

—U.S. MILITARY SERVICES and the USE of FORCE—

THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. COLE. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 October 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 67p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 999-2000/65

“The circumstances surrounding the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen,” in which 17 American soldiers were killed and three dozen others were wounded.

THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. COLE. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session. 19 & 25 October 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 131p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.106-1119

“...why Yemen when there are continuing State Department travel warnings in effect for others, by they tourists or persons engaged in commerce? Why Yemen, when the annual State Department report on global terrorism issued in April 2000, just 6 months ago, stated—and I quote that report—“The Yemeni government’s inability to exercise authority over remote areas of the country continue to make the country a safe haven for terrorist groups.”

BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH ASYMMETRIC WARFARE. U.S. Department of Defense. Vincent J. Goulding. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 30, No. 4. Winter 2000-2001. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2000. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 30/4

“If US strategic and operational leaders come to the conclusion that urban warfare is too costly and destructive, the results at the tactical level will be devastating. Unfortunately, some in the defense intellectual community have already drawn that conclusion. Their prophecies of doom and gloom are invariably based on historical precedent that highlights the carnage of Mogadishu or Grozny. What these analysts overlook is the timeless strategic importance of those ticks on the map that brought together the forces that fought in them. The strategic significance of such places will not go away simply because many in the defense establishment have determined that the urban environment is ill-suited to the emerging American way of war. If anything, it will increase as future enemies justifiably perceive the urban battlefield as a US critical vulnerability.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/goulding.htm>

BOMB ATTACK IN SAUDI ARABIA. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 July; 18 September 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 154p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.104-832

Reports on the June 25, 1996, bomb attack on the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 U.S. servicemen and injured approximately 550 others, including 250 Americans.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM: A COALITION UPDATE. Office of the President (George W. Bush). 2 March 2004. Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2004. [White House Website].

SuDoc# N/A

“Following the appalling events of September 11th, countries across the world expressed their support for action against terrorism. That support now forms the foundation of a remarkable world-wide coalition. The Coalition rapidly established its objectives. The first things to do were: to stop Usama Bin Laden and the Al Qa’ida network and to ensure that Afghanistan ceased to harbour and sustain international terrorism. The Coalition’s objectives remain: to do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism; to deter states from supporting, harboring, or acting complicitly, with international terrorist groups.”

Online

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/campaignagainstterrorism.pdf> (PDF)

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/coalition/coalitionupdate.html>

CAN WE PUT THE LEADERS OF THE “AXIS OF EVIL” IN THE CROSSHAIRS? U.S. Department of Defense. Matthew S. Pape. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.62-71. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/3

“An absolute prohibition on the use of assassination under any circumstances, on purely ethical grounds, ignores the realities of the current threats the United States faces, and unnecessarily constrains the President’s ability to respond to them.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/pape.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02autumn/pape.pdf> (PDF)

“CHECKMATE ON THE NORTHERN FRONT”: THE DEPLOYMENT OF TASK FORCE 1-63 ARMOR IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. U.S. Department of Defense. Brian Maddox. *Armor*. Vol. 112, No. 5, September-October 2003. Fort Knox, Kentucky: U.S. Army Armor Center, 2003. p.6-10. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.78/2: 112/5

“Diplomatic differences with a newly elected Turkish government prevented the planned deployment of a large coalition force to open a second ‘Northern Front’ in Iraq. Military planners turned to a different option that relied more on finesse and flexibility to accomplish stated objectives. This strategy involved a diverse group of forces and organizations that included national intelligence agencies, conventional U.S. Army and Air Force units, Special Operations Forces, and Kurdish Pesh Merga fighters.”

COAST GUARD FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 7 March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 71p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. T 68/2: 107-67

“In fiscal year 2003 the Coast Guard will make great strides in addressing these five goals: Build Maritime Domain Awareness ... Ensure Controlled Movement of High Interest Vessels ... Enhance Presence and Response Capabilities ... Protect Critical Infrastructure and Enhance Coast Guard Force Protection ... Increase Domestic and International Outreach ...”

COLLAPSED COUNTRIES, CASUALTY DREAD, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. Jeffrey Record. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.4-23. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/2

Examines the tensions between the civilian military leadership and the military command structure regarding the relative emphasis placed on the possibility of American military casualties. Points out that it is the civilian leadership which is now less concerned with such losses than is the leadership within the military. Places tactics used in the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the context of previously undertaken military actions which also relied less on forces on the ground and more on overwhelming American airpower than in previous conflicts such as the Second World War, Korea, and Vietnam.

[Online](#)

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02summer/record.htm>

COMBATING TERRORISM: AXIS OF EVIL, MULTILATERAL CONTAINMENT OR UNILATERAL CONFRONTATION?. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 16 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 114p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/20

“Should terrorist states be contained or confronted? How can multilateral coalitions be sustained when no definition of terrorism has been agreed upon? What consideration of circumstances justify unilateral action on the part of the United States against terrorism?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31490> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: EFFORTS TO PROTECT U.S. FORCES IN TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST: STATEMENT OF MARK E. GEBICKE, DIRECTOR, MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. United States General Accounting Office. 28 October 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997. 14p. (Testimony).

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: T-NSIAD-98-44

Overview and information concerning “(1) the environment U.S. forces overseas are facing, including the terrorist threat and the relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the measures DOD has taken to enhance the security of personnel ... and (3) DOD initiatives to improve its overall force protection program.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14438> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR U.S. FORCES, INVENTORY AND QUALITY CONTROLS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 21 June 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 142p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: T 27/11

“If the availability and reliability of individual protective equipment were a military priority, these problems would have been addressed as quickly and as effectively as DOD fixes a rifle that overheats or an ammunition shortage. The persistence and

extent of protective mask failures suggest the problem and the solution go beyond training and maintenance by individual service members ... The threat of chemical and biological warfare is real and it is changing. U.S. forces must be protected to the maximum extent possible from a broad and growing list of toxins and agents. In terms of individual protection, only high-quality masks and suits will do that job. The current system of chemical and biological defense appears too willing to tolerate preventable equipment failures.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13743>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13744> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM: STATUS OF DOD EFFORTS TO PROTECT ITS FORCES OVERSEAS: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS. U.S. General Accounting Office. July 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997. 37p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: NSIAD-97-207

