

—IRAQ—

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 2 & 3 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 197p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/15

Heated and sometimes rancorous debate concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Bush Administration's arguments for attacking Iraq, including discussion of various possible outcomes should the United States preemptively strike Saddam Hussein's regime.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42846> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/82194.pdf (PDF)

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002. U.S. Congress. 107th Congress, 16 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. [Public Law 107-243].

SuDoc# AE 2.110: 107-243

“The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to—(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq ... the President shall ... no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that—(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and (2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25226>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS25227> (PDF)

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 7 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 47p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 107-721

“A signal of our Nation’s seriousness of purpose and its willingness to use force may yet persuade Iraq to meet its international obligations ... Iraq also aids terrorists who have attacked the United States and its allies, including terrorists who use weapons of mass destruction ... members of al Qaida are known to be in Iraq...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS24445> (PDF)

BEYOND IRAQ: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 12 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 55p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-167

“First of all, how should the United States deal with domestic issues in Iraq and in other Middle Eastern countries; in particular, how can we promote prospects for democracy or stability or economic reform, all simultaneously? And, second, what are the repercussions of United States policies in Iraq on regional political and economic issues, on traditional regional alignments, and on the evolving Middle East peace process in which the President has become very, very much involved in recent days? Finally, what is the likely impact of our policies in Iraq on broader foreign policy concerns, including the war on terrorism, nonproliferation efforts, generally, and our relations with the United Nations, our NATO allies, and other nations? The ramifications of United States policies in Iraq go far beyond the Iraqi people or Iraqi territory. Nations throughout the Middle East, including regimes that have supported terrorists, are assessing how the United States and coalition reconstruction of Iraq will affect their own interests. An American presence in Iraq that is devoted to achieving democracy and a healthy economy puts enormous pressure on states in the region to undertake reform.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41159>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41160> (PDF)

BLOCKING PROPERTY OF THE FORMER IRAQI REGIME, ITS SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, AND TAKING CERTAIN OTHER ACTIONS. Office of the

President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 3 September 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 10p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-122

“...the United Nations Security Council decided that U.N. member states shall freeze the assets of the former Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein, and other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime, and their immediate family members and cause the transfer of those assets to the Development Fund for Iraq ... The order ... broadens the scope of persons whose assets may be frozen under those orders by adding the immediate family members of former Iraqi senior officials whose assets may be frozen. This order also allows for the confiscating and vesting of some of those assets and provides for the transfer of all vested assets to the Development Fund for Iraq ... to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the Iraqi people.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37594>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37595> (PDF)

BRITISH BULLDOG OR BUSH’S POODLE?: ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE IRAQ WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. James K. Wither. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 4, Winter 2003-04. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p. 67-82. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/4

“As the efforts to rebuild Iraq have graphically illustrated, the United States cannot carry the security burden alone. At the very least, it needs its European allies to contribute troops for peace support operations and resources for nation-building. However, if European states want to be in a position to influence the global strategic agenda, rather than having it dictated to them by the United States, they will ultimately need to be able and willing to contribute a ‘hard’ security capability. If the European Union and the United States were to become true strategic partners, Britain would have a crucial role in facilitating revitalized military cooperation. The United Kingdom possesses the only armed forces with the prospect of remaining interoperable with the United States for the foreseeable future, while any serious attempt to build European power-projection capability would be reliant on British commitment and expertise. In these circumstances, the UK might yet be able to remain both a leading player in Europe and a special partner of the United States and thus realize Prime Minister Blair’s vision of Britain as a pivotal power.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/wither.htm>
<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/wither.pdf> (PDF)

THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND WAR WITH IRAQ. U.S. Department of Defense. Jeffrey Record. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 1, Spring 2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.4-21. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/1

“This article identifies and examines the Bush Doctrine’s major tenets, and then assesses the doctrine’s strengths and weaknesses within the context of the Administration’s prospective attack on Iraq ... The Bush Doctrine has sparked great controversy at home and abroad. Some critics see it as further testimony to American unilateralism and arrogance; as the triumph within the Bush Administration of a neo-conservative agenda aimed at ensuring a permanent American primacy in the world. Others regard it as a reckless setting of a dangerous precedent that other states will exploit to mask aggression. Still others see the doctrine as simply a construct to justify an attack on Iraq. Proponents of the Bush Doctrine contend that a threat revolution is under way which requires new approaches to using force. The 9/11 tragedy, they argue, was a warning of worse—much worse—things to come if the United States remains in the reactive posture it assumed during the Cold War. The stakes, they claim, are as high as they were during the Cold War, but we are now dealing with enemies who do not care whether they live or die. As with many controversial topics, both supporters and critics exhibit strengths and weaknesses in their arguments.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/record.htm>
<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/record.pdf> (PDF)

CONDEMNING BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS, MUSLIM-AMERICANS, SOUTH ASIAN-AMERICANS, AND SIKH-AMERICANS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 3 September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 10p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 108-249

“H. Res. 234 condemns bigotry and violence against individuals of Arab-American, Muslim-American, South Asian-American, and Sikh-American descent. It was introduced in response to concerns about an increase in discriminatory backlash crimes following the commencement of military action in Iraq in March 2003. Specifically, H. Res. 234 recognizes the many contributions of Arab-Americans, Muslim-Americans, South Asian-Americans, and Sikh-Americans to the nation, calls upon law enforcement authorities to work vigorously to prevent discriminatory backlash crimes against such persons and to aggressively investigate and prosecute

crimes that do occur, and reaffirms the House of Representatives' commitment to assuring that the civil rights of all Americans, including individuals of Arab-American, Muslim-American, South Asian-American and Sikh-American descent, be protected.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36925>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36929> (PDF)

CONFISCATING AND VESTING CERTAIN IRAQI PROPERTY. Office of the President. George W. Bush. [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 24 March 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 4p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-51

“Message from the President of the United States transmitting notification that he has taken additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in executive order 12722 of August 2, 1990, by exercising his statutory authority to confiscate and vest certain property of the government of Iraq and its agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled entities, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) and 50 U.S.C. 1631.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30600>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30602> (PDF)

CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: IR 1/4

“An invasion of Iraq and the replacement of Saddam Hussein’s regime by a democratic government would cost tens of billions of dollars and years of U.S. effort to occupy and reconstruct the large and diverse country. While the United States could undoubtedly win a war against Iraq on its own, it is difficult to imagine remaking Iraq on our own ... if we do attack, what will happen, specifically to Israel ... This issue has spawned many different points of view. There is, however, a consensus that exists between our two countries. We both believe without question that Saddam Hussein must be removed. Saddam’s continued existence in the region serves to further aggravate an opportunity for real peace and cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27265> (PDF)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT LEGISLATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 9 January 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 37p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/14

“The Congress supports the actions taken by the President of the United States to defend Saudi Arabia, demands that Iraq immediately withdraw from its illegal occupation of Kuwait, and supports the President’s diplomatic and economic initiatives to resolve the Persian Gulf crisis ... Resolution 661—August 6, 1990 Imposes trade embargo and financial sanctions against Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. (Medical supplies and humanitarian foodstuffs are exempt from the trade embargo.) ... Resolution 678—November 29, 1990 Authorizes member states to use all means necessary to uphold the above resolutions and restore international peace and security in the region, unless Iraq fully complies with the above resolutions on or before January 15, 1991.”

CONSTITUTIONALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN IRAQ. U.S.

Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 25 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 115p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-217

“The climate in Iraq can best be described as cautious unease. The Iraqi people today are free of Saddam, but they are not yet free of fear. We’ve seen progress when it comes to ensuring the basic security of the Iraqi people, the recruitment of a new police force, the continued elimination of Ba’athist party remnants, and the capture of armed gangs of militants, all of which are positive signs, but clearly there is a lot more that needs to be done. We must end the looting and the street violence and restore the rights of the Iraqi people. The foundation of a peaceful, just, and prosperous society cannot be constructed while lawlessness reigns.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44132>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44134> (PDF)

CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ. Office of the President. George W. Bush. [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 3 September 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 3p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-118

“The crisis that led to the declaration of a national emergency on August 2, 1990, has not been fully resolved. The United States, along with its coalition partners, continues to work to stabilize Iraq, identify and dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, capture former regime leaders, and locate and return Iraqi assets overseas for the benefit of the Iraqi people. As part of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the United States is providing for temporary governance of Iraq, including the establishment of a process to lead to a new internationally recognized government.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37598>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37599> (PDF)

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 4 & 27 September, 18 October 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 130p. [Hearing & Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/12

“The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is one of the defining moments of a new era, a new era full of promise, but also one that is replete with new challenges. While the rules of the road developed during the cold war did, in the end, preserve peace, East-West in Europe, the task now is to build an enduring peace that is global in its scope and not limited just to Europe and not rooted in confrontation and tension. If we are to build a stable and more comprehensive peace, we must respond to the defining moments of this new era, recognizing the emerging dangers that are lurking before us. We are entering an era in which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new violence and new conflict. It is an era in which new hostilities and threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted.”

CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF: SANCTIONS, DIPLOMACY AND WAR. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 4-6, 12-14, 17, 19 & 20 December 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 920p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 989-90/57

“As we open our hearings today on the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the country is united on ends, but the problem is they are not united on means. There is agreement that a ruthless dictator like Saddam Hussein should not be allowed to threaten the industrialized world through control of oil. Second, there is an agreement that peace in the post-Cold War era demands that we create no incentives for larger nations to gobble up their smaller neighbors. Third, there is agreement that an Iraq with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons spells trouble for everyone ... we would

really like to focus our hearings today on what about Iraq, what about this guy, Saddam Hussein, what is he likely to cave in to, how is he likely to act to the threat of war, to sanctions, pressure to economic cutoff. How is he likely to react to diplomatic initiatives? Are diplomatic initiatives likely to make him more conciliatory toward resolving the issue, or would a diplomatic initiative make him feel like he is going to win?"

