDF)

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 2001. U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2002. 76p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 2001

“As of this report, the September 11 attack against the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon will go down in history as the most lethal terrorist attack. As part of our response against the terrorist group responsible for the attack and the government that harbors them, the U.S. Military on October 7, 2001 began carefully targeted military operations (codename: Operation Enduring Freedom) against al-Qa’ida terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In response to Operation Enduring Freedom we witnessed 248 anti-U.S. demonstrations and incidents against U.S. interests worldwide. In fact, anti-U.S. demonstrations against our facilities began soon after September 11 in anticipation of our taking military action against Afghanistan ... A HAMAS suicide bomber detonated an explosive device at a bus junction in Jerusalem, killing two people and wounding four. One of the injured was an American ... Two Americans were injured when their car was fired on by Palestinian Fatah activists near the West Bank settlement where they resided. A HAMAS suicide bomber entered a busy restaurant in Jerusalem and detonated a bomb, killing 15 people and injuring 130 others. Four of the injured were Americans. A bomb exploded near a shop in al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia killing two people and injuring four others. An American was among the injured ... 240 Americans were killed in the Pentagon and Pennsylvania terrorist incidents on September 11. Official figures from New York City authorities on U.S. citizen casualties in the World Trade Center attacks are unavailable ... Of the 252 incidents that involved U.S. citizens and interests, 244 specifically targeted Americans.”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19799.pdf> (PDF)

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 2000. U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2001. 30p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 2000

“Of the 177 incidents that involved U.S. citizens and interests, 174 specifically targeted Americans ... Seventeen Americans were killed when the U.S. Navy destroyer, the U.S.S. Cole, was attacked by terrorists during a scheduled refueling stop in Aden Harbor, Yemen ... Thirty-nine Americans were injured ... October 4 and 6, 2000—Damascus, Syria: Thousands of anti-U.S. demonstrators attacked the U.S. Embassy in Damascus on two separate occasions with Molotov cocktails and rocks to protest U.S. support for Israel. Eventually, tear gas successfully dispersed the crowd ... A vehicle containing an American Embassy family was attacked by an angry mob during a violent demonstration in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. All of the windows in the car were shattered and the family was eventually evacuated to the hospital for treatment of non-life threatening injuries. The anti-U.S. protestors numbered approximately 15,000 and attacked Jordanian security services...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19800.pdf> (PDF)

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1999. U.S. Department of State. December 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2000. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 1999

“The ‘year of anti-U.S. demonstrations’ may best describe 1999. During 1999, there were 921 demonstrations directed against U.S. interests worldwide. Approximately 97 percent of the demonstrations were directed against the U.S. Government or diplomatic facilities. Forty-four of the demonstrations were violent. Anti-U.S. demonstrations were held in response to various world events where the U.S. Government’s involvement was perceived to be pivotal ... Of the 257 incidents that affected the safety of U.S. citizens and the security of their interests, 245 specifically targeted Americans...” As in most previous years, the vast majority of anti-American incidents took place in South America, specifically in Colombia.

Online

<http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rpt/23133.htm>

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1998. U.S. Department of State. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1999. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 1998

“August 7, 1998—Nairobi, Kenya: When the driver realized that they could not penetrate the dual security perimeter protecting the underground basement entrance, he detonated the truck bomb ... The explosion killed 291 people and injured nearly 5,000. Among the dead were 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service nationals (FSNs) employed by the U.S. Embassy. Six Americans and 13 FSNs were injured. The majority of the deaths were caused by the collapse of the Ufundi Building located 2-3 meters from the blast site ... August 7, 1998—Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Almost simultaneously to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi at approximately 10:39 a.m., a truck bomb pulled up to the front entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. As the truck bomb approached the entrance to the Embassy, an Embassy water truck was blocking the entrance to the Embassy. The presence of the water truck coupled with access control procedures prevented the truck bomb from entering the compound. The driver then detonated the truck bomb, which was located 10-12 meters from the U.S. Embassy building. The explosion killed 10 people (no Americans) and injured 77 people, including one American ... December 19, 1998—Damascus, Syria: An angry mob consisting of thousands of Syrians and Palestinians attacked the U.S. Embassy compound following a pro-Iraq demonstration that turned violent.”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19807.pdf> (PDF)