“During our visits to overseas bases, we found significant security improvements have been made in Turkey and the Middle East to protect against vehicle bombs. In these countries, sites have been fortified in various ways against a terrorist attack, particularly against a truck bomb similar to the one that struck Khobar Towers ... Saudi Arabia has seen the most profound changes, as thousands of DOD personnel have been moved to remote facilities in the desert and restricted from leaving base throughout their entire tour ... DOD has placed less emphasis on improving security at sites where the terrorist threat is not considered to be high.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS12638> (PDF)

COMBATING TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Colin S. Gray. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 23, No. 3, Autumn 1993. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1993. p.17-23. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 23/3

“...no counterterrorist policy or grand strategy possibly can be complete if it excludes provision for going after terrorists with all necessary force. The use of force, no matter how careful, always will attract criticism. It is as important for citizens to elect political leaders willing to brave that criticism as it is for them to license political-military counterterrorist capabilities. If politicians are never willing to order military counterterrorist units into action, it will not be surprising if those units lose all potential deterrent value ... terrorism, though usually threatening only isolated and small-scale violence, poses a full frontal challenge to the implicit contract between

citizen and state. The protection of individuals and their property against harm remains the most fundamental obligation of government.”

A COMPANY COMMANDER’S THOUGHTS ON IRAQ. U.S. Department of Defense. John B. Nalls. *Armor*. Vol. 113, No. 1, January-February 2004. Fort Knox, Kentucky: U.S. Army Armor Center, 2004. p.13-16. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.78/2: 113/1

“This article shares some of my experiences in Iraq that will help prepare commanders and platoon leaders on what to expect and how to better prepare soldiers for the tasks ahead. These tasks are not covered by a supplement or manual, and are not a joy to learn in the midst of a firefight. I know there are more than a hundred correct responses to every issue. These opinions are based on my experiences as a tank and headquarters company commander in an armor battalion preparing for and executing combat operations in a stability and support environment.”

CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE WAR POWERS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 18, 23-25, 30 June; 1, 9, 23, 28, 30 July; 5 August 1970. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. 601p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.F 76/1: C 76/9

“We are not interested in assessing blame or taking punitive action. Our concern is with the appropriate scope and substance of congressional and presidential authority in the exercise of the power of war in order that the Congress may fulfill its responsibilities under the Constitution while permitting the President to exercise his. We seek to define arrangements which will allow the President and the Congress to work together in mutual respect and maximum harmony. In other words, we are looking forward, rather than backward, to future situations which surely will arise again to threaten conflict between the Congress and the President over the exercise of warmaking powers.”

CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES TO UNCONVENTIONAL PROBLEMS: ANALYZING TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Del Erin Stewart. *MIPB: Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. Vol. 28, No. 1, January-March 2002. Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 2002. p.15-20. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.84: 28/1

“Considering the implications of the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, many changes must occur in how the U.S. Army conducts its counterterrorist operations. New methodologies and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) must

emerge if the Army is to address this new threat. Based on experience, the following methodology is one possible interim fix.”

CRITICAL CHALLENGES CONFRONTING NATIONAL SECURITY—CONTINUING ENCROACHMENT THREATENS FORCE READINESS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 16 May 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 437p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: C 35/3

“The Committee on Government Reform has conducted a 2-year long investigation of encroachment on military training ranges and the critical importance of training for the safety of the men and women in the armed forces. This investigation has uncovered a growing number of restrictions placed on training at military training ranges by environmental regulations, urban sprawl, international treaties and competition of limited airspace and frequency spectrum.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26497> (PDF)

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: ARMY NEEDS TO ADDRESS RESOURCE AND MISSION REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING ITS TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND. U.S. General Accounting Office. February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-03-214

“GAO recommends that the Army validate TRADOC’s workload and personnel requirements before further reducing the Command’s reengineering plan adequately addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues. In commenting on the report, the Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations related to TRADOC’s reengineering but expressed various concerns about other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions would be taken.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30705> (PDF)

DEFINING AND ACHIEVING DECISIVE VICTORY. U.S. Department of Defense. Colin S. Gray. April 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 52p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002017177

“...discusses the idea of decisive victory with reference to different levels of analysis—the operational, strategic, and political. It is suggested that the concept of decisive victory needs to be supplemented by two ancillary concepts, strategic success

and strategic advantage. The author explores the means and methods most conducive to achievement of decisive victory. He explains that objectively 'better' armies tend to win (war may be the realm of chance, but the dice are loaded in favor of those who are militarily competent); that there is no magic formula which can guarantee victory ... that technology is not a panacea, the answer to all military and strategy difficulties; that the complexity of war and strategy allows for innovative, even asymmetrical, exercises in substitution as belligerents strive to emphasize strength and conceal weakness; and that it is essential to know your enemies, especially if you require them to cooperate in a deterrent or coercive relationship. The author concludes by arguing that the concept of decisive victory is meaningful and important."

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19491> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/victory/victory.pdf> (PDF)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Defense. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 710p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AP 6/2: S.HRG.108-176

"Balancing the risk associated with near-term modernization and mid-term transformation has required us to make some tough choices. We have had to terminate or restructure numerous current force modernization programs to generate the capital to fund transformation. In a nutshell, our fiscal year 2004 budget submission funds people, readiness, and transformation at the expense of some of our infrastructure accounts and current force modernization. We made these judgments only after a careful balancing of both operational risk and the risk of not transforming to provide the capabilities the Army needs to meet the obligations of our near- and mid-term strategy."