DESERT STORM, THE BUDGET AND OTHER ISSUES: THE STATE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TWO YEARS AFTER THE BUSH TRANSITION. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 23 January 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 88p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.102-754

"We have seen estimates of Desert Shield all over the lot. I am not sure that anybody really has a good solidly based figure that they can really validate with any specificity. But we want to know what the best estimates are on these things because, as I talked about just a moment ago, back in the days of the Vietnam war we saw guns and butter. We didn't want to tax ourselves. We didn't want to bring in the revenue to take care of the problem at that time. We put it off and built up some debt. During the 1980s we paid for our military buildup—which we are glad we did—but we had that military buildup where we basically paid for it with a credit card. That ran our debt way up. And here we are again going into additional expenses, and how are we going to take care of those is really the picture that overlays all of the domestic concerns and all of the things I mentioned earlier, and the high risk areas and the general status of our economy."

DISARMING IRAQ: THE STATUS OF WEAPONS INSPECTIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 15 September 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 149p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/9

"Despite the best efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA, Iraq has not disclosed the full truth about its chemical and biological weapons programs. UNSCOM believes Iraq is probably concealing SCUD missiles, and questions remain about Iraq's nuclear programs. As long as Baghdad is under its present leadership, we must expect Iraq will reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction if given the opportunity. Iraq's goal is to gain relief from sanctions without revealing more about its weapons programs."

DIVESTING SADDAM: FREEZING, SEIZING, AND REPATRIATING SADDAM'S MONEY TO THE IRAQIS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 14 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 100p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 49/20: 108-28

“Over the last 20 years, Iraq and its people have been systematically looted by the brutal tyranny of Saddam Hussein. Today, tens of billions of dollars in assets and cash lie somewhere outside of Iraq in the smoky depths of phony front companies, hidden trusts, and cash accounts in the names of regime family members and loyalists. This stolen money represents another layer of destruction and deceit that the Hussein regime inflicted on the Iraqi people ... Today the Oversight Investigations Committee holds the first congressional hearing on the search for Saddam’s money and the efforts to return it to the Iraqi people. Initial press reports are startling, with stories of shell companies in numerous countries, discoveries in Iraq of hundreds of millions of U.S. Dollars, and oil smuggling schemes that are without parallel among other petty dictators and thugs.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41513> (PDF)

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION, 2004. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 2 October 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 27p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/5: 108-160

“The primary goals of this bill are to fund the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as relief and reconstruction activities in those countries. To accomplish the first goal, the Committee is providing \$66,560,004,000 to prosecute the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. These funds are for increased operational tempo, military personnel costs, military construction, procurement of equipment, increased maintenance and military health care support. To achieve the second goal, the Committee is providing \$21,444,000,000 to help secure the transition to democracy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These funds are for enhanced security and reconstruction activities including border enforcement, building a national police service in Iraq, standing up a new Iraqi army and continued building of the Afghan National Army, reconstituted judicial systems, rehabilitation of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and provision of basic electricity, water and sewer services and other critical reconstruction needs in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS38934>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS38935> (PDF)

AN ENLARGED NATO: MENDING FENCES AND MOVING FORWARD ON IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 29 April 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 70p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-186

“Even as we focus on Iraq, we realize the events of the last several months have sharply altered our relationship with allies and the entire international community. The application of overwhelming U.S military power in Iraq has changed the calculations of some of our opponents. Meanwhile, differences over the U.S. approach to Iraq and revelations that some of our allies may have assisted Saddam Hussein’s government have chilled relations with long-time friends. It is in this context the committee will vote tomorrow on the expansion of NATO. In doing so, we will reaffirm the utility and the necessity of our alliance relationships. But we are cognizant that some of those relationships have suffered deep wounds.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42025>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42026> (PDF)

EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR THE FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL KILLED IN THE APRIL 14, 1994 BLACKHAWK SHOOTDOWN. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 18 June 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 48p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 105/111

“These two bills, which take different approaches, seek to provide compensation to the American families of the victims of the tragic shootdown of two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters in the northern Iraq no-fly zone. This compensation would be comparable to the payments provided by the Secretary of Defense to families of foreign nationals who were also on board those helicopters. On April 14, 1994, two American Black Hawk helicopters on a humanitarian mission in the no-fly zone of Iraq were shot down by two American F-15 fighter planes when the helicopters were mistakenly identified as Iraqi helicopters. There were 15 Americans and 11 foreign nationals aboard the helicopters. There were no survivors.”

EXIT STRATEGY DELUSIONS. U.S. Department of Defense. Jeffrey Record. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Winter 2001-02. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2001. p.21-27. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 31/4

“Saddam Hussein remains in power because the United States was not prepared to assume any responsibility for Iraq’s postwar political reconstruction. The Bush Administration was so intent on wrapping up its easy, albeit dramatic, military win in

Kuwait and vacating the premises that it even declared a unilateral cease-fire in the absence of any Iraqi request for terms. To be sure, America militarily exited the war in the Gulf, but it was a politically inconclusive departure.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01winter/record.htm>

EXPORT OF FRIGATE ENGINES TO IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Subcommittee International Economic Policy and Trade. 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 May 1980. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 72p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: EN 3/2

“Today the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade will hold a hearing on the decision by the United States to issue a license for the export and sale of eight General Electric gas turbine engines to Italy for their use in frigate ships being built and sold by Italy to the Government of Iraq ... Iraq was listed by the administration in a letter dated December 29, 1979, as a state which aids international terrorism.”

EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM IN HONG KONG; AND REQUESTING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 17 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 51p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: F 88

“Requesting the President to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of adoption of this resolution documents or other materials in the President’s possession relating to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction ... it is important that we all recognize that there is general surprise that only a few discoveries have been made so far with respect to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction since the fall of Baghdad. It remains unclear whether Saddam Hussein destroyed his programs prior to our military action, whether the weapons remain hidden in some obscure corner of Iraq, or whether Saddam Hussein moved these weapons outside the country to another country, possibly Syria. In any case, Congress must be involved in determining the nature and scope of the intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, given that this issue was important in the decision to take military action against Iraq.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42824> (PDF)

http://www.house.gov/international_relations/108/87795.pdf (PDF)

FACING SADDAM'S IRAQ: DISARRAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 28 September 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 24p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-261

Maneuvers by U.S. allies and others to push for a less stringent United Nations weapons inspection regime, and the reaction of the Committee to such efforts.

FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 22, 24 & 25 September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 224p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AP 6/2: S.HRG.108-373

“If we fail to recreate Iraq with a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid economy we will have provided the terrorists with an incredible advantage in their war against us. Terrorists love state sponsors, countries that provide them with cash, arms, refuge, a protected place to rest and plan future operations. Saddam’s Iraq was one of those countries. If terrorists cannot find a congenial state sponsor, they thrive in chaotic environments with little or no effective government. When militias, warlords, and communities war with each other, terrorists are right at home. Think back on the Lebanon we knew in the 1980s.”

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005 (STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION); AND THE SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT THE U.N. SHOULD REMOVE THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ COMPLETELY AND WITHOUT CONDITION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 7 & 8 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 488p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: F 76/12/2004-2005

“...it is the sense of the Congress that—(1) the United Nations should immediately act to lift the economic sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 and 687; and (2) member states of the United Nations should allow and encourage their nationals to trade with Iraq.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42948> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/86991a.pdf (PDF)

FROM THE FULDA GAP TO KUWAIT: U.S. ARMY, EUROPE AND THE GULF WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. Stephen P. Gehring. Washington, DC: Department of the Army; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 377p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.2: K 96

“Iraq’s aggression against the oil-rich emirate of Kuwait in August 1990 sparked an international crisis in a part of the world vital to the West but where the United States and its allies maintained few land-based forces. As a result, the United States faced a significant test of its ability to project decisive military power to the Persian Gulf region in a timely and effective manner and to employ those forces as the cutting edge of the international coalition ... This book describes how the U.S. Army, Europe, assembled, prepared, and deployed the powerful forces it contributed to the coalition effort in the Gulf and how USAREUR accomplished these challenging mission while maintaining its continuing security responsibilities on the Continent and preparing to execute its program of force reductions.”

THE GULF WAR: PEACE IN OUR TIMES? U.S. Department of Defense. Wm. J. Olson. *Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College.* Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 1986. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1986. p.47-56. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 16/4

“There are ... a number of strategic lessons to be gleaned from the conflict. First, and perhaps most important, the war and its causes demonstrate clearly that states, even small, Third World powers with limited means and no indigenous arms capability, are perfectly able, ready, and willing to use force to resolve their problems. Iran was willing to use subversion and terrorism in an effort to effect a desired change in Iraq, and the Iraqis were willing to use armed force to gain their own ends ... Second, the war demonstrates the ease with which arms can be acquired, even under adverse conditions ... Third, the war illustrates the potential level of conflict in the Middle East. The briefness of the past Arab-Israeli wars has given rise to the idea that wars in the region are short and sharp. The Gulf War clearly shows that this is not the inevitable pattern (and the conflict in Lebanon may punctuate that statement). Wars can be protracted. This has implications for the regional states and beyond.”

HEARINGS TO EXAMINE THREATS, RESPONSES, AND REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 31 July; 1 August 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 275p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-658

“These weapons must be dislodged from Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein must be dislodged from power ... We want to explore Saddam’s track record in acquiring, making, and using weapons of mass destruction and the likelihood, in the opinion of

the experts what will come before us in the next 2 days – the likelihood that he would share them with terrorists.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23559>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23560> (PDF)

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN: VICTIMS SPEAK OUT. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 20 November 2003. U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 45p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: H 88/38

“...as our witnesses will soon explain, Saddam Hussein and his sons systematically violated the human rights of Iraqis and those of other countries as well. They did so with utter disregard, operating a vast enterprise encompassing at its worst mass graves, the use of torture chambers, chemical baths, routine rapes, brutal and arbitrary murder including legitimizing killings and medical amputations as punishment. In lesser cases, restrictions on social, legal and educational mobility for women, arbitrary detentions in both crude prisons and psychiatric facilities, collective punishment by association and the blockading of entire villages. They all became common punishment for undescribed offenses. Saddam and his sons treated Iraq and its people as their own personal preserve subject to their very whim. What they wanted, they got. What they wanted to do to others, they did at will.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44172> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/91184.pdf (PDF)

IDENTIFYING THE IRAQI THREAT AND HOW THEY FIGHT. U.S. Department of Defense. September 1990. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, 1990. 48p. [Manual].