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 6, No. 1, December 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999. p.4. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.6/NO.1

“The way the media cover terrorist organizations, their leaders, and acts of political violence may inadvertently further the goals of terrorist groups ... Media coverage of terrorist incidents inadvertently plays into the terrorists’ hands by giving them a public voice and heightened visibility.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/pdf/pw1299.pdf> (PDF)

PREPARING FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 20 September 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 179p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/15

“Several surprising facts about bin Laden’s group came to light during the trials of the men involved in the 1998 attack against U.S. embassies in Africa. And those facts reveal how well organized, sophisticated and elusive a network we’re up against. U.S.

government officials estimate that bin Laden's organization, al Qaeda, has thousands of operatives who are active, or suspected to be active, in 34 countries, including the United States ... The al Qaeda organization, and others like it ... have wings that handle finance, documents, public-relations and intelligence. They run businesses. They conduct surveillance of enemy targets. They cultivate journalists to ensure favorable coverage in the press. They have sophisticated websites for both fund-raising and recruiting. Clerics teach operatives that killing civilians is allowed. A former member of al Qaeda explained how a charismatic teacher taught him not to fear killing non-combatants. If the innocent victim is 'a good person,' his teacher said, 'he goes to paradise.' If he's a bad person, 'he goes to hell.'"

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19244>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19245> (PDF)

ROLLING BACK RADICAL ISLAM. U.S. Department of Defense. Ralph Peters. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p. 4-16. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/3

"Fundamentalist terrorism has not arisen despite the progress the world has made, but because of it ... We face a failing civilization in the Middle East. But if we have the least spark of wisdom, we will do all that we can to ensure the failure does not spread from cultures that have made socioeconomic suicide pacts with themselves to lands that still might adapt to the demands of the modern and post-modern worlds."

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/peters.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/peters.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1997. U.S. Department of State. November 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1998. 72p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 997

"In this tenth anniversary issue ... we review the terrorist events and trends that have affected Americans visiting, living, and working overseas. The information contained in this section illustrates the broad spectrum of political violence and terrorism that Americans and American interests have faced overseas. A historical review of the types of Anti-American incidents show that bombings are the primary mode of attack—1,163. The majority of bombings were against U.S. business interests. Of the

761 Americans murdered abroad since 1968, 459 lives were taken in just five attacks. These attacks were suspected to be state-sponsored. Our chronology of lethal attacks against Americans provides a synopsis of all those terrorist and political attacks that resulted in the death of Americans overseas. In this chronology, we provide statistics from 1968 when the U.S. Government first started keeping such records ... Finally, we look at Operation Desert Storm, the one major event that resulted in the most dramatic increase in anti-American incidents during the past 10 years. In that 20-day period, 135 attacks against Americans and U.S. interests were carried out worldwide, including an assassination and an attempted assassination.”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19808.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1996. U.S. Department of State. July 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1997. 35p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 996

“...Three Americans were killed in a suicide bombing in Jerusalem on February 25, 1996. One American was killed when two gunmen opened fire near the Israeli complex of Bet El in the West Bank on May 13, 1996. One American was killed in a drive-by shooting in the West Bank on June 9, 1996. Nineteen American military personnel were killed when a truck bomb exploded at the al-Khobar military housing facility in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19810.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1995. U.S. Department of State. July 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1996. 27p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 995

“...One American was killed in a suicide bombing in the Gaza Strip on April 9, 1995. One American was killed in a suicide bombing in Jerusalem on August 22, 1995. An Israeli-American dual citizen was stabbed to death in Jerusalem on September 5, 1995. One American serviceman and four U.S. contractors were killed in the bombing of the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG) building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on November 13, 1995. Two American diplomats were killed in an attack on a U.S. Consulate shuttle bus in Karachi, Pakistan, on March 8, 1995...”