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 27 February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 68p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. B 85/3: 108-6

"Knowing the current and emerging threats to America, it is imperative that we continue to strive to reach the goals of the 21st century transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces ... We must prepare for new forms of terrorism, such as cyber attacks on our network infrastructure. At the same time, we must work to increase our own areas of advantages, such as the ability to project military power over long distances, precision-strike weapons, and our space, intelligence, and under-sea warfare capabilities. As it is difficult to predict every conceivable type of attack, we are

required to prepare for new and unexpected challenges in order to continue to defend against terrorism and other emerging threats of the 21st century.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33966>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS33968> (PDF)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET PRIORITIES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Budget. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 12 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 58p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. B 85/3: 107-23

“We identified six key transformational goals that define our highest priorities for investments in the ’03—’07 FYDP. First, to protect the U.S. homeland and forces overseas; Second, to project and sustain power in distant theaters; Third, to deny enemies sanctuary, or places where they can hide and function. Fourth, to protect information networks from attack; Fifth, to use information technology to link up U.S. forces so they can fight jointly; and Sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space—and protect U.S. space capabilities from enemy attack. We reached these conclusions before September 11, but our experiences since then have validated many of those conclusions, and reinforced the importance of continuing to move forward in these new directions. The 2003 budget request advances each of the six transformational goals by accelerating funding for the development of the transformational programs and by funding modernization programs that support the transformation goals.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19331>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19332> (PDF)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO TRANSFORM THE ARMED FORCES TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 127p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-771

“The purpose of today’s hearing is to review the manner in which the Department is pursuing the transformation of our Armed Forces, to assess the progress that has been made in terms of acquisition programs, experimentation activities, operational concepts, organizational changes, and cultural adjustments; to identify truly transformational items in the fiscal year 2003 budget request; and to determine if legislation is necessary to facilitate and promote transformation.”

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION LESSONS LEARNED SINCE THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. COLE. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 14 June 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. 78p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/19

Department of Defense's antiterrorism and force protection program, the problem of combating terrorism, terrorism directed against U.S. military personnel and interests abroad, specific lessons learned from the Cole incident.

DEPLOYMENT FORCE PROTECTION AND HEALTH ISSUES. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Subcommittee on Health. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 93p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4.V 64/3: 108-21

"The issue of force protection includes a series of important topics, including joint medical surveillance, pre- and post-deployment health assessments, environmental security, the use of drugs for health protection, transparency and ease of record-keeping and record transfer, and equipment, procedures, systems, and documentation in the theater. Today the subcommittee has asked the General Accounting Office to offer testimony on its work to review force protection and medical readiness policies now in place in the Department of Defense, and to review the VA's role in coordinating care and benefits for veterans. As we will learn, there are some gaps."

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: THE CANADIAN APPROACH. U.S. Department of Defense. Sean M. Maloney. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn 1997. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1997. p.135-152. [Article].

SuDoc# 101.72: 27/3

"The application of military force by a democratic government within the confines of its own borders, and in some cases against its citizenry, has long been a controversial and politically sensitive topic. Though that is not a new type of operation for either the American or Canadian military establishments, the nature of the threats each is being asked to confront has evolved. The threats now include (in addition to natural disasters and minor urban unrest) cult groups armed with weapons of mass destruction, agents of narco-parastates in Latin and South America, organized and armed urban unrest, and the violent potential of private paramilitary groups. It is safe to assert that threats to North American domestic security will increase in nature, scope, and number in the next century. This in turn will presumably prompt more debate on and calls for an increase in the military's role in containing and neutralizing those threats."

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/maloney.htm>

FACING THE HYDRA: MAINTAINING STRATEGIC BALANCE WHILE PURSUING A GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Conrad C. Crane. May 2002. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 30p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002020578

“Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report told the Army and the other services to focus their efforts on conducting major combat operations, strengthening homeland security and force protection, and accelerating transformation. However, the Army must simultaneously continue its operations along three other axes. It must remain committed to day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities around the world; sustain its smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs); and remain ready to conduct other major combat operations. If the Army fails in these critical missions, operational ‘victory’ in the war on terrorism will be replaced by strategic failure as regional instability increases around the world. To meet its concurrent obligations, the Army will have to reshape and expand its force structure. Several factors—including an increase in the number of SSCs, which highlighted shortfalls in the Active Component’s combat support and combat service support force structure—were stretching the Army operationally even before September 11. The new demands of homeland security, force protection, and transformation acceleration will only exacerbate the problem.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20442> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/hydra/hydra.pdf> (PDF)

THE FBI INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAUDI ARABIA BOMBING AND FOREIGN FBI INVESTIGATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime. 105th Congress, 1st Session, 12 February 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 30p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/1: 105/44

“Today, our first hearing of the new Congress focuses on the investigative activities of the FBI outside the United States, and specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s investigation into the bombing of the military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Recently, FBI Director Louis Freeh and Attorney General Janet Reno have both made public statements that the Saudis are withholding information necessary for the FBI to make findings and draw conclusions concerning the investigation.”

FIGHTING BARBARIANS. U.S. Department of Defense. David Tucker. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 1998. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1998. p.69-79. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 28/2

“Americans are reasonable, not cowardly, when it comes to the loss of life through military action outside the United States. But what about the case of direct attacks on the American public, possibly including chemical or biological weapons or some other weapon of mass destruction? If one is imagining here a terrorism campaign, then history suggests that the response of the American people would be the demand for an entirely justified and quite thorough revenge, even what one author has described as ‘healthily disproportionate action’ ... the advantage of the civilized depends on three things: an ability to assess accurately the threats before them, the possession of a strategic sense subtle enough to distinguish between the trivial and the essential, and, on the part of their leaders, an informed judgment of the character of the led. We may, in these matters, pose the most significant risk to our own well-being.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98summer/tucker.htm>

FOX CO. RAIDS AL HASISIRAH TO RECOVER STOLEN VEHICLES. U.S. Department of Defense. Rob Henderson. *ConMar: The Continental Marine Magazine*. Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2003. New Orleans, Louisiana: Public Affairs Office, Marine Forces Reserve, 2003.

SuDoc# D 214.23: 27/3

“Reserve Marines from Fox Co., 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, in conjunction with the An Nasiriya Police Department, raided the village of Al Hasisirah, 14 miles outside An Nasiriya to recover stolen vehicles for the An Nasiriya City Council.”

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ADAPTIVE USAIC&FH TRAINING IN COMBATING TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Stephen J. McFarland. *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. Vol. 29, No. 2, April-June 2003. p.52-53. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.84: 29/2

“The training will consist of familiarity with Middle Eastern cultures, the basics of Islam, the historical aspects of terrorism, an introduction to the Al Qaeda, the importance of financial tracking, and advanced interrogation and analytical techniques.”

GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATURE OF WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. Antulio J. Echeverra. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 31p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003010784

“Just a few years into the new millennium, and it is already a truism to say that globalization—the spread of information and information technologies, along with greater public participation in economic and political processes—is transforming every aspect of human affairs. What is not clear, however, are the impacts of these trends, especially how they might affect the nature of war. Understanding the nature of war is important for more than academic reasons; the nature of a thing tends to define how it can and cannot be used, which, in the case of war, makes it extremely important to both political and military leaders. To answer the question of war’s nature, one must turn to the famous Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who devoted more time than perhaps any other military theorist (contemporary or otherwise) to this topic.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29449> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/global/global.pdf> (PDF)

GOLD STANDARD. U.S. Department of Defense. Joseph Krypel. *NCE: Navy Civil Engineer*. Vol. 40, No. 2, 2003. Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC: Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 2003. p.16-21. [Article].

SuDoc# D 209.13: 40/2

“In the minds of many here, the real ‘shock and awe’ that will be most remembered from *Operation Iraqi Freedom* wasn’t from any air campaign or the huge televised explosions causing destruction to enemy troops and secret military headquarters. Instead, the sharpest memories will be of the awesome off-load and back-load of thousands of Marines and the tons of fighting equipment and ammo meant to supply all American military services.”

GOVERNMENTS, SOCIETIES, AND ARMED FORCES: WHAT THE GULF WAR PORTENDS. U.S. Department of Defense. Jeffrey D. McCausland. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 1999. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1999. p.2-21. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 29/2

“With the dramatic changes that have occurred in the international political landscape during the last decade, states are now confronted by more complex questions concerning their military forces than ever before. The use of troops in concert with allies in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, observer duty,

and even peacemaking (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) presents a new assortment of implied tasks. Furthermore, the focus and attention span of military and political leaders seem reduced by the daunting array of ongoing wars around the globe that allow little time for considering long-term strategies and potential future conflicts. As we deal with these emerging challenges, however, it remains a responsibility of Western military and civilian force planners to also consider possible large conflicts and how to manage them ... Since the Gulf War the West has been confronted with several peace support operations and military interventions, in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere around the globe. Whether the effort is a peacetime humanitarian assistance mission or a military engagement like that unfolding in Kosovo at this writing, the essential aspects of military force planning—particularly for coalition operations—are constant. Societal-governmental-military relations within any country are defined by its culture, politics, social conditions, and history. Effective relations within this trinity are fundamental to creating conditions for success in war. The Gulf War remains a useful illustration of these forces at work.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/mccausla.htm>

GULF WAR ILLNESS: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DOD PLUME MODELING FOR U.S. TROOPS' EXPOSURE TO CHEMICAL AGENTS: STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING, APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS. U.S. General Accounting Office. 2 June 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 37p. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: GAO-03-833 T

“DOD’s conclusion as to the extent of U.S. troops’ exposure is highly questionable because DOD and CIA plume modeling result are not reliable. In general, modeling is never precise enough to draw definitive conclusions, and DOD did not have accurate information on source term (such as quantity and purity—concentration—of the agent) and meteorological conditions (such as the wind and weather patterns), essential to valid modeling. In particular, the models DOD selected were not fully developed and validated for long-range environmental fallout; the source term assumptions were not accurate; the plume height was underestimated; the modeling only considered the effects on health of a single bombing; field-testing at Dugway Proving Ground did not realistically simulate the actual bombing conditions; and divergence in results among models.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-833T> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03833t.pdf> (PDF)

HOMELAND DEFENSE: OLD FORCE STRUCTURES FOR NEW MISSIONS? U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 29 April 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 165p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: D 36/47

“Today we examine efforts to reform and restructure Department of Defense [DOD], capabilities to defend the U.S. homeland and support civil authorities in the event of terrorist attacks. The cold war strategic pillar of containment, deterrence, reaction and mutually assured destruction crumbled on September 11, 2001. Since then, we have been building a new security paradigm ... Significant strides have been made to reshape and refocus military capabilities to meet an uncertain world of lethal intentions and unconventional capabilities overseas. But at home less has been accomplished to clarify the structural, legal and fiscal implications of new military operations within the sovereign borders of the States.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41604> (PDF)

HOMELAND DEFENSE: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON HOW OVERSEAS AND DOMESTIC MISSIONS IMPACT DOD FORCES: STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT. U.S. General Accounting Office. 29 April 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 15p. [Testimony].

SuDoc# GA 1.5/2: GAO-03-677 T

“It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command to plan and execute domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command’s plan for domestic military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic missions and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air patrols are unable to also perform required combat training. Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in personnel tempo data.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-677T> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03677t.pdf> (PDF)

HOW THE SERVICES ARE TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES TO BETTER CONDUCT ANTI-AND COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed

Services. Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 28 June; 11 July 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 157p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/2 A: 2001-2002/ 45

“...it is important that we not forget the role our Armed Services play in fighting terrorism ... this panel will hold a series of hearings regarding the transformation of our military relative to these new threats and requirements ... This morning, the panel is specifically interested in hearing about the new tactics, techniques and procedures being implemented or considered by each service as well as the Navy-Marine Corps team to enhance your war fighting capabilities.”

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations. 108th Congress, 1st Session, 13 May 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003. 147p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.G 74/7: H 88/6

“The transition from combat to police operations has not been as rapid or as smooth as planned. Hard lessons learned in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan need to quell emergent lawlessness seem to have fallen out of the battle plan during the dash to Baghdad. The military mechanics of basic security and free-flowing humanitarian assistance need to be brought forward quickly before vicious thugs and radical mullahs can occupy the high moral ground so nobly gained in battle.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS41622> (PDF)

INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE NBC. U.S. Department of Defense. October 1977. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Headquarters, 1977. 75p. [Manual].

SuDoc# D 101.20: 21-41

“This manual provides the soldier with the information necessary for him or her to survive during nuclear, biological or chemical attacks. It provides a ready reference for the individual soldier; it outlines the survival and operating standards which they must master if he or she wishes to defend against becoming a casualty ... Regardless of your rank or position in your unit, you must know, and be able to take immediate action for your own survival. What you must know is called the NBC Defense Individual Standards of Proficiency. Even though it sounds tough, these standards are just a list of fairly simple things you must know and be able to do. There are nine basic standards for survival, and eight more for operating under NBC conditions. We’ll take a look at each of these standards, one at a time, and let you know exactly what you need to know and do to survive in a war where NBC weapons are used.”