SuDoc# D 101.2: IR 1/3

“This Iraqi threat guide has been prepared for the soldier at company level and below. Basic data on commonly used weapons and weapons systems, and on tactical units are shown. Other references must be used if more complete information is needed. This guide resulted from a quick reaction effort by the US Army Intelligence Agency. It has been compiled from a variety of sources and with the responsive support of the Defense Intelligence Agency ... This pamphlet was produced from unclassified sources.”

IMPACT OF IRAQI INVASION ON UNITED STATES ENERGY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 5 September 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 300p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: IR 1/3

“...the fundamental issues raised for this country by the Iraqi invasion will not be resolved by military force alone, but rather by the development of a comprehensive energy policy. In the short term, the question this country faces is, How will we handle a major international shortfall in oil production which could happen momentarily, and how will American consumers be protected? In the long term, the question is, How to reduce our dangerous reliance on an unstable energy supply? ... Today in America we consume roughly 17.5 million barrels of oil each day, up nearly 2 million barrels just 5 years ago. When the invasion interrupted the flow of 4.5 million barrels a day to the world markets, the price per barrel went from nearly \$25 to over \$31 and the price at the pump rose an average of 15 cents, regardless of whether the oil was purchased prior to the invasion or not.”

IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 September 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 29p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/19: S.HRG.104-796

CIA intelligence policy, activities, and findings concerning Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

IRAQ: CAN SADDAM BE OVERTHROWN? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 2 March 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.105-444

“Given the failures of the opposition, and the unwillingness of U.S. officials to back them up, is it realistic to support any opposition group? Even if the United States went forward with a program to stabilize or oust Saddam, can anyone seriously hope to dislodge him?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS874>

IRAQ CLAIMS ACT OF 1993. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 13, 14, 20 & 28 October 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 219p. [Hearings & Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/14

“The administration strongly supports this legislation. We believe it would provide a fair and orderly system for resolving the claims of U.S. nationals and the U.S. Government against Iraq. It would help to implement the system set up by the United Nations that will compensate the victims of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait from the proceeds of future Iraqi oil sales. In addition, it would authorize us to provide compensation for claims that are not within the jurisdiction of the U.N. Compensation Commission from Iraqi assets frozen in the United States. For example, the claims of members of military forces who served in the Persian Gulf are not covered by the U.N. program. In addition, the U.N. program does not cover prewar claims against Iraq. In the case of the United States, this would include unsatisfied prewar claims of many U.S. individuals and businesses, such as default of loans to Iraq and the claims of U.S. Navy personnel who were injured in the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark. It would also include substantial prewar claims by the U.S. Government against Iraq.”

IRAQ: NEXT STEPS—HOW CAN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SUCCEED IN IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 24 September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 59p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-282

“One of the most difficult challenges that we face in working to rebuild Iraq is establishing a new Iraqi Government with a constitution developed and approved by the Iraqi people. In United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, adopted unanimously on May 22, 2003, the international community called for the establishment in Iraq, ‘of a representative government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender.’ The United States is committed to this goal. A number of nations want to accelerate this self-governance process and are calling for the transfer of full power to Iraqis within months. Yet United States officials estimate that preparing Iraq for democracy will take much longer. Ultimately, we all agree that Iraqi citizens must take full responsibility for Iraq’s governance as soon as possible.”

IRAQ: NEXT STEPS—HOW TO INTERNATIONALIZE IRAQ AND ORGANIZE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ADMINISTER RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 23 September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 87p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-293

“This hearing is the first in a series of hearings on Iraq by this committee. The series will frame the issues the Congress must address as it reviews President Bush’s proposed \$87 billion supplemental funding request for maintaining and supporting Iraq reconstruction efforts. However, our intention is to look well beyond the scope of this supplemental ... There is general consensus in the international community

and within the United States Government that the critical task at hand is to establish a sovereign Iraqi government as quickly as possible and to prevent Iraq from becoming a so-called failed state. To achieve this goal, we need to reach agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the international community in Iraq and on how we can more effectively organize our own efforts. The stakes for United States national security are high. Beyond the obvious implications for U.S. credibility, the outcome in Iraq may determine how we are perceived in the Islamic world for a generation. And it will affect the degree of international cooperation in the war on terror. It will affect our own military and the prospects for economic growth in the United States.”

IRAQ: NEXT STEPS—WHAT WILL AN IRAQ 5-YEAR PLAN LOOK LIKE? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 24 September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 67p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-276

”Many Iraqis have had a difficult time understanding how the most powerful nation in the world could defeat their Armed Forces in 3 weeks and still have trouble getting the lights turned on. Yet skepticism and frustration and extremely difficult conditions have not eliminated hope among the Iraqi people ... Asked to choose which government they saw as the best model for Iraq from among the alternatives of Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or the United States, 37 percent picked the United States. Only 33 percent said they preferred an Islamic government. Two-thirds said that U.S. troops should remain in Iraq for at least another year ... What would a 5-year plan for Iraq look like and how much would it cost? How long will the \$87 billion from the supplemental last? How long will the \$21 billion of that targeted for reconstruction last? Will the United States commitment help generate international contributions at the Donor Conference in October or at other conferences surely to come? How does oil revenue fit into the projections of reconstruction financing, quite apart from the overall budget of the country?”

IRAQ: RECONSTRUCTION. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 11 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 82p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-53

“Most experts believe that years of public investment and expert guidance will be required to establish Iraq as a secure and responsible member of the world community. And failure to stay the course in Iraq would risk grave damage to the United States’ credibility, particularly after the last several months of fractious diplomacy over the propriety of military force.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34480>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS34481> (PDF)

IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESOURCES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 4 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 81p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-165

“With regard to the rebuilding effort ... it is still unclear what international contributions have been offered and what goals the administration has set for securing both financial and human resources. Experts have identified the need for peacekeeping forces along with economic and technical experts, but it remains unclear who is being asked to provide these personnel ... Another issue that we wish to explore in depth is the degree to which Iraq’s own resources will be available for the rebuilding effort and how Iraqi funds will be administered. These resources include the \$1.7 billion in frozen Iraqi assets in the United States, at least \$600 million in Iraqi assets in other nations, plus the more than \$700 million dollars recovered by coalition forces that was hidden in Iraq by Saddam Hussein’s family and associates. We would also like to examine funds remaining in the United Nations’ Oil For Food account and revenues from future oil sales. Together, these assets represent a substantial down payment on Iraq’s future, but the administration of Iraqi assets will require full transparency and a high degree of political sensitivity.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS40845> (PDF)

IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: U.S. POLICY AND PLANS. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 22 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 83p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-132

“The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what kind of country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some important ingredients for success, an educated population, a tradition of trade and industry, large reserves of oil to benefit its people. The achievement of stability and democracy in Iraq present an opportunity to catalyze change in the region that can greatly improve United States national security. Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq are key to success in this larger context of the Middle East region and in the global war on terrorism. Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained American commitment would heavily influence the political dynamics of the region and reinforce the credibility of United States diplomacy around the world.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS40423>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS40424> (PDF)

IRAQ: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR RECONSTRUCTION—NEXT STEPS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 23 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 68p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-219

“The findings of Dr. Hamre’s group confirm that we must act with both urgency and patience in Iraq. America must take critical steps now to give nation-building a chance to succeed. We must be prepared to stay the course in Iraq for years. The report states, ‘The potential for chaos is becoming more real every day,’ and the Coalition Provisional Authority ‘lacks the personnel, money and flexibility needed to be fully effective.’ The report describes the resistance in Iraq as ‘well-trained, well-financed, well-organized irregular forces throughout the country.’ We need to ensure that there are adequate resources and the right type of resources to respond to the attacks that are occurring. There must be enough military forces, police, and civilian personnel, and we must not marginalize non-military agencies with expertise in post-conflict reconstruction.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44237>

IRAQ: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR RECONSTRUCTION—RESOURCES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 29 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 97p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.108-255

“A major untapped resource with the potential for changing the dynamics on the ground is the international community. The United States needs to build a new coalition to win the peace. Involving other nations in Iraq will help reassure the Iraqi people that the results of our nation-building efforts are legitimate. At the same time, international involvement will reduce the burden on the United States taxpayer and help maintain the American people’s political support. Just as we called upon our military strength to win the war, we need to call on the strength of our diplomacy to overcome pre-war disagreements with allies and reach a new consensus on how to ensure that Iraq emerges as a peaceful and stable nation. We may need a new United Nations Security Council resolution or some other form of international commitment to increase assistance to Iraq.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44449> (PDF)

THE IRAQI ARMY'S DEFEAT IN KUWAIT. U.S. Department of Defense. James W. Pardew, Jr. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 1991-92. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1991. p.17-23. [Article].

SuDoc# 101.72: 21/4

“Saddam Hussein’s campaign to consume Kuwait was a military disaster of historic proportions for Iraq. It left the country in ruin and the Iraqi army a smoldering wreckage in the desert. Though the outcome of Desert Storm was never in doubt, the speed and scope of the Iraqi army’s collapse were surprising. By worldwide standards, Iraq’s army was formidable. Iraq was equipped with modern systems of Soviet and Western design and combat-experienced by eight years of war with Iran. Further, its senior military leaders had planned and executed corps-sized maneuvers in combat. The Iraqi army was large, possessed a professional officer corps, and had the potential to expand through national mobilization. Iraq held weapons of mass destruction and had used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War to support combat maneuver. Why did this force immediately crumble against the coalition? Most of the answers are found in the unity, determination, and superior quality of US and allied forces.”

IRAQI POWER AND U.S. SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. U.S. Department of Defense. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1990. [SSI Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.2: IR 1

“The authors of this report look at the last campaign of the Iran-Iraq War and show how the Iraqis were able to turn that war around, inflicting a crushing defeat on the Iranians. As a result of their victory the Iraqis were able to set themselves up as the pre-eminent Arab military power in the Middle East. The authors go on to explain how the emergence of Iraq as a formidable power has affected the balance of power in the region, particularly addressing the tense relations between the newly powerful Iraq and Israel. They conclude with recommendations for U.S. policy makers and military commanders for dealing with Iraq. This report should be a useful guide not only for specialists in the Middle East but also for any officer interested in the operational art and the relation of the military to civilian policy making.”