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1994. U.S. Department of State. April 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1995. 25p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 994

“There were 110 anti-US incidents in 1994 ... January 26, 1994—Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: A U.S. diplomat employed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was the target of an assassination attempt while traveling home ... January 31, 1994—Mogadishu, Somalia: At about 11 a.m., a United States Liaison Office (USLO) convoy ... was attacked ... August 22, 1994—Mogadishu, Somalia: At approximately 10 a.m., a FAST Marine convoy transporting the U.S. Ambassador was attacked by armed Somali militiamen ... September 5, 1994—Mogadishu, Somalia: A U.S. military motorcade, along with armored personnel carriers from the Australian contingent of UNOSOM, was attacked ... February 7, 1994—Cairo, Egypt: Suspected members of the al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (the Islamic Group) exploded a small device outside a Misr-American Bank (a joint Egyptian-American owned private bank) ...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19812.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1993. U.S. Department of State. August 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1994. 36p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 993

“Mogadishu, Somalia: A total of 30 American servicemen were killed in action and 175 were wounded in action, during the U.S. military intervention in Somalia. Twenty-nine casualties took place in 1993 ... January 15, 1993—Sanaa, Yemen: An M-20 bazooka round fell in an open field approximately 70 meters outside the U.S. Embassy perimeter wall ... January 25, 1993—Sanaa, Yemen: An explosive device detonated outside the perimeter wall of the U.S. Embassy ... August 30, 1993—Kuwait City, Kuwait: Unknown persons using automatic weapons fired on an apartment building housing employees of a U.S. Department of Defense contractor ... October 26, 1993—Cairo, Egypt: A lone, apparently deranged, gunman opened fire in the coffee lounge of the Semiramis Hotel, killing two Americans, one Frenchman, and one Italian ... February 26, 1993—New York, New York: At midday, a yellow Ryder rental van packed with explosives detonated at the World Trade Center, killing six people and injuring about a thousand others ... Investigation of the incident by various Federal law enforcement agencies led to the arrest of several suspects, most of whom were foreign nationals and followers of the blind Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19813.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1992. U.S. Department of State. June 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1993. 36p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 992

“There were 189 anti-U.S. incidents in 1992 ... December 23, 1992—Somalia: Traveling on the road to the food and supplies distribution center in Bardera, Somalia, a civilian U.S. Army employee was killed and three State Department security personnel were wounded in a land mine explosion. They were the first American casualties of the deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia ... December 29, 1992—Aden, Yemen: Bombs exploded at two hotels where more than 100 U.S. military personnel, who were serving in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, were billeted...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20310.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1991. U.S. Department of State. June 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1992. 51p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 991

“There were 334 Anti-U.S. incidents in 1991 ... February 1, 1991—Cairo, Egypt: Two small explosions occurred inside the American Express office in Garden City, Cairo ... February 3, 1991—Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: A contract bus transporting U.S. Air Force personnel was fired upon by unknown assailants ... March 6, 1991—Kuwait City, Kuwait: An explosion occurred at the U.S. Embassy ... August 13, 1991—Peshawar, Pakistan: USAID Contractor Moqim Rahmanzai was shot and wounded while on his way to work at the University of Nebraska (Omaha) Educational Sector Support Project ... November 8, 1991—Beirut, Lebanon: An explosion occurred at the American University Beirut (AUB), causing heavy damage to several buildings ... December 30, 1991—Baghdad, Iraq: A powerful explosion ripped through a parking lot of the Ishtar Sheraton Hotel ... the Sheraton is across the street from the Palestine Hotel, where UN personnel were staying...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20308.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1990. U.S. Department of State. July 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1991. 32p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 990