INFORMATION SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO IMPROVING DOD'S INCIDENT RESPONSE CAPABILITIES. U.S. General Accounting Office. March 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001. 25p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-01-341

“The Department of Defense (DOD) depends on interconnected information systems and communication networks for critical combat and business operations. Many of these systems and networks are interconnected through the public telecommunications infrastructure, including the Internet, and they may be targeted by an increasing variety of cyber attacks.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS13321> (PDF)

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS. U.S. Department of Defense. *MIPB: Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*. Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 2003. Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 2003. 69p. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.84: 29/3

Contains articles such as “The New Counterintelligence Response to the Cyberthreat,” “Nonpassive Defense of the Army’s Computer Networks,” and “Global War on Terrorism: Polygraph—An Intelligence Tool.”

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE OTHER WORLD WAR. U.S. Department of Defense. 26 February 1987. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 1987. 38p. [Manual].

SuDoc# D 301.35: 208-3

“This pamphlet serves as a primer for Air Force personnel to gain a basic understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. It addresses numerous issues touching on the definition, theory, tactics, targets, and effects of terrorism, and the threat that terrorism poses to the US Air Force. The attachments describe general protective measures that may be undertaken by Air Force members.”

LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY. U.S. Department of Defense. Thomas R. Lujan. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 27, No. 3, Autumn 1997. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1997. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 27/3

“It is the premise of this article that the coming years will see a continuation, if not an increase, in the employment of the Army within the United States. Further, because of the potentially adverse effect of such deployments on the relationship between the Army and the American people, the critical element of success is strict conformance

with the legal framework established by the Constitution and federal law. Consequently, it is incumbent on our national strategic leaders and their staffs to understand and appreciate the legal underpinnings of these operations. This article seeks to aid that understanding by presenting and analyzing the legal lessons learned from selected domestic employments in the 1990s. In that same context, military lessons learned will be drawn from the employment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Topics to be addressed are the Army's role in disaster relief operations, its support to civilian law enforcement in the fight against drugs, and the full range of domestic deployments available under the presidential authority to quell insurrection and maintain public order.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm>

LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Richard J. Erickson. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, Air University Press, 1989. 267p. [Monograph].

SuDoc# D 301.26/6: T 27/3

“In conducting military operations against international terrorists and their state sponsors or supporters, the United States is committed to democratic values, which rest in large measure upon the rule of law, including international law. Operational international law is that body of treaty and customary international law that affects the otherwise unrestrained execution of military action. It reflects a community desire for restraint in the use of armed force. It necessitates legal advice in the planning of military operations. But what are the principles of international law that decisionmakers must consider? The primary objective of this study is to identify those principles for the lawful use of military force. The study has two secondary purposes. The first is to review available legal approaches to terrorism. Should terrorism be treated as ordinary crime, whether under domestic or international law, or as unlawful combat and war crime under the law of armed conflict? The second objective is to determine the current applicable international law of state responsibility.”

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ATTACK ON U.S.S. COLE, ON THE REPORT OF THE CROUCH-GEHMAN COMMISSION, AND ON THE NAVY'S JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL MANUAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. MILITARY SERVICES. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 3 May 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 92p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-609

“A purpose of this hearing it to review ... professional judgments ... Are actions by a commanding officer not in compliance with rules, regulations, and military orders acceptable as long as a subsequent determination can be made that such actions did not cause the incident under investigation? ... Is this the proper standard to use in judging the performance of a commanding officer?”

MANAGING RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM: MILITARY READINESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 April 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 250p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. G 74/7: R 11/15

“Prime bands of the electromagnetic spectrum used by the Department of Defense [DOD], to carry essential radio and satellite transmissions are being targeted for development by commercial telecommunications firms here and abroad. Growing civilian demand for wireless services confronts growing DOD requirements for network combat systems on the already crowded finite shoreland of the radio frequency spectrum. So today we ask, are national security needs for critical radio frequency bands reflected in DOD planning and national spectrum allocation policies?”

A MILITARY ETHIC IN AN AGE OF TERROR. U.S. Department of Defense. Anthony E. Hartle. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1987. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1987. p.68-75. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 17/2

“In possible responses to international terrorism, the use of directed or controlled violence against the responsible terrorists seems justified when less radical means of effective response are not available ... If violence is employed only as a last resort, both procedural and institutional justification are credible in such a situation in terms of inherent human rights. When noncombatants are knowingly endangered, however, even if such risk is necessary to permit effective response, the case becomes much less clear ... Under the murky moral conditions of counterterrorist activity and the prosecution of low-intensity warfare—the most likely forms of commitment for American military forces in the near future—the moral dimensions of military activity become hard to discern ... let me also note that those actions against terrorism that are appropriate for our government should be carried out with maximum force and efficiency, for international terrorism is indeed a growing threat to legitimate governments—a threat more dangerous than many appreciate. Paul Johnson calls it ‘the cancer of the modern world.’ If we are to prevent it from destroying the societies it attacks, we must apply drastic and radical treatment to what clearly is a malignancy. At the same time, we must ensure that our responses to terrorism do not injure the moral fabric of our society.”

MILITARY OPERATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2003 OBLIGATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL, BUT MAY RESULT IN LESS OBLIGATIONS THAN EXPECTED. U.S. General Accounting Office. September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 20p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-03-1088

“GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) take several actions to ensure that the fiscal year 2003 funds appropriated for GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) are fully utilized, including that the Secretary of Defense review the services’ spending plans before transferring additional funds from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to ensure the funds will be obligated as planned. GAO also suggests that, given the results of this review, Congress not provide the \$1.4 billion requested by the President for DOD in fiscal year 2004 for continued support of Operations Desert Spring and Northern and Southern Watch since DOD canceled them. GAO made changes to its recommendations based on DOD’s comments on a draft of this report and DOD now agrees with the revised recommendations.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1088> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031088.pdf> (PDF)

MILITARY TRAINING: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND DISTRIBUTIVE LEARNING COULD BENEFIT THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAM. U.S. General Accounting Office. September 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 49p. [Report].