IRAQI RESISTANCE TO FREEDOM: A FROMMIAN PERSPECTIVE. U.S. Department of Defense. Cynthia E. Ayers. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.68-84. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/3

“According to Fromm, feelings of alienation, isolation, and powerlessness can also result in destructiveness. In Iraq, this destructiveness is currently presented as opposition to those who have upset the status quo—those who liberated the Iraqi population from the security of a more-or-less constant (however oppressive) lifestyle. These liberators also upset the hierarchy of superiority—thus increasing feelings of powerlessness. The tendency to resort to destructiveness in order to alleviate unsavory insecure (or ‘unbearable’) feelings is irrational, can be obsessive, and may ultimately result in a desire for total annihilation ... Average citizens of Iraq have been without a sense of individual empowerment for most if not all of their lives. Their newly found freedom will give them opportunities to express their destructive tendencies born as a consequence of severe oppression. Ironically, as Fromm noted, the destruction most likely will be aimed at those who offer freedom—the freedom which brings with it feelings of insecurity and powerlessness, the freedom of not knowing what to do or when to do it—fueled by resentment of a new structure that does not possess the power to instill the level of fear that the populous had lived with for many years.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03autumn/ayers.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03autumn/ayers.pdf> (PDF)

IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East; Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 29 June 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 206p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/13

“We have several topics of interest to the subcommittees, including: The post-Gulf War experience of IAEA in inspection, disposal, and monitoring of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program; assessments of the current status of Iraq’s nuclear weapons activities; and the assessments of our witnesses of the lessons learned by the international community of the Iraqi experience and their recommendations of how to prevent a similar incident from recurring in the future.”

IS THE CURRENT UN AND US POLICY TOWARD IRAQ EFFECTIVE? U.S. Department of Defense. William F. Donaher and Ross B. DeBlois. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 31, No. 4, Winter 2001-02. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2001. p.112-125. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 31/4

“Economic sanctions in Iraq are not working. Unarguably, the sanctions have contained Saddam’s military, but are economic sanctions the only way we can achieve this end? The consequences of ten years of sanctions include pushing the dictator closer to his people, and posing a threat to our future interactions with Iraq and our presence in the region ... ten years of economic sanctions have created a humanitarian disaster in Iraq rivaling that of many third-world African countries.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01winter/donaher.htm>

ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 17 & 25 June 1981. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 132p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IS 7/3

“The Government of Israel contends that its action was necessary for its self-defense because the reactor was intended to produce atomic bombs and would become operational very soon. The Government of Iraq has claimed that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and has vowed to continue this program in spite of the Israeli attack ... the Israeli action will seriously affect the already tense situation in the Mideast. Accordingly, this hearing will also attempt to examine and evaluate what some of those foreign policy implications of the Israeli action may be. For instance, does the Israeli attack represent a dangerous precedent with respect to resolving nuclear proliferation disputes? “

A LESSON OF THE GULF WAR: NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIRES COMPUTER SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Government Information and Regulation. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 19 June 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 35p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.102-575

“GAO investigators have confirmed that during the Persian Gulf War, foreign hackers were able to access DoD computer systems at 34 different sites. In some cases, these hackers modified or copied sensitive information which was directly related to our military operations in the Persian Gulf. The hackers had access to crucial information regarding military personnel, the type and quantity of equipment being moved, and the development of important weapons systems ... one of the most troubling aspects of this whole thing is the fact that unsophisticated teenagers from the Netherlands were able to get into DoD computers. While these teenagers might have been doing it ‘just for fun,’ it is certainly possible that they were interested in selling information.

Moreover, if Dutch teenagers can get into our military computers, I suspect that our enemies can do it as well. It appears that we were lucky this time.”

LESSONS LEARNED FROM DESERT STORM REGARDING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PREPAREDNESS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Veterans Affairs. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 March 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 188p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.V 64/4: S.HRG. 105-1072

“The General Accounting Office has issued its report with respect to the Gulf War in 1991 and has noted ‘very drastic shortages in individual protective equipment, inadequate chemical and biological agent detection devices, inadequate command emphasis on chemical and biological capabilities, and deficiencies in medical personnel training and supplies.’ I don’t know what they could have found in addition to that. That seems to be the whole universe. The General Accounting Office noted that many of these deficiencies remain unaddressed today.”

LESSONS LEARNED: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991. 119p. [SSI Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.2: IR 2

“Iraq emerged from its war with Iran as a superpower in the Persian Gulf. This had not been its original intent ... Iraq achieved regional superpower status through a series of escalatory steps that were required to repel Iran’s Islamic fundamentalist crusade. Iraqi leaders mobilized a diverse population, strengthened Iraq’s armed forces, and transformed its society to take the offensive and terminate the war with Iran. The major change wrought by Iraq was mobilization of a million man army from a population of only 16 million. Iraq’s General Staff trained recruits in the complex techniques of modern warfare and equipped them with the most up-to-date weaponry. Thus, they were able—at the decisive battle of Karbala V—to administer a crushing defeat to Iran, which since has ceased to exist as a military power in the Persian Gulf. This report explains how the Iraqi army achieved this feat. It traces its progress through various phases of its development, and details the strategic, operational and tactical skills demonstrated in Iraq’s final campaigns.”

THE LIBERATION OF IRAQ: A PROGRESS REPORT. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 June 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 23p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-824

“Saddam has manipulated the perception of the impact of the sanctions and has it entirely within his power to bring significant relief to the civilian population of Iraq. Much of the money that has been made available for humanitarian purposes has not been spent, and will not be spent, as long as Saddam can prevent it in order to build pressure against the continuation of the sanctions by creating the impression that only the elimination of the sanctions can restore health to Iraqi women and children and deal with the humanitarian catastrophe we now see.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10945>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10946> (PDF)

LUCRATIVE TARGETS: THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS. U.S. Department of Defense. Perry D. Jamieson. Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, U.S. Air Force; U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 247p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 301.82/7: K 96

“The United States had several reasons for its interest in the fate of a remote sheikdom on the Persian Gulf. First, Americans fundamentally objected to any nation destroying the sovereignty of another, particularly in cases in which the conqueror was so much stronger than its opponent. Iraq, which fielded the world’s fourth-largest army, had abruptly overrun a neighbor roughly the size of New Jersey. Second, the United States was gravely concerned about the future designs of Saddam Hussein, a truculent, unpredictable dictator who had doggedly waged an eight-year war against another bordering nation, Iran, and had brutally repressed his own countrymen. If Saddam’s conquest of Kuwait went unchallenged, he might become the dominant figure in the Middle East. Third, the Iraqi autocrat held in Iraq and Kuwait more than three thousand American civilians who he could use as ‘human shields’ for cities and military installations. Fourth, the United States, which in 1990 drew approximately half of its oil from foreign sources, had a compelling economic interest in the region. If Iraq absorbed Kuwait, Baghdad would roughly double the petroleum supply under its control. Its oil reserves then would stand at about 195 billion barrels, second in the world only to Saudi Arabia. America’s immediate concern was that Saddam Hussein might invade Saudi Arabia. After overrunning Kuwait, the Iraqi dictator controlled almost 20 percent of the world’s petroleum supplies, and his forces stood poised within a half-day’s tank ride from the oilfields of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which held another 37 percent.”

MAKING SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS TO SUPPORT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AND RELATED EFFORTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2003, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 1 April 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 53p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/5: 108-33

“This bill makes appropriations for the military functions of the Department of Defense as it prosecutes the war in Iraq, for domestic security functions of the Department of Homeland Security, for foreign assistance to Jordan, Israel, and Turkey, and relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, and to continue anti-terrorism efforts around the world. The bill also makes certain technical and conforming corrections to Public Law 108-7.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31243>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31244> (PDF)

MASS KILLINGS IN IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 19 March 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 51p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.102-652

“In 1987, Iraq initiated a campaign to depopulate Iraqi Kurdistan. The military operation, code named the Al-Anfal campaign, encompassed the systematic destruction of every village in Kurdistan, the massive use of chemical weapons against defenseless villagers, and the deportation and execution of tens of thousands of men, women, and children. In all, at least 180,000 people died in the Al-Anfal campaign; about 5 percent of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan. Had the gulf war not intervened, it is likely that Iraq’s Kurdish population would have been exterminated.”

THE MIDDLE EAST SCHOLARS AND THE GULF WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. Norvell B. DeAtkine. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer 1993. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993. p.53-63. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 23/2

“The Arabist revisionists have been hard at work dissecting the causes and results of the 1991 Gulf War ... we should eliminate the obligatory Arab-Israeli issue from the etiquette of political science studies of the Middle East by placing it in its proper perspective. It has never been, and is not now, the primary issue in the Middle East, yet numerous scholars have been nurtured on the concept that the Middle East issue equals the Palestinian issue. Saddam Hussein did not invade Iran nor Kuwait because of Palestine. The conflicts in Sudan, Western Sahara, Eritrea, Kurdistan, and Afghanistan were not instigated by Israel. The fact that tyranny reigns almost everywhere in the Arab World is not a by-product of Zionism or imperialism. Until the Middle East academic establishment begins to educate scholars free of personal

agendas so that they can appreciate the whole complex tapestry of national motivation in this vexed part of the world, and until their institutions break free of teaching a lock-step liturgy in place of a truly liberal perspective, its diminished reputation will not improve.”

NEW PROPOSALS TO EXPAND IRAQI OIL FOR FOOD: THE END OF SANCTIONS? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations; Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 17 March 1999. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 39p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-86

“Iraq began in 1995 selling \$4 billion worth of oil a year, with the money going into a U.N.-controlled account to buy food and medicine. Iraq is now allowed to sell \$10.4 billion worth of oil each year, to buy not just food and medicine, but much, much more. Under Resolution 1051 Iraq is allowed to import all sorts of dual use items. So-called dual use goods include a veritable universe of things that could be perfectly innocuous, but may be used in chemical or biological weapons programs or for nuclear weapons or for missile development.”

NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 & 26 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 158p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-798

“It is one thing to lay out the threat. But we need a clear, unequivocal statement of what the U.S. objective is in Iraq. Is it weapons of mass destruction? Is it regime change? Is it return of Bahraini prisoners? What is it? Why ... has the policy of containing Saddam failed? What is the urgency? What are the regional considerations? What should we be prepared for? ... What about the day after? What responsibility, if any, do we have? What is the President’s vision for what Iraq will look like after Saddam is gone? Are we committing the American people to a sustained commitment to Iraq until there is stability in Iraq?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27033>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27035> (PDF)

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: LEARNING FROM THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 17 & 23 October 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 58p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.102-422

Upon the discovery of Iraq's aggressive weapons of mass destruction program, Congress looks to curb other nations from following the same path.