“There were 233 anti-American incidents in 1990 ... January 5, 1990—Peshawar, Pakistan: An American guard assigned to U.S. Consulate Peshawar’s new office building was attacked and beaten by three unidentified individuals ... March 27, 1990—Lebanon: Three masked gunmen entered the home of a Christian U.S. missionary and shot and killed him with a silenced pistol ... June 8, 1990—East Jerusalem: An American tourist was stabbed and slightly wounded ... August 29, 1990—Amman, Jordan: An Iraqi-American citizen was assaulted and threatened by two unknown Arab men...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20307.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1989. U.S. Department of State. 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1990. 35p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 989

“There were 184 Anti-American incidents in 1989 ... On September 19, 1989 UTA Flight 772 exploded and crashed in the Tenere Desert near Agadez, Niger. All 171 passengers (including 7 Americans) aboard the aircraft were killed ... February 12, 1989—Islamabad, Pakistan: During an afternoon demonstration, the USIS ACC in Islamabad was attacked by a violent mob. The demonstrators were protesting the publication in the United States of author Salman Rushdie’s book *Satanic Verses*, viewed by many Muslims as blasphemous ... Three American journalists covering the event were physically abused ... July 6, 1989—Tel Aviv, Israel: A Palestinian passenger on a bus en route to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv grabbed control of the steering wheel from the bus driver, while shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ (God is Great). The man forced the bus into a ravine, where it caught fire. Sixteen people (including one American) died in the crash, and 27 others (including seven Americans) were injured ... July 31, 1989—Beirut, Lebanon: The Organization of the Oppressed of the Earth announced that Lt. Col. William Higgins had been hanged in response to the July 29 Israeli abduction of a Hizballah religious leader, Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid. A videotape was released showing a body hanging from a gallows ... August 18, 1989—El-Bireh, West Bank: The U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem was notified that the body of Amjad Gibril, a 14-year-old American citizen of Palestinian descent, had been found in El-Bireh...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20306.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1988. U.S. Department of State. May 1989. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1989. 43p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 988

“Bomb Attack on the Acropole Hotel, Khartoum, Sudan, May 15, 1988: Three Americans, two women and one man, were listed among the casualties resulting from the explosion ... During the trial [the perpetrators] admitted to having been trained in Lebanon. They told the court that their action was aimed at Western interests. Twenty-five-year-old Hassan Qasim Nimr was quoted as saying, ‘I was defending the Palestinian, Lebanese, and Arab cause ... we targeted Western interests because they gave our land to Zionists and are still meddling in the Arab world...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20305.pdf> (PDF)

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICANS: 1987. U.S. Department of State. April 1988. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1988. 43p. [Report].

SuDoc# S 1.138/2: 987

“April 2, 1987—Cairo, Egypt: A Sunni extremist hurled a Molotov cocktail (beer bottles filled with gasoline) over the fence at the residence of the President of the American University in Cairo ... May 11, 1987—Kuwait: A bombing seriously damaged the offices of the Al-Rashed travel company, an agent for TWA and several other airlines. A male Yemeni employee of the travel company was killed in the blast. The attack may have been sponsored by Iran in retaliation for Kuwait’s backing of Iraq in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war ... May 26, 1987—Cairo, Egypt: Three officers of the American Embassy in Cairo were the targets of an assassination attempt ... November 25, 1987—Kuwait: A Molotov cocktail was thrown at the front door of the American Life Insurance Company (ALICO)...”