SuDoc# GA 1.13: GAO-03-1026

“As they have recently demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are playing an increasingly significant role in U.S. military operations by performing extremely difficult, complex, and politically sensitive missions on short notice anytime and anywhere in the world. To successfully conduct these missions, SOF personnel must undergo extensive training—often years in duration—to acquire a wide variety of military skills, among them a proficiency in a foreign language ... More frequent and longer deployments and competing priority training needs have reduced the time that both active-duty and reserve/guard units have for language training.”

Online

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1026> (PDF)

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031026.pdf> (PDF)

NATIONAL SECURITY: CASE STUDIES IN POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION, VOLUME II, U.S. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. U.S. Department of Defense. Richard J. Norton & James F. Miskel, eds. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1994. 279p. [Collection].

SuDoc# D 208.202: SE 2/V.2

“With the exception of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Armed Forces of the United States have not been involved in a major conventional conflict in more than 20 years. This does not mean that the U.S. military has been inactive, far from it. These forces have been engaged—some would say over-engaged—in a large number of contingency operations. These contingency operations are the focus of this volume. They are important subjects of inquiry for a number of reasons. The first reason is the projected frequency of future contingency operations ... Another reason for studying contingencies is the associated weight and risks of contingency operations.”

NAVY MEDICINE CONTRIBUTES TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. *Navy Medicine*. Vol. 94, No. 3, May-June 2003. Washington, DC: Bureau of Navy Medicine and Surgery, p.6. [Article].

SuDoc# D 206.7: 94/3

“The jungle island of Basilan, located south of Zamboanga, has been an ideal base for the Abu Sayyaf for a number of years. In a reign of terror not restricted to the island of Basilan this Muslim guerrilla organization has bombed a Philippines Airlines plane, unleashed a grenade attack in a Zamboangan department store, savaged villages, and kidnapped hundreds...”

A NOTE ON INTERESTS, VALUES, AND THE USE OF FORCE. U.S. Department of Defense. Jeffrey Record. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 31, No. 1, Spring 2001. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2001. p.15-21. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 31/1

“The criteria laid down by Weinberger as amended by Colin Powell insist upon the presence of vital interests, a determination to win, public support, exhaustion of non-force alternatives, and use of overwhelming force. The criteria essentially restrict use of force to defense of directly threatened vital strategic interests. Proponents of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, including Weinberger and Powell themselves, do not believe that force should be threatened or used as a tool of diplomacy ... Proponents of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which is still popular inside the Pentagon, also believe that such objectives as restoring democracy, stopping genocide, and enforcing peace agreements on parties to foreign civil wars do not qualify as strategic interests, and certainly do not meet the standard of ‘vital’ interests. But uses of force along the strategic periphery to prevent situations of disorder and violence from escalating into challenges to national interests that *do* count have been historically commonplace for

great powers attempting to exert influence over other peoples. Every state can be expected to defend itself, but only great powers extend protection to other peoples.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01spring/record.htm>

OUR SOLDIERS, THEIR CITIES. U.S. Department of Defense. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1996. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 26/1

“The future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken cities of our world. We will fight elsewhere, but not so often, rarely as reluctantly, and never so brutally ... in the next century, in an uncontrollably urbanizing world, we will not be able to avoid urban deployments short of war and even full-scale city combat. Cities always have been centers of gravity, but they are now more magnetic than ever before. Once the gatherers of wealth, then the processors of wealth, cities and their satellite communities have become the ultimate creators of wealth. They concentrate people and power, communications and control, knowledge and capability, rendering all else peripheral. They are also the post-modern equivalent of jungles and mountains--citadels of the dispossessed and irreconcilable. A military unprepared for urban operations across a broad spectrum is unprepared for tomorrow. The US military, otherwise magnificently capable, is an extremely inefficient tool for combat in urban environments. We are not doctrinally, organizationally, or psychologically prepared, nor are we properly trained or equipped, for a serious urban battle, and we must task organize radically even to conduct peacekeeping operations in cities. Romantic and spiritually reactionary, we long for gallant struggles in green fields, while the likeliest ‘battlefields’ are cityscapes where human waste goes undisposed, the air is appalling, and mankind is rotting.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/peters.htm>

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT: DEVISING THE ARMY'S ROLE. U.S. Department of Defense. Cole. C. Kingseed. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 22, No. 3, Autumn 1992. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992. p.96-102. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 22/3

“...Army planners must attend to promoting long-term stability and sustainable host-nation development as a way to preempt violence, to reduce threats to American interests, and to assist domestic governments in developing their own reform and

infrastructural programs. Good examples of such actions are counter-drug and counterterrorism efforts that have made substantial gains during recent years ... By focusing on peacetime operations, the Army can contribute to the alleviation of the conditions that have traditionally led to the employment of combat forces in conflict. Additionally, the Army can accomplish these missions without increases in numbers and materiel and without sacrificing its preparation for wartime missions. In the long run, war prevention is surely cost-effective; it reduced military and human costs by preserving peace. Peacetime engagement is by no means a panacea for all the problems in the developing world, but it is an important component in our emerging national security strategy. It is an effort in which the US Army can and should play a leading role.”

POSSE COMITATUS AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Chris Quillen. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 32, No. 1, Spring 2002. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2002. p.60-74. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 32/1

“Current US policies and laws are not properly aligned with the possibility of nuclear terrorism. The Department of Defense possesses the technical capability, but not the legal authority, to act as it needs in most situations. Confusion over which level of government is authorized to act and which federal agency is, in fact, the lead federal agency could have catastrophic consequences during a domestic nuclear terrorist incident. As the National Commission on Terrorism has warned, “There is a risk that, in preventing or responding to a catastrophic terrorist attack, officials may hesitate or act improperly because they do not fully understand their legal authority or because there are gaps in that authority. As a result, it is necessary to expand DOD’s legal authority, but such action should be taken advisedly in calm deliberation rather than later in the middle of a crisis.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02spring/quillen.htm>

PROTECTING OUR HOMELAND AGAINST TERROR: BUILDING A NEW NATIONAL GUARD FOR THE 21st CENTURY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 13 December 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 39p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4. J 89/2: S.HRG.107-738