ON TRACK IN IRAQ? U.S. Institute of Peace. *Peace Watch*. Vol. 10, No. 1, December 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003. p.5. [Article].

SuDoc# Y 3. P 31: 15-2/V.10/NO.1

“Acknowledging that planners had failed to adequately prepare for the likelihood of widespread unrest in post-war Iraq, George F. Ward, director of the Institute's Professional Training Program, told a gathering of administration and congressional staff on Capitol Hill in late October that the United States had only a few months to turn the corner on security and self-governance in Iraq. The need to expedite the transfer of Iraqi sovereignty has several sources, said Ward: support for the coalition presence among Iraqis is declining, the bombings are frightening away international and non-governmental organizations that are needed in the humanitarian and reconstruction effort, and the American public is unlikely to tolerate indefinitely continuing losses.”

Online

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2003/12/iraq.html>

OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science; Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 19 May, 2, 9-11 & 23 June 1987. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. 334p. [Hearing & Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/8

“This hearing today is taking place in the shadow of the tragedy which resulted in the death of 37 young Americans in the Persian Gulf on Sunday, although the hearing was scheduled some weeks ago to deal with the question of the United States decision to assume major additional responsibilities to protect shipping in the Persian Gulf of Kuwait tankers under the U.S. flag. There are a number of very serious policy questions which this incident raises and which this subcommittee will want to consider. The unprovoked and outrageous attack Sunday night by Iraqi aircraft against the U.S.S. Stark, a Naval vessel operating in international waters in the Persian Gulf adds a new dimension of urgency to this entire issue. Our hearing will focus first upon this attack. This tragic event equally shows the necessity for the Congress and for the American people to examine the ramifications of the administration's actions in the Persian Gulf and to consider what American policy in this area should be. Three days after the attack, Iraq has yet to accept full responsibility for the deaths and the action of one of its aircraft. Iraq has yet to offer financial compensation to the

families of the 37 Americans who tragically lost their lives. Iraq has yet to offer any compensation to the United States for the damage of our naval vessel.”

PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 September 2002.] U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 4p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 107-252

“The policies and actions of the Saddam Hussein regime continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, as well as to regional peace and security ... Because of Iraq’s failure to comply fully with these resolutions, the United States will continue to apply economic sanctions to deter it from threatening peace and stability in the region.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22802>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS22803> (PDF)

PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 4 February 2003.] U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 4p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-31

“The United Nations Security Council resolutions affirm that the Security Council will review Iraq’s policies and practices in judging Iraq’s compliance with those resolutions. Because of Iraq’s failure to comply fully with these resolutions, the United States will continue to apply economic sanctions to deter it from threatening peace and stability in the region.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS28819>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS28820> (PDF)

PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 3 September 2003.] U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 17p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-117

“The United States, along with its coalition partners, continues to work to stabilize Iraq, identify and dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, capture former regime leaders, and locate and return Iraqi assets overseas for the benefit of the Iraqi people. As part of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the United States is providing for the temporary governance of Iraq, including the establishment of a process to lead to a new internationally recognized government.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36779> (PDF)

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee; House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science; Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East; Subcommittee on International Operations. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 8 August; 18 & 25 September; 17 October; 28 November; 11 December 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 576p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/15

“Since Iraq invaded Kuwait a week ago, touching off the latest Middle East crisis, U.S. military forces have been moving toward the Gulf; efforts to isolate Iraq economically have escalated; and prices for crude oil and petroleum products have risen significantly in the United States and around the world. In two similar situations in the past—1973 and 1979—the rise in oil prices caused rapid inflation and led ultimately to the two most serious recessions in the post-War period. There is of course concern that this could happen again. The purpose of this morning’s hearing is to discuss the current crisis ...”

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS OF 1990-91 AND THE FUTURE OF MORALLY CONSTRAINED WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. Martin van Crevald. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 1992. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992. p.21-40. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 22/2

“The rise, climax, and resolution of the Gulf War have impinged on the rules of war in at least five significant ways. First, the opening move in the war—President Saddam Hussein’s use of force to relocate an existing international boundary, conquer territory, and abolish a sovereign state—itself constituted a violation of the Western concept of *jus ad bellum*. Second, adding insult to injury, the Iraqi government then announced that in case war broke out it would resort to a weapon prohibited by formal international treaty, i.e. poison gas. Third, foreign citizens belonging to many different nationalities were rounded up, taken hostage, and sent to various strategic installations so that they might serve as human shields against attack. Fourth, in what many saw as a justified response to these moves, the US government dropped hints

that if hostilities broke out—and possibly even if they did not break out—Saddam Hussein would be among the first targets. Finally, perhaps most remarkable of all, the United States and its allies avoided responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by declaring war unilaterally and launching a campaign in pursuit of their interests, but rather asked for and obtained a Security Council mandate for turning the Iraqis out. Only then did they resort to military action.”

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS: RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, June 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 259p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/16

“Included in this committee print ... is a series of relevant documents and reports relating to important developments in the Persian Gulf Crisis, covering the time period of August 2, 1990, to March 7, 1991. Also included are complete texts of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, as well as a chronology of events of the past 7 months. In this regard, the committee print will contribute to the public’s understanding of the Congress’ historical debate in authorizing the use of force against Iraq’s illegal invasion of Kuwait.”

THE POSTWAR GULF: RETURN TO TWIN PILLARS? U.S. Department of Defense. David O. Smith. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 1991. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1991. p.51-60. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 21/2

“...the Nixon Administration promulgated what came to be known as the ‘Twin Pillar’ policy of relying on two moderate regional states—Iran and Saudi Arabia—to do the job [of protecting vital American interests] ... The Gulf War has highlighted several lessons relevant to formulating a new regional strategy ... Maintaining peace and stability in the Gulf will be extremely problematic, but we can no longer afford the risk of relying on regional surrogates to protect vital US interests. At the same time, we must be sensitive to the realities of regional politics. We cannot impose either a military presence or a security framework; whatever structure we seek to build must have strong regional support. In the short term and from a strictly military standpoint, it may be more desirable to deter aggression in the Gulf ourselves than to depend on regional allies; however, to do so risks a long-term catastrophe if our presence serves only as a catalyst to topple the feudal monarchies which now own and protect the oil ... In the post-Cold War era, the Gulf will be the most vulnerable, and therefore the most dangerous, point on the globe. Our future strategy must reflect this basic fact.”

PROSECUTING IRAQI WAR CRIMES: A CONSIDERATION OF THE DIFFERENT FORUM OPTIONS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Affairs. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.108-174

“As the regime of Saddam Hussein crumbles in Iraq, the subject of this hearing on how we can best hold those accountable for war crimes in that country takes on increasing significance. The administration apparently has already begun to draw up plans to deal with both the historical offenses by the Iraqi regime against its own people and its neighbors as well as crimes committed by the regime during the current conflict. It is vital that Congress play a role in examining these issues, and this hearing is a vital starting point in that process. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein’s regime is responsible for many war crimes. The main question before this Committee today is how best those crimes should be prosecuted. There are a number of options available, ranging from international tribunals sanctioned by the United Nations to the domestic courts of Iraq or perhaps even the United States. Whatever forum is used, the result must have legitimacy both for the Iraqi people and for the international community.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41319>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41320> (PDF)

PROTECTING THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR IRAQ AND CERTAIN OTHER PROPERTY IN WHICH IRAQ HAS AN INTEREST. Office of the President. George W. Bush. [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 2 June 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 4p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-76

“Unless licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to this order, any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution garnishment, or other judicial process is prohibited, and shall be deemed null and void, with respect to the following: (a) the Development Fund for Iraq, and (b) all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, and interests therein, and proceeds, obligations, or any financial instructions of any nature whatsoever arising from or related to the sale or marketing thereof, and interests therein, in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33500>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33501> (PDF)

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3289, EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR DEFENSE AND FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, 2004. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 15 October 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 6p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8:108-320/CORR

“The resolution provides for consideration of H.R. 3289, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, under an open rule. The rule provides one hour of general debate equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations. The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the bill. Under the rules of the House the bill shall be read for amendment by paragraph. The rule waives points of order against provisions in the bill for failure to comply with clause 2 of rule XXI (prohibiting unauthorized appropriations or legislative provisions in an appropriations bill), except as specified in the resolution. The rule authorizes the Chair to accord priority in recognition to Members who have pre-printed their amendments in the Congressional Record.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS39852>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS39853> (PDF)

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION. Office of the President. George W. Bush. [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 24 February 2004.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 17p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-160

“The Governing Council established a Hajj policy committee to oversee the plan for 25 flights carrying more than 5,000 passengers to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. As of January 26, approximately 45,000 Iraqi pilgrims were participating in the Hajj. This is a significant increase over the number of pilgrims who traveled under the Saddam regime, and is the first time in several years that the Hajj was open to all Iraqis. Reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure continued at a fast pace during this period. Electrical power production received significant attention, as did repair of other dilapidated and sabotaged infrastructure, including water supplies, health facilities, the oil sector, and schools. This report will summarize the breadth of reconstruction activities throughout Iraq.”