Online

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20304.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURES IN CONFLICT. U.S. Department of Defense. Paul M. Belbutowski. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1996. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996. p.32-42. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 26/1

“Religion has its force in the essential mystery of the religious experience in all cultures. Islam, identified by some as being on a collision course with the West, combines government and religion, where the US secularist tradition separates

church and state. US leaders, for example, may be surprised that Muslims worldwide express solidarity with Islam, even if this trend is gradual or almost imperceptible. To miss this point it to underestimate the Order of Battle of Islamic militants, or understanding the modus operandi of Muslim-oriented terrorist groups, are surface factors alongside the diverse power of the religion itself ... This article does not suggest that leaders should attempt to cover the vast intellectual ground of culture and time themselves, but that such an appreciation is fundamentally relevant to the times in which we live when the survival of Western institutions in their current form may be in question. It is also fundamental to problems one can encounter in failed or failing states, where the military instrument does not necessarily prevail.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/belbutow.htm>

TERRORISM FINANCING: ORIGINATION, ORGANIZATION, AND PREVENTION. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 31 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 194p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9:S.HRG.108-245

“Today, the Committee on Governmental Affairs is holding a hearing on the financing of terrorism. Terrorism costs money. From funds needed to buy explosives and airline tickets, to living expenses, to payoffs to the families of suicide bombers, terrorists must have constant and untraceable sources of money. Stopping the flow of these funds is a formidable task. Osama bin Laden is an experienced financier who once reportedly boasted that he and other al-Qaeda leaders know the cracks in the Western financial system like the lines on their own hands.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44946> (PDF)

TERRORISM: GROWING WAHHABI INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 26 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 92p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.108-267

“The problem we are looking at today is the State-sponsored doctrine and funding of an extremist ideology that provides the recruiting grounds, support infrastructure and monetary life blood of today’s international terrorists. The extremist ideology is Wahhabism, a major force behind terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, a group that, according to the FBI ... is the ‘number one terrorist threat to the U.S. today.’ Nearly 22 months have passed since the atrocity of September 11th. Since then, many

questions have been asked about the role in that day's terrible events and in other challenges we face in the war against terror of Saudi Arabia and its official sect, a separatist, exclusionary and violent form of Islam known as Wahhabism ... since the Wahhabi presence in the United States is a foreboding one that has potentially harmful and far-reaching consequences for our Nation's mosques, schools, prisons and even our military, these hearings could not come at a more opportune time."

TERRORISM: NEAR EASTERN GROUPS AND STATE SPONSORS, 2002. Library of Congress. Kenneth Katzman. 13 February 2002. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2002. [Online Report].

SuDoc# LC 14.19/3: RL31119

"The Al Qaeda terrorist network founded by Osama bin Laden is believed to pose a continuing, although diminished, threat to the United States at home and to U.S. interests and allies abroad following the network's defeat in its base in Afghanistan. As stated in taped appearances by its leaders since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the goal of Al Qaeda is to destroy high profile U.S. targets in order to end what Al Qaeda claims is U.S. suppression of Islamic societies. In these appearances, bin Laden virtually claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks. Throughout its history, Al Qaeda has sought to oust pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and gain removal of U.S. troops from the region."

Online

<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf> (PDF)

TERRORISM, THE MEDIA, AND THE GOVERNMENT. U.S. Department of Defense. L. Paul Bremer, III. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 18, No. 1, March 1988. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1988. p.52-59. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 18/1

"...given the media's involvement in terrorist incidents, it seems to me that reporters and their editors should be asking themselves some tough questions as they cover terrorist incidents ... 1. Have my competitive instincts run away with me? ... 2. What is the benefit in revealing the professional and personal history of a hostage before he or she is released? ... One former hostage is certain that the lies he told his captors saved his life ... 3. When reporting on the statements made by hostages and victims, have I given sufficient weight to the fact that *all* such statements are made under duress? ... 4. Should I use statements, tapes, and the like provided by the terrorists? 5. How often should I use live coverage? ... Giving extensive coverage to terrorist statements may well encourage future acts of terrorism ... 6. Am I judging sources as critically as I would at other times? ... During terrorist incidents we have all seen

reporting of what amounts to nothing more than rumor ... 7. Should I even *try* to report on possible military means to rescue the hostages? ... A particularly reprehensible practice by some news organizations is trying to discover and publish reports on the movements of military forces during a terrorist incident ... 8. What about honest consideration for the victims' families? One former hostage recounts how his teenage son received a telephone call in the middle of the night. The journalist calling had a question: "The latest reports indicate that your father will be executed in two hours. Any response?"