“This is a hearing on whether the National Guard should have an enhanced role in homeland security, not to defer or deter from its primary mission, but to give it another role ... The Guard is responsible for and experienced with homeland security missions, including air sovereignty, disaster relief, responding to suspected weapons

of mass destruction events, and counter-drug operations. The Guard has existing physical, communications and training infrastructure throughout the United States.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS26067> (PDF)

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 17 February 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 81p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: SO 5/3

“A Marine was killed in a sniper attack on January 12 ... In late January, another Marine died in a sniper attack in Mogadishu. Military planners hope to sustain civilian support even if clashes occur between armed Somali bands and U.S. forces moving into remote areas in coming days and weeks. The freelance gunmen appear to lack any popular sympathy at present and are retreating to the countryside. Meanwhile, American troops have received instructions on Somali values and cultural practices in order to avoid behavior that could create anti-American sentiment. Some analysts, however, are concerned that cultural clashes may be inevitable, particularly if the U.S. presence turns out to be prolonged. The most serious threat may come from the Somali Islamic Union (Ittihad), an Islamic fundamentalist group largely based in the northeastern region of the country but also active in Kismayu and Mogadishu. There is concern that members of Ittihad, possibly encouraged by fundamentalist forces outside Somalia, may target western relief workers and troops in an attempt to disrupt the operation and terrorize western relief workers.”

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 25 October 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 61p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.107-408

“What exactly is the definition of homeland security, and to what extent should the Department of Defense be involved in homeland security? How does the Department of Defense relate to the Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge’s new office? Is the Department of Defense organized properly to deal with the many aspects of homeland security? ... Should the Posse Comitatus Act be revised or repealed? If so, do we want the Armed Forces enforcing the law, as would be required in an insurrection? Should every State have a weapons of mass destruction civil support team ... to assist civilian authorities in responding to an incident or attack on U.S. soil involving weapons of mass destruction?”

ROLE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 103rd Congress, 2d Session, 10 February 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. 55p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.103-558

“...the extraordinary power that was given to Presidents during the period of the Second World War and the cold war, with its danger of nuclear conflict, caused Congress to cede extraordinary power to the executive branch, power that allowed three Presidents, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, to wage an undeclared war in Indochina for a decade.”

RUSSIA IN AFGHANISTAN AND CHECHNYA: MILITARY STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE PARADOXES OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT. U.S. Department of Defense. Robert M. Cassidy. February 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 81p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003009739

“Asymmetric warfare poses some of the most pressing and complex challenges faced by the United States today. As American defense leaders and strategic thinkers adapt to this era of asymmetry, it is important that we learn both from our own experience and from that of other nations which have faced asymmetric enemies. In this monograph, Major Robert Cassidy uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the ‘big war’ paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29070> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/rusafgan/rusafgan.pdf> (PDF)

SEA POWER 21: PROJECTING DECISIVE JOINT CAPABILITIES. U.S. Department of Defense. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2004. 35p. [Report].

SuDoc# D 201.2: SE 1

“The events of 11 September 2001 tragically illustrated that the promise of peace and security in the new century is fraught with profound dangers: nations posed for conflict in key regions, widely dispersed and well-funded terrorist and criminal organizations, and failed states that deliver only despair to their people ... Enhancing

security in this dynamic environment requires us to expand our strategic focus to include both evolving regional challenges and transnational threats ... our Navy must expand its striking power, achieve information dominance, and develop transformational ways of fulfilling our enduring missions of sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward presence.”

SECURITY TRANSFORMATION: REPORT OF THE BELFER CENTER CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRANSFORMATION. U.S. Department of Defense. John White and John Deutch. March 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 21p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003014002

“Homeland security, the new first priority, needs to be integrated with more traditional national security concerns. The role of the Intelligence Community must strike a new balance in terms of foreign intelligence and domestic security. The military mission should be redefined. Meeting all of these challenges demands a fundamental transformation of American strategy, armed forces, and national security organization.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS31295>

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/sectrans/sectrans.htm>

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/sectrans/sectrans.pdf> (PDF)

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/sectrans/sectrans.pdf> (PDF)

SOLDIERS IN CITIES: MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN. U.S. Department of Defense. Michael C. Desch, ed. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. 174p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002011350

“This compendium is the result of a conference on ‘Military Operations in an Urban Environment’ cosponsored by the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce in conjunction with the Kentucky Commission on Military Affairs, the U.S. Army War College, and the Association of the United States Army. At the time of the conference, the concept of homeland defense was emerging as an increasingly important mission for the U.S. military. Now this mission has catapulted to prominence with the attacks of September 11 and the appointment of a Director of Homeland Defense—a Cabinet-level position. The authors of the chapters examine the ongoing doctrinal thinking, draw historical comparisons, and discuss the thoughts of those attending the conference—experts from the military, government civilian agencies, academia, think tanks, and the defense industry—regarding unconventional

warfare. Collectively, they provide a comprehensive report on critical factors that the U.S. military soon may face.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17853> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/cities/cities.pdf> (PDF)

STATE DEFENSE FORCES AND HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Department of Defense. Arthur N. Tulak, Robert W. Kraft, and Don Silbaugh. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 4, Winter 2003-04. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.132-146. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/4

“State Defense Forces are already integrated at the state level in the emergency management and consequence management plans of the several states and territories that maintain such forces. Given the dual-apportioned character of the National Guard to fulfill both its federal mission in support of the National Military Strategy and its state missions of civil support and disaster assistance, SDFs represent a valuable additional component for homeland security and homeland defense contingency planning and operations. State Defense Forces can provide a pool of specially trained personnel to assist in homeland security planning command and control ... NORTHCOM should ensure that future contingency planning efforts for homeland security operations fully incorporate the valuable capabilities that State Defense Forces can provide.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/tulak.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/tulak.pdf> (PDF)

STATUS OF MILITARY READINESS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 106th Congress, 2nd Session, 27 September 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 219p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. AR 5/3: S.HRG.106-1068

“Are we maintaining our current level of readiness on the backs of the men and women in the armed forces and their families? Is that fair? Is this why we are struggling to meet our recruiting goals, struggling to maintain the essential levels of retention, most particularly of the skilled enlisted and junior grade officers?”