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORIZAITON FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 23 January 2004.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 18p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-155

“On October 16, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1511. The objective of Resolution 1511 is to increase the international community’s participation in Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction. Specifically, the resolution provides that the U.N. should strengthen its role in Iraq, particularly in areas of the U.N.’s special expertise, including in the field of political transition; authorizes a multinational force under unified command; calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of Iraqi police and security forces; and appeals to Member States and the international financial institutions to strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and redevelopment of Iraq’s economy.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44543> (PDF)

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 16 October 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 19p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-135

“This report covers approximately the period from July 19, 2003 to approximately September 25, 2003. During this period, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ... made significant progress toward addressing the many challenges facing liberated Iraq. Security remained the CPA’s highest priority. Still, deadly attacks were instigated by backers of the former regime, and by extremists who infiltrated from outside Iraq ... Reconstructing Iraq’s infrastructure, devastated by war and years of neglect, continued to be a high priority ... Intensive efforts are underway to solicit international contributions for both reconstruction and stabilization ... Finally, steps toward representative democracy gained momentum. The 25-member Governing Council (GC), the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration contemplated by Resolution 1483, appointed an interim ministerial cabinet as well as a committee to develop procedures for drafting a constitution.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS40465> (PDF)

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 3 September 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 15p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-120

“This report covers approximately the period from June 5, 2003 to July 18, 2003. During this period, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ... tackled a range of problems facing Iraq ... The CPA’s highest priority has been to establish a secure environment for the Iraqi people. The CPA has made significant progress in rehabilitating and professionalizing Iraq’s police force ... This report will summarize the breadth of our reconstruction activities throughout Iraq ... Relief and reconstruction efforts are summarized in section II. Democracy building and governance issues are described in section III. Military operations are covered in section IV.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS37220> (PDF)

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 29 April 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 10p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-63

“On March 19, after Saddam Hussein and his sons rejected a final opportunity to leave Iraq peacefully, the President directed U.S. Armed Forces, operating with other Coalition forces, to commence combat operations against Iraq.” Includes sections concerning an Iraqi Interim Authority, Economic Support Funds to aid opposition groups and humanitarian relief, humanitarian relief planning, reconstruction, the Iraqi debt, military operations in Iraq, and the Free Iraqi Forces.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31448>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31449> (PDF)

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REGARDING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 24 March 2003.]

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 1p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-54

“I have recently concluded, along with other coalition leaders, that only the use of armed force will ... restore international peace and security in the area. I have also determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 93-148).”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30581>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30583> (PDF)

A REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 107-243 (AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002). Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 19 March 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 10p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-50

“This report summarizes diplomatic and other peaceful means pursued by the United States, working for more than a dozen years with cooperating foreign countries and international organizations such as the United Nations, in an intensive effort (1) to protect the national security of the United States, as well as the security of other countries, against the continuing threat posed by Iraqi development and use of weapons of mass destruction, and (2) to obtain Iraqi compliance with all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions regarding Iraq...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30924>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30925> (PDF)

REPORT ON MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 28

January 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 11p.
[Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-23

“Iraq remains a serious and growing threat to international peace and security. For more than a decade, the Iraqi regime has deceived and defied the will of the international community and numerous UNSC resolutions by, among other things, continuing to seek and develop WMD and prohibited long-range missiles, brutalizing the Iraqi people, supporting international terrorism, and committing gross human rights violations. The United States has participated in international efforts at containment, sanctions, inspections, and selected military action against Iraq, and, despite these measures, Iraq continues to violate its international obligations.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27160>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS27161> (PDF)

REPORT ON THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 13 February 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 16p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-40

“This report is submitted pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243). It reports on matters relevant to that Resolution including matters relating to the planning for post-liberation Iraq under section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338). The report also discusses recent developments in areas previously reported under section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1). This report covers approximately the period from December 15, 2002, to February 10, 2003.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30927> (PDF)

REPORT ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 September 2002.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 3p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 107-253

“The crisis between the United States and Iraq that led to the declaration of a national emergency on August 2, 1990, has not been resolved. The Government of Iraq continues to engage in activities inimical to stability in the Middle East and hostile to U.S. interests. Such Iraqi actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23017>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS23018> (PDF)

A REQUEST FOR 2003 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS. Office of the President (George W. Bush). [U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 25 March 2003.] Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 28p. [Communication from the President].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/7: 108-55

“A request for 2003 supplemental appropriations to support Department of Defense operations in Iraq and to strengthen the capabilities of our friends and allies who will share the burden of military and stabilization activities.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30614>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30616> (PDF)

REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT TO SUBMIT TO THE HOUSE THE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND DOCUMENTS ON RECONSTRUCTION/ SECURITY OF POST-WAR IRAQ; AMENDING THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 TO REAUTHORIZE OPIC; COMMENDING THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY; AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY 2004/2005 TO CARRY OUT THE CONGO BASIN FOREST PARTNERSHIP; CONDOLENCES IN RESPONSE TO THE MURDER OF SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER LINDH; AND EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE REGARDING THE UKRAINE MAN-MADE FAMINE IN 1932-1933. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 25 September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 68p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: P 92/6

“First, the resolution seeks access to the report prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Lessons Learned.’ It is my understanding that the requested document is not yet in the form of a report, but is in the form of an initial briefing document which will in turn be followed by a comprehensive written report at a later date. This briefing and report are major undertakings that will entail hundreds of interviews, a large number of which are still ongoing. The briefing and report are very much works in progress and exist today in draft form only.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42822> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/89533.pdf (PDF)

REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT TO TRANSMIT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DOCUMENTS RELATING TO IRAQ'S DECLARATION ON ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 18 March 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 3p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 108-38

“...requesting the President to transmit to the House of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents in the President's possession relating to Iraq's declaration on its weapons of mass destruction that was provided to the United Nations on December 7, 2002...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30336>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30344> (PDF)

REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT TO TRANSMIT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ENTITLED "OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STRATEGIC LESSONS LEARNED" AND DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY OF POST-WAR IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 1 October 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 6p. [Report].

SuDoc# Y 1.1/8: 108-289/PT.1

“Because the briefing materials and report are still in draft form, but will be made available to the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] once each is completed, which in turn will grant access to any Member of the House, consistent with appropriate security procedures and House Rules, and because the second part of the request is so broad and vague, the Committee deemed the resolution to be premature in the first instance, and virtually impossible to support in the second instance, and accordingly ordered it reported adversely.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS38870>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS38872> (PDF)

SADDAM'S IRAQ: SANCTIONS AND U.S. POLICY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 22 March 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 78p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-735

“On the question of disarmament, there have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq for well over a year. We have no idea what Saddam is up to. We can be pretty sure it is not good for us. In order to get inspectors back in, the United States has agreed to water down the inspection regime and weaken the sanctions regime. And even those concessions have not brought compliance from Saddam.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS8897>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS8898> (PDF)

SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1 & 2 August 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 81p. [Markup].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/10

“The United States Government may not sell to Iraq any item on the United States Munitions List ... Licenses may not be issued for the export to Iraq of any item on the United States Munitions List ... The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the export to Iraq of any goods or technology on the control list ... Licenses may not be issued for the export to Iraq of any chemical that the President determines may be used primarily in the production of chemical weapons or may be otherwise devoted to chemical warfare purposes ... The Nuclear Regulatory Commission may not issue any license or other authorization under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for the export to Iraq of any source or special nuclear material, any production or utilization facility, any sensitive nuclear technology, any component, item, or substance determined to have significance for nuclear explosive purposes ... All forms of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (other than assistance for medical supplies and other forms of humanitarian assistance) and the Arms Export Control Act shall be denied to Iraq.”

STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO PERSIAN GULF WAR ILLNESS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. Subcommittee on Military Personnel. 105th Congress, 1st Session, 11 February 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 100p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 997-98/10

“Today the subcommittee will hear testimony on the status of investigations into the gulf war illnesses. Specifically, we will receive testimony on the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. Also, we will receive a review of actions taken by the Department of Defense to identify causes of the gulf war illnesses and provide the military members still suffering from these illnesses some insight. The principal goal of this hearing is to gain a better understanding of the Department’s approach to treating ill gulf service members, those of whom are still on active duty, and to identify additional actions that may be needed to improve their treatment and their potential discharges under the medical proceedings.”

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: EUROPE. U.S. Department of Defense. Raymond A. Millen. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 16p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003010773

“Fear of provoking a terrorist backlash petrifies Europe. Europeans worry that a war with Iraq may cause further instability in the Middle East, ignite a regional conflict, and thereby unleash a wave of terrorism against European states. Due to its proximity and accessibility, European fears of Middle East and North Africa terrorism are not unfounded. With 15 million Muslims living in Europe, the risk of terrorism emanating from or through its Muslim community is daunting. Unlike the United States, which has a tradition of assimilating emigrants, European countries maintain tacit segregation of their émigrés ... The United States cannot allay many of these fears by explaining how the dynamics in the Middle East will change in the post-Saddam Hussein era. Only through action and success will the Europeans conclude that stability in the Middle East and consequent eradication of the regional terrorism was the proper course of action.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29446> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqueurop/irqueurop.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: LATIN AMERICA. U.S. Department of Defense. Max G. Manwaring. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 20p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003012358

“Generally, Latin Americans argue that the terrorist enemy is not a single state or group of ‘rogue’ states. It is not a single terrorist leadership—such as Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda. It is not Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Rather, the enemy is the violent terrorist doctrine of anyone’s extremism. In that connection, the enemy is a lethal combination of transnational nonstate actors who exploit for their own narrow

purposes poverty, disease, social discontent, refugee flows, illegal drugs, instability, irredentism, and insurgency regardless of geo-strategic location or level of power ... For Latin America, the problems of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism or a Saddam Hussein is not urgent in a context where political-socio-economic instability threatens compromise the continuity of democratic systems and free market economies. This is a radically different security environment than that being addressed in U.S. policy.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30476> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqlatin/irqlatin.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND TURKEY. U.S. Department of Defense. W. Andrew Terrill. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 14p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003010783

“A U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will place popular pressure on a number of moderate Arab states to reduce high profile military cooperation with the United States. Following a war, Saudi Arabia will probably seek to reduce substantially or eliminate the U.S. military presence in the kingdom due to a more limited regional threat and the domestic difficulties with a U.S. presence. Other Arab nations may continue to cooperate with the U.S. military but seek to do so with reduced visibility following an Iraq war. Radical Middle Eastern states are deeply concerned about a U.S. presence in Iraq but will probably be constrained from opposing it through subversion due to fear they may become a future target in the war on terrorism. The politically powerful Turkish military will seek to ensure that U.S.-Turkish ties will remain intact despite disagreements over Iraq. Israel will consider using an invasion of Iraq to expel Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, increasing Arab speculation about U.S.-Israeli coordination against the Arab world. The likelihood of Israel expelling PA leaders will depend upon how the Israelis perceive Washington will respond to such an act.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29448> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqmide/irqmide.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: POST-SOVIET STATES. U.S. Department of Defense. Stephen Blank. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 22p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 20030012052