THE TERRORIST AND HIS VICTIM. U.S. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. 95th Congress, 1st Session, 21 July 1977. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 33p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: T 27/6

"The resort to the soulless violence we call terrorism requires a peculiar, personal commitment that is complex and intricate in its genesis. Those who plan and direct, and those who execute terroristic enterprises either love such extreme violence for its own sake, or they are persuaded or persuade themselves that it is both necessary and efficacious. Terrorism is so awful that it needs a justification. It is approached by the reasoning with a fervent appeal to ideology, by the moronic with blind, soldierly obedience. Neither politics nor ideology make terrorists; they are only rationalizations for acts of terrorism ... Acts of terror are intended to influence, to bring power through violence to those in whom such power does not ordinarily reside ... the media has a vital role to play in shaping the future course of terrorism. Terrorism will atrophy when it is seen no longer to pay. A big part of the payoff is in media publicity, the brief moment in history when the little man hopes to play the hero he never was. No innocent victim should have to pay with his life for another's moment of false glory."

TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES. U.S. Department of Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. 131p. [Report].

SuDoc# D 1.2: T 27

"Middle Eastern terrorism revolves around the issues of a Palestinian homeland, Israel's existence and policies, Arab states jockeying for regional power, sectarian strife, religious extremism, and, until recently, the Iran—Iraq War. The dramatic rise of Middle Eastern terrorism is a direct result of the steady growth of state support. Middle East groups and state agents have operated globally and have obtained sophisticated arms, extensive logistics, precise intelligence, and safehaven."

TERRORIST FINANCING: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49/20: 107-83

“One month after the attacks, this committee passed the most far-reaching anti-money-laundering legislation in more than two decades, aimed at giving the government even more tools to disrupt terror financing and to stop the laundering of money from other illegal activities ... However, a United Nations report that will be released today says, ‘The terrorists still have access to sizable chunks of money.’ And reports have indicated that they have transformed cash into commodities, from heroin to gold, and are moving and using it in a form to fund their efforts.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29017> (PDF)

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 15 November 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 44p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-455

“The alternative of not understanding motivations or objectives, has disastrous consequences. We have only to look as far back as September 11, the hijackings of that day, for a very real example. Up until that time the majority of hijackings did not result in a great loss of life. Therefore, the pilots and crew of aircraft were trained to cooperate, avoid resistance, and calm the passengers. That training was ineffective, given the motives and objectives of these killers, the enemy we face today. As a result, we were left unprotected and unprepared.”

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 23 September 1974. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 96p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: T 27/4/PT.1

“The SLA exemplifies the new breed of terrorist we will continue to encounter. He is better educated, resourceful, disciplined, and armed with a political ideology which serves to motivate him. Along with this, he usually has no interest in material or monetary gain; neither he nor his peripheral supporters can be easily bribed. In addition to these characteristics, the new breed of terrorist views himself in a historical perspective; time, he feels, is on his side. He views the revolutionary

struggle as a protracted one, and he chooses where and when he will act with deliberation ... The domestic terrorist identifies closely with his foreign counterparts and their struggles abroad. The exploits of the Tupamaros, Al Fatah, and the IRA are studied and followed. Similar to foreign terrorists, U.S. revolutionaries are attempting to institutionalize their activity; to many it has become a full-time occupation ... The apprehension of terrorists is a difficult task. Conventional police methods employed against politically motivated terrorists are inadequate. Ordinary felons are much more vulnerable to detection than 'political' terrorists."

TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 14 May 1975. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 260p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: T 27/4/PT.4

"The aims of disruptive terrorism are: self-publicity; to build up the movement's morale and prestige; to discredit and demoralize the authorities; to provoke the authorities into taking excessively harsh repressive measures, likely to alienate the population and force a rising spiral of official expenditure in arms, lives and money, resulting in public clamor for the abandonment of counteraction. The aims of coercive terrorism are: to demoralize the civil population, weaken its confidence in central authority, and instill fear of the terrorist movement; to make an example of selected victims, by torture and/or death to force obedience to the leadership of the movement. There is an important observation to be made at this point: terrorism is a weapon of the weak."

A THEORY OF FUNDAMENTALISM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOVEMENT. U.S. Department of Defense. Stephen C. Pelletiere. 28 September 1995. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995. 63p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2001041906

"Containment of fundamentalism depends first and foremost on accurate information about the nature of the movement ... examines the origins of various fundamentalist groups that are challenging [Middle Eastern] governments, and explains why they were able to grow in the face of official repression by some of the most sophisticated and well-equipped security services in the world ... concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14275> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1995/theory/theory.pdf> (PDF)

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs95/theory/theory.pdf> (PDF)

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN AFRICA. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Africa. 104th Congress, 1st Session, 6 April 1995. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. 74p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IS 4

“Islamic militancy has emerged as one of the most serious threats to Western security. It has increased interregional tensions and is forging new unholy alliances over the challenge posed by it. While the perception of Islamic extremism as exclusively a Middle Eastern problem lives on, thousands of African Islamic militants are being trained in making bombs, throwing hand grenades, and shooting assault weapons ... They are sworn to fight the ‘Great Satan America’ for the global supremacy of Islam. In this context, it is clear that Islamic extremism and militant groups pose a direct threat to regional stability, to the fragile democracies of the African continent, and to U.S. security interests. They overtly challenge U.S. leadership and that of its allies by making them primary targets of their hatred and their hostility.”

THREAT POSED BY THE CONVERGENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND TERRORISM. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 13 December 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 66p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 106/148

“Drug trafficking and terrorism are illegal, clandestine activities and they have a number of common needs: the acquisition of weapons, the maintaining of anonymity, hiding assets, keeping a steady flow of cash, and they both have found their hands strengthened through the ability to operate transnationally. It is important to bear in mind for a variety of reasons, including the collapse and diminished prosperity of certain governments, state funding for terrorism is drying up and terrorists are increasingly looking to crime for funding.”

TRANSCRIPT OF USAMA BIN LADEN VIDEO TAPE. U.S. Department of Defense. Osama Bin Laden. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001. 7p. [Transcript].

SuDoc# D 1.2: 2002006792

Transcript of the videotape on which Usama Bin Laden expresses surprise that the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were so devastating, praises the attackers, and admits complicity in the events of September 11, 2001.

[Online](#)

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS16430> (PDF)

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/d20011213ubl.pdf> (PDF)

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE AL QAEDA MODEL: CONFRONTING NEW REALITIES. U.S. Department of Defense. Paul J. Smith. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p. 33-46. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/2

“Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 was a major turning point in the evolution of international terrorism. In this case, the United States was attacked not by a fellow state, but a non-state terrorist organization ... The lesson to be learned from al Qaeda is that terrorist groups can now exist in a transnational milieu, divorced from state-driven constraints. Even if we witness the demise of al Qaeda, we are not likely to witness the demise of its model.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02summer/smith.htm>

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST: CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC? U.S. Department of Defense. Anthony H. Cordesman. 31 May 1999. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999. 231p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.2: T 68/9

“There is no doubt that the Middle East can present significant potential threats to the West. The Arab-Israeli conflict helped trigger an oil embargo in 1973, and has been a source of consistent political tension. The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War have both led to recent Western power projection in the region. Terrorist attacks have occurred in both Europe and the United States, and against Western citizens living and working in the Middle East. The military build-up in the region, and the steady process of creeping proliferation create new threats to a primary source of energy exports, as well as the growing risk of missile attacks on Western states or terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction.”

Online

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1999/tranthrt/tranthrt.pdf> (PDF)

UNORTHODOX THOUGHTS ABOUT ASYMMETRIC WARFARE. U.S. Department of Defense. Montgomery C. Meigs. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.4. [Article].