“A short war with rapid decisive victory minimizes future risks connected with Iraq to our force stationed in the former Soviet Union. However, it does not eliminate existing threats or allow for reduction in force unless we prosecute the war in Afghanistan much more intensively and accelerate the rebuilding of that state. No feasible scenario allows for immediate reduction of troops in the Transcaucasus or Central Asia, but many conceivable scenarios of a war gone wrong in Iraq could lead to the need to send more forces into these theaters...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30278> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqsovet/irqsovet.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: SOUTH ASIA. U.S. Department of Defense. Amit Gupta. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 18p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 20030012210

“India and Pakistan, the major countries of South Asia, have distanced themselves from the proposed U.S.-led military action in Iraq. Both countries remain concerned that a prolonged war would affect their domestic security situation and their economies adversely. The war will not change either country’s long-term relationship with the United States. They see the United States as an important strategic and economic partner. India and Pakistan will continue to provide strong support in the war on terrorism. Increased security cooperation is taking place with India. India, especially, could be a partner in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq’s economy, its civil society, and its military ... For Pakistan, being an American ally in the war on terror has placed some domestic pressure on the Musharraf government. This makes Islamabad reluctant to participate in another military operation that is viewed as being anti-Muslim in its orientation. Leaders of the Islamic fundamentalist party, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), that has formed provincial governments in Balochistan ... have begun to call for a revival of the Taliban and resistance to the Karzai government in Kabul. The ministers have also said that they will use force to oppose the operations of the FBI and American forces on Pakistani soil. Added to the anger of the Islamic groups is a broad public movement against U.S. policy in Iraq that could be used to help launch an agitation against the Musharraf regime.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30385> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqsoasa/..\\irqsoasa\\irqsoasa.pdf> (PDF)

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ: SOUTHEAST ASIA. U.S. Department

of Defense. Anthony L. Smith. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 20p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003012209

“Most relationships will, in fact, ride out possible adverse consequences from conflict in Iraq, but objections will be two-fold. While states like the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand could be described as generally supportive of the United States in the war against terrorism and are not alarmed by the doctrine of preemption, several other Southeast Asian states consistently have cited nonintervention and absolute state sovereignty to either oppose, or remain unengaged, in various interventions over the last decade. New ASEAN members like Burma, Laos, and Vietnam have been unhappy with ‘humanitarian intervention,’ being critical of the NATO operation in Kosovo, and refusing to be involved in the peacekeeping operation in East Timor. Therefore, armed invasion of Iraq will not sit well with these states, but they will do little more than verbally oppose it. Disagreement over an intervention, however, is nothing new in these relationships. States with majority Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Malaysia will face popular discontent over a U.S. invasion of Iraq. States with minority Muslim populations will see similar discontent, but these sentiments will not have the same impact on government decisionmaking. The U.S. relationship with Indonesia is the most likely to be damaged by a conflict with Iraq. A protracted war in Iraq would be most damaging to U.S. relations with Southeast Asia’s Islamic community.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30384> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/irqseasa/irqseasa.pdf> (PDF)

THIRTEEN YEARS: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN IRAQ. U.S. Department of Defense. Alan W. Dowd. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.46-60. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/3

“In all of this—from the carrots and sticks in Pakistan and Syria, to the ongoing hunt for al Qaeda in Afghanistan, to the proxy war with Iran, to the transformation of Iraq, to the chess game with Saudi Arabia—we catch a glimpse of the next phase in the war on terror. Blending the surprise and lethality of traditional warfare with the tension and stalemate of the Cold War, what lies ahead is something altogether different—a colder, harsher strain of conflict. The United States is well-suited for this ‘colder war.’ Since 12 September 2001, America has been on guard, alternately showing restraint and resolve, the clenched fist of war and the open hand of friendship ... It took longer than 13 years for us to arrive at the crossroads embodied by postwar Iraq, and it may take longer than 13 years to move beyond it. ‘It is,’ as Churchill intoned in 1946, ‘a

solemn moment for the American democracy. For with primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03autumn/dowd.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03autumn/dowd.pdf> (PDF)

TRANSFORMING IRAQ'S ECONOMY. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 11 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 80p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. EC 7: IR 1/3

“One is that we need a full economic program and it cannot be a haphazard transformation of the economy. The program has to be well thought out, comprehensive, transparent, and elaborated to the public, both here and in Iraq ... The second point is that oil alone is definitely not a panacea. While Iraq has huge reserves, these are underground and don't do the man on the street much good. The third point is that the solution to transforming the Iraqi economy is empowering the private sector. There is no escaping this. The fourth point is that the plan must be implemented by an independent commission of technocrats with the ability to fast-track the regulatory approvals necessary to underpin this plan. Let us remember Iraq has four very important resources. First is oil, which we all know about. Second, Iraq has water, two major rivers in an otherwise arid part of the world. Iraq has very fertile land and has achieved self-sufficiency in food production in the past, and can do so again. Fourth, and most important, Iraq has a large technical professional labor force made up of engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, et cetera, and it has experienced a very severe brain drain which needs to be reversed.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS44619> (PDF)

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:90904.pdf (PDF)

U.N. INSPECTIONS OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS: HAS SADDAM WON? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 September 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 37p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: W 37/2

“The threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his continued efforts to thwart international inspections of his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. The gravity

of the threat posed by Saddam and the inadequacy of our nation's response to that threat has been highlighted" was reported in the Washington Post.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10656>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS10657> (PDF)

U.N. ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East; Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1 April; 29 July 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 383p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/17/992

"The subcommittees ... meet today to receive testimony from administration officials concerning the implementation of the cease-fire agreement in Iraq and its implications for U.S. policy. Since the end of the Gulf War, these subcommittees have held several oversight hearings with the administration regarding developments in Iraq. Based on these hearings, press reports, and meetings with U.S. officials it is clear that Iraq is consistently violating virtually every provision of the cease-fire agreement. The subcommittees are interested in ascertaining from the administration the extent to which the United Nations Security Council is taking steps to compel Baghdad to accept the U.N. resolutions."

U.N. ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East; Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 23 April; 18 July; 21 October 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 400p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/17

"There are a number of complex issues which must be addressed in the aftermath of the Gulf war. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688, as well as previous resolutions concerning the Gulf crisis, involve the U.N. and its affiliated agencies in a number of areas, including monitoring the implementations of the cease-fire agreement, peacekeeping, reparations, repatriation, reconstruction, environmental clean-up and the plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees. The Congress will no doubt receive additional aid requests from the administration for many of these U.N. operations, and it is essential that we have a clear understanding of the U.S. role in working with the U.N. system."

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ: COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, March 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992. 76p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: SE 2/21

“This report sets out, in table format, most of the provisions of the 12 resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council on Iraq in 1991, broken down into nine broad issue areas or topics. For each of the 92 provisions summarized, a notation is made indicating if the provision was implemented or complied with, as of December 31, 1991. A quantitative analysis of the status of compliance as drawn from the tables in this report concludes that Iraq’s rate of compliance with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions is lower than its rate of noncompliance with those provisions. Of the 59 provisions requiring Iraqi implementation, either alone or in concert with the United Nations or IAEA, Iraq complied with 14, or 24 percent. Iraq did not comply with 45 or 76 percent of these 59 provisions.”

UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 8 April; 22 May 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 128p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/11

“From 1985 to 1990, the United States Government approved 771 licenses for the export to Iraq of \$1.5 billion worth of biological agents and high-tech equipment with military application. The United States spent virtually an entire decade making sure that Saddam Hussein had almost whatever he wanted in the most advanced technology—technology that was restricted for sale to the East Bloc because of its military usefulness. We continued to provide this equipment until just weeks before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait ... In 1982, the State Department took Iraq off the list of terrorist countries and actively resisted any and all efforts to return it to that list until after Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait. The Department of Commerce was left with virtually no legal basis on which to deny the vast majority of high-tech exports going to Iraq. It took the State Department until 1989 to impose controls on the export of biological toxins to Iraq, controls that had long been in place for the East Bloc. Even after Saddam Hussein used poison gas on his own people in 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds, the Administration refused to impose economic sanctions and fought hard against legislation that would have done so.”

UNITED STATES-IRAQI RELATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 21 March 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 68p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/9/991

“Regarding international terrorism, Iraq was actually removed from the list of states supporting terrorism in 1982, following steps to rein in Abu Nidal and cut past terrorist links. Iraq expelled the Abu Nidal organization in 1983 and sought to establish a new image as a state opposed to terrorism. Between 1982 and the summer of 1990, the only known terrorist acts linked to Iraq were the murders of three Iraqi political exiles in 1988. However, Iraq provided sanctuary for members of certain Palestinian terrorist groups during that period.”

UNITED STATES-IRAQI RELATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 26 April 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. 64p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/9

“Of particular interest to the subcommittee today will be: recent negative statements by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region; Iraqi efforts to acquire military technology illegally from the West; and U.S. policy toward Iraq. Members may seek Administration views during the course of the hearing today on H. Con. Res. 298, a resolution condemning the deliberate and systematic human rights violations by the Government of Iraq; and H.R. 4585, a measure to impose sanctions against Iraq.”

UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ: NEXT STEPS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. 1 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 72p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/9: S.HRG.107-388

“Iraq continues to pose a significant national security threat to the United States. It continues to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction capabilities. If UN sanctions were completely lifted, its weapons program would accelerate. We may have hindered or prevented upgrades to Iraq’s WMD capabilities, but what should we do about the capabilities they already possess?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS21587>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS21588> (PDF)

UNITED STATES POLICY IN IRAQ: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PRIVATE POLICY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 September 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 37p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.105-725

Problems with American policy and the extent to which Saddam Hussein has and may in the future take advantage of American policy uncertainties.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 15 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 76p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/3/2003

“There is clearly a public order problem in Iraq. In many places, it is unclear as to who is in charge. People are grabbing authority—and property—for themselves. Among the other dangers that must be confronted are the influences of Iran and of Wahabism, and of any resurgence of Baathism. It is in Iran’s interest—and al-Qaeda’s—to foment violence whenever it can and thus get us out of Iraq as quickly as possible. To combat this, the population must be firmly on our side, cooperation as the street level with the coalition. If the first order of business is security, the second order is the provision of basic human needs. How long will it take for the lights to go back on and for the water to flow freely again, and what are your plans to accomplish that? Can we demonstrate to Iraqis that we will not be helping the well-off first? What will happen when people’s hoarded food from the saved Oil for Food rations begin to run out? What will be the basis of Iraq’s economy for the next several years? Do you plan to entrench the Iraqi oil ministry within the Iraqi state, or will you urge either its privatization or its revenues be placed in the hands of the people rather than the hands of the government?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42654> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/87090.pdf (PDF)

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 1 March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 43p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-19

“The evidence is piling up that Saddam has reconstituted his illegal weapons programs. Two defectors from the regime have told British press that Saddam has a small nuclear weapon ... Further, there is ample evidence, both public and otherwise, that Saddam is using the cover of a legally allowed missile program to work on longer range missiles that could eventually deliver weapons of mass destruction...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13498>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13499> (PDF)

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 10, 18, 19 & 26 September, 2 October 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 412p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/46

“Today’s hearing marks the first of a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq’s continued violation of numerous United Nations (U.N.) resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community.”