“One lesson of 9/11 is that al Qaeda now applies additional idiosyncratic threats to the operational structures of campaigns as well as to strategic targets. Operational asymmetry is important when military capabilities are employed. But today’s threat from terrorism and the type of operations we can expect from terrorist networks in the future derive from idiosyncratic uses of both military and nonmilitary capabilities ... By attacking idiosyncratically at a point the enemy selects in an attempt to avoid US operational advantages, and by exploiting our weaknesses or blind spots, the terrorist is capable of inflicting harm at will. His operational asymmetry is derived from his ability to continuously evolve new tactics and by the cellular and compartmented nature of his support structures ... Now that the unconventional threat is so closely linked to national defense, military leaders must be trained to recognize the wider problem ... The military cannot be saved only to fight the next world war. Leaders need to be trained to recognize the warning signs and to expand their approaches to this new environment.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/meigs.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/meigs.pdf> (PDF)

USAMA BIN LADEN, F.B.I. TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVE: MURDER OF U.S. NATIONALS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES; CONSPIRACY TO MURDER U.S. NATIONALS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES; ATTACK ON A FEDERAL FACILITY RESULTING IN DEATH. U.S. Department of Justice. Langley, Virginia: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001. [FBI Website].

Usama Bin Laden’s FBI Ten Most Wanted poster: “*Usama Bin Laden is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks killed over 200 people. In addition, Bin Laden is a suspect in other terrorist attacks throughout the world.*”

Online

<http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/laden.htm>

VIOLENCE AND THE PEACE PROCESS. U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 8, No. 5, August 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002. p.1. [Article].

SuDoc: Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.8/NO.5

“Conflicts in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and the Middle East provide valuable lessons regarding the causes and effects of political violence.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2002/8/index.html>

WORDS HAVE CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF INCITEMENT AND ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-SEMITIC PROPAGANDA ON AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 18 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 31p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: W 89/6

“Anti-Americanism, tainted with Anti-Semitism, set the stage for the vicious attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. As a result, today we find ourselves facing an ideological enemy, an enemy that may turn out to be harder to defeat than al-Qaeda or the Taliban: The fanatical anti-American and anti-Semitic incitement that has permeated the Arab world...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42269> (PDF)

http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/107/78802.pdf (PDF)

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO USAMA BIN LADEN. U.S. Department of Defense. Ahmed S. Hashim. *Naval War College Review*. Vol. 54, No. 4, Autumn 2001. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2001. p.11-35 [Article].

SuDoc# D 208.209: 54/4

“Muslims, says Bin Laden, from Palestine to Iraq, from Chechnya to Bosnia, have been slaughtered in large numbers, their lands expropriated, and their wealth looted, by non-Muslims ... America, [Bin Laden would say] provided some of the arms used in massacres of Muslims; for example, the killing of hundreds of Lebanese civilians in Qana in 1996 in the wake of the Israeli Operation GRAPES OF WRATH involved American weapons. In the Yugoslav civil war, America stood passively by, mouthing platitudes about human rights, as Muslim civilians were massacred. American does nothing while Russians slaughter Chechens yearning to be free of Moscow’s yoke. Further, they would reply, America says nothing about the depredations of the Arab rulers against their own peoples ... the focus of Bin Laden’s anger in the 1996 epistle was the continued American ‘occupation’ of the land of the holy places, a presence that the corrupt Al-Sauds had permitted at a time when their country suffered from economic distress and demoralization ... Usama Bin Laden is a dangerous opponent, and so are those who might succeed him should he be killed over the course of the American onslaught ... It is clear that America is detested by many people the world over for what it is—a successful and dynamic modern society. It has created envy among the dispossessed and revulsion among ideologically alienated groups who see it

as totally antithetical to their own values or aspirations. There may be very little that can be done to assuage the anger of those who hate America for its very nature.”

Online

<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art1-au1.htm>