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 16 September 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 91p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 997-98/51

“The past 8 years have seen Saddam increasingly able to claw his way out of his diplomatic, economic, military, and strategic isolation. Despite the devastation it suffered during Desert Storm, the Iraqi military still maintains significant capabilities ... A reduced military presence and allies who have begun to hedge their bets, these are neither encouraging signs nor signs of strength ...”

UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science; Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 26 September; 6 December 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 73p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: P 43/13

“The day of the invasion the Security Council passed Resolution 660 calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. When this effort and the diplomatic efforts of the Arab League were summarily rejected by Saddam Hussein on August 26, the Security Council of the United Nations imposed mandatory economic sanctions to increase the pressure on Iraq and to make it pay greater costs for its aggression. The hope was that by isolating Iraq politically and economically, Saddam Hussein would withdraw. While these diplomatic and economic steps were being taken, military forces were deployed in the region to deter further aggression and to support the Security Council’s resolutions. As of now, 27 nations have joined in this truly unprecedented multinational force. To date, the international coalition has had considerable success in isolating Iraq and making it pay high costs for its occupation

of Kuwait. We regret, Mr. Chairman, the pain that this has caused innocent citizens of Iraq, a people with whom we have no quarrel. But the question before us now is whether the costs we impose on Saddam Hussein through sanctions alone will be high enough to cause him to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait.”

U.S. OPTIONS IN CONFRONTING IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 February 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998. 85p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/7

“For many of us, two questions remain. One, if the sites of the weapons of mass destruction are inspected freely and with no time limits, in accordance with this new agreement, what about the weapons that have been moved out of Iraq? What about the disclosure regarding those and the inspection and their elimination? And, two, if sanctions have not worked with Saddam Hussein in the past, then what will?”

U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 19, 23 & 25 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 216p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-840

“The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to continue our hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. The purpose of these hearings is to give the administration an opportunity to present its position on Iraq and to allow this committee to examine the administration’s proposal with administration witnesses and experts outside the government.”

U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 28 January 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 36p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG. 106-327

“Does U.S. support for outside resistance groups make it more or less likely that inside pressure will topple Saddam’s regime? ... Do the recently expanded rules of engagement for our forces in the area go far enough or should we more aggressively attack the Iraqi air defense system? Are we rebuilding Iraq’s oil refining capacity just weeks after we attacked part of it?”

THE U.S. POLICY REGARDING UNITED NATIONS INSPECTIONS OF IRAQI CHEMICAL SITES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations; Committee on Armed Services. 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 3 September 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 48p. [Joint Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: P 75/13

“We have noted for some time that international apathy has been creeping into enforcement of the inspection regime in Iraq. There appears to be a steady erosion of international will within the UN Security Council, the United Nations, and among regional states who should have the most to fear from a resurgent Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction. These divisions in the coalition against Iraq may have encouraged Saddam to defy UN resolutions and interfere again with UN monitoring and inspection missions. The United States has been the most insistent country on the right to inspect Iraqi facilities any time and anywhere and to destroy those materials and weapons proscribed in UN resolutions. We have over the years fought against pressures to compromise and against the weakening of international resolve to compel Iraqi compliance. Without U.S. vigilance and determination in the face of international apathy and fatigue, Iraq would resume developing weapons of mass destruction, threatening its neighbors, and destabilizing an already precarious situation in the Gulf.”

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 60p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/14

“There is some disagreement about the precise nature of the threat from Iraq, and, thus, about the need to press for early action on Iraq, as opposed to, for instance, dealing with the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. There are disagreements about tactics, about the efficacy of inspections, and different evaluations about the cost of intervention, what should follow a possible intervention, and so forth.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42848> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/81813.pdf (PDF)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 4 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 66p.

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: P 75/22

Saddam Hussein’s intentions and actions in the years since U.N. Weapons Inspectors left Iraq, specifically the state of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities.

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42274> (PDF)

http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/107/75563.pdf (PDF)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 & 28 September 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 105p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG. 106-1121

“Our overall policy toward Iraq has been successful in containing Iraqi aggression. It is a policy that the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the State Department and other agencies of government, executes on a daily basis. It is a policy that has required and will continue to require patience, tact, and perseverance. We have developed and are implementing this policy because if left to pursue its objectives unhindered by international sanctions and coalition forces, Iraq would pose an unacceptable threat to our national interests and the interests of our allies and friends in both the Middle East and around the world.”

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 March 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. 63p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/3/2000

“U.S. policy toward Iraq has followed a consistent course since the liberation of Kuwait in January 1991 ... Our policy is based on the objective judgment that the regime of Saddam Hussein poses a continuing threat to regional peace and security, which must be contained ... The United States has focused on addressing humanitarian needs in Iraq since the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when brutal military repression displaced tens of thousands of civilians in northern Iraq. We responded with Operation Provide Comfort, a U.S.-led coalition effort that provided food, shelter, and other forms of disaster assistance on a massive scale. The coalition also instituted a no-fly zone in the north in 1991, and another one in the south in 1992. That has contained the Iraqi military and prevented any repetition of large scale use of force against civilians. In the Security Council, we have championed the humanitarian interests of the Iraqi people...”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS6976>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS6825> (PDF)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 March 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. 92p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: IR 1/3

“...since the Persian Gulf War, the United States has been determined to prevent Iraq from again becoming a serious threat to international stability and peace. In this effort, the strong, bipartisan support of Members of Congress has been essential and the tool of U.N. economic and weapons sanctions has been of singular value. It is our policy that these sanctions should remain until Iraq is in overall compliance with all relative Security Council resolutions.”

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, DC, AUGUST 3, 1995. U.S. Department of State. Madeleine K. Albright. *Dispatch*. Vol. 6, No. 34, 21 August 1995. Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1995. p.649-653. [Text of Remarks].

SuDoc# S 1.3/5: 6/34

“We are insisting that Iraq meet fully all obligations established by the Security Council because we remain highly distrustful of the Iraqi regime and because that regime remains a potential threat to a region of great strategic importance to the U.S. and to the world. It was five years ago this week that Iraq invaded Kuwait. Hundreds of thousands of American soldiers put their lives at risk to halt and reverse that act of blatant aggression. We should not allow Saddam Hussein to regain in the Security Council what he forfeited through his own ambition and miscalculation on the battlefield. It should be obvious that a premature return to business as usual with this regime would entail grave and unacceptable risks.”

Online

<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatchv6no34.html>

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ, ADMINISTRATION VIEWS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 September 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 55p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. IN 8/16: P 75/26

“Saddam is a dictator who took over one of the wealthiest countries in the world and utterly destroyed its economy through his reckless actions. As we all know, he started two major wars, tried to wipe an entire country off the map, attacked Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran unprovoked, tried to assassinate the former President of the United States, gassed his own people as well as Iranians, and committed innumerable abominations in what the great Iraqi intellectual Kanan Makiya called a republic of fear.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42847> (PDF)

http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/107/81814.pdf (PDF)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: MOBILIZING THE OPPOSITION. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 106th Congress, 1st Session, 2 March; 23 June 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 37p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.106-241

“Our policy rests on three pillars. First, as long as he is around, we want to contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both to Iraq’s neighbors and to the Iraqi people. The second one is that we want to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of his refusal to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions. And third, finally, we want to work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as with Iraq’s neighbors, to change the regime in Iraq and to help its new government rejoin the community of nations.”

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 3 YEARS AFTER THE GULF WAR. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 23 February 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. 61p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: IR 1/15

“Saddam Hussein realizes that new military action would provoke an international response. But he is still creating pain and terrible suffering among the Kurdish people. His preferred tactic at the moment is to sporadically interrupt the supply of electric power into Northern Iraq. The result is that hospitals, businesses, homes and villages—without notice—lose power for sometimes days or weeks on end ... He has also used an internal blockade against his own northern provinces to prevent the shipment of spare parts and raw materials, making the traditional farming practices and light manufacturing impossible. He has also debased his own currency in an attempt to wipe out the personal savings of Kurdish citizens ... Every day that we maintain this embargo and cause economic suffering to the Kurds, we are both politically radicalizing the Kurds and increasing the flow of refugees into Turkey...”

“Every day that we maintain this embargo and cause economic suffering to the Kurds, we are both politically radicalizing the Kurds and increasing the flow of refugees into Turkey...”

WAR AND THE IRAQ DILEMMA: FACING THE HARSH REALITIES. U.S. Department of Defense. Richard L. Russell. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.46-61. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/3

“The harsh reality is that international sanctions and intrusive UN weapons inspections have failed to undermine the Iraqi regime or force Saddam to abandon his WMD programs. On the contrary, the sanctions may have worked to bolster Saddam’s reign rather than weaken it. The sanctions are evaded through all of Iraq’s neighbors, including American partners in Jordan and Turkey, as well as through Saddam’s foes in Iran and Syria. The sanctions have created an enormous black market controlled by Saddam and his family. Saddam uses the black market earnings to shore up the loyalty of his intelligence, security, and elite military forces to safeguard his regime.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/russell.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/russell.pdf> (PDF)

THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM OF IRAQ. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 114p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-573

“Over 15 years ago, a prominent U.S. news magazine ran a picture of Saddam Hussein on its cover with the caption, ‘Most Dangerous Man in the World.’ Despite a long war with Iran in the mid-1980s, a devastating defeat by the United States in 1991, major revolts by the Kurds and the Shiite elements within his country, numerous coup attempts, wary neighbors, and a constant international application of sanctions, Saddam Hussein remains in power and continues to develop all of the weapons of mass destruction, threatening his own citizens and neighbors in the world.”