TANKS AND "SHOCK AND AWE". U.S. Department of Defense. Jay D. Pellerin. *Armor*. Vol. 112, No. 5, September-October 2003. Fort Knox, Kentucky: U.S. Army Armor Center, 2003. p.32-34. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.78/2: 112/5

"This article discusses the idea of shock and awe and how the main battle tank remains relevant—first, as a part of the rapid dominance concept, and secondly, the forms of shock and awe that is best fits. This, coupled with current events, will show that rapid dominance by shock and awe can work, and that tanks contribute to its success."

TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 18 September 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 106p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 995-96/43

"So the terrorists who attacked our forces in Saudi Arabia last November and last June failed in their first objective. They failed to drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Now we must ensure that the terrorists do not succeed in their other objective, to undermine America's will so that we will abandon our military presence, our interests, and our allies and go home ... So in discussing this issue, we need to start with what is at stake. It is the same vital American interest that we fought Desert Storm to protect: To protect access to the vast energy resources in the region; to protect the stability of the region and permit the Middle East peace process to move forward; to prevent Iraq from developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and to protect freedom of navigation through the air and sea-lanes in that region."

3D SQUADRON, 7th U.S. CAVALRY UP FRONT: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM LESSONS LEARNED. U.S. Department of Defense. J.D. Keith. *Armor*. Vol. 112, No. 5, September-October 2003. Fort Knox, Kentucky: U.S. Army Armor Center, 2003. p.26-31. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.78/2: 112/5

"As the squadron continues to conduct stability operations and support operations in Baghdad and prepares for redeployment back to Fort Stewart, Georgia, it is the opportune time to capture more significant reflections on the squadron's operational and logistics experiences as it executed one of the fastest, longest, and most demanding campaigns in recent memory. With minimal war stories and hopefully some thought-provoking comments, this article presents a few of the lessons learned by the squadron during this latest conflict that other divisional cavalry squadrons can capitalize on as they prepare to conduct reconnaissance and security operations around the world."

TRANSFORMATION AND HOMELAND SECURITY: DUAL CHALLENGES FOR THE US ARMY. U.S. Department of Defense. Terrence K. Kelly. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 2. Summer 2003. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.36-50. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/2

“This new security situation, dominated not just by the need to project exceptionally lethal force overseas, but also to assist in homeland security, will force change on the military. While once a significant mission of the Army, protecting US citizens from attacks at home has not been a major concern for generations, and the Army has not organized or actively planned for this mission in recent memory.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/kelly.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/kelly.pdf> (PDF)

TRANSFORMING DEFENSE. U.S. Department of Defense. Conrad C. Crane. December 2001. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. 192p. [Online Monograph].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2002017070

“...the United States fired 79 sea-launched cruise missiles at suspected terrorist sources in Afghanistan and the Sudan. ‘Let our actions today send this message loud and clear,’ the President declared, ‘there will be no sanctuary for terrorists.’”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19473> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2001/trnsdefs/trnsdefs.pdf> (PDF)

TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND STATE SURVIVAL: A ROLE FOR THE MILITARY? U.S. Department of Defense. Paul J. Smith. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 30, No. 3. Autumn 2000. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2000. p.77-91. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 30/3

“As transnational security challenges continue to grow in severity around the world, military leaders and planners are facing the almost inevitable reality that armed forces will be deployed against them in the decades ahead. This trend is not occurring without controversy, however. Some military leaders strongly oppose the use of military forces in non-warfare operations for a variety of reasons, including fears that such missions detract from military training and readiness. Nevertheless,

governments around the world are increasingly discovering that civilian agencies which would normally manage these problems--such as police, health, environment, or immigration ministries--simply cannot cope with the magnitude of the problems they are confronting. This trend implies a major change in how countries will likely deploy their armed forces in the decades ahead. More important, however, it suggests a fundamental new role for military forces in the 21st century.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/smith.htm>

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND OVERSEAS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 96th Congress, 1st Session, April 1979. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 207p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: OV 2/5

“An inherent tension exists between the extensive network of U.S. bases overseas and American foreign policy. Overseas facilities must be constructed over long periods of time and tend to become self-perpetuating. On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy is evolutionary, and capable of dramatic change to reflect international developments ... This study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for the Committee on Foreign Relations examines the U.S. foreign policy objectives in each region of the world, identifies and assesses the major U.S. overseas military installations, and analyzes the effectiveness of those installations in supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Attention is also paid to alternate means and approaches.”

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES POSTURE STATEMENT 2003-2004: TRANSFORMING THE FORCE AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM. U.S. Department of Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003. 118p. [Report].

SuDoc# D 1.98: 2003-2004

“Two critical challenges face our nation’s Special Operations Forces (SOF). The first is fighting a global, long-term war against terrorism; SOF are the tip of the spear in that effort. The second related challenge confronting SOF is the need to ‘transform’ their forces. SOF must improve their speed, precision, lethality, stealth, survivability, and sustainability to meet the needs of the future. SOF must be able to fight in unpredicted places, at unpredicted times.”

UNORTHODOX THOUGHTS ABOUT ASYMMETRIC WARFARE. U.S. Department of Defense. Montgomery C. Meigs. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 2003. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2003. p.4. [Article].

SuDoc# D 101.72: 33/2

“Now that the unconventional threat is so closely linked to national defense, military leaders must be trained to recognize the wider problem ... The military cannot be saved only to fight the next world war. Leaders need to be trained to recognize the warning signs and to expand their approaches to this new environment.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/meigs.htm>

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/meigs.pdf> (PDF)

WAGING ANCIENT WAR: LIMITS ON PREEMPTIVE FORCE. U.S. Department of Defense. D. Robert Worley. February 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. 61p. [Online Report].

SuDoc# D 101.146: 2003009740

“A major conclusion of this study is that the concepts on the use of force and the well-established language of international relations are inadequate to the current ‘war on terrorism.’ If we cannot ignore our place among the major powers, and if the conceptions appropriate to state-on-state conflict are not germane to conflict with nonstate actors, then we must conclude that separate strategies are necessary. Accordingly, a strategy is proposed for waging war against nonstate actors lacking legitimate standing that is separate from and subordinate to the grand strategy that supports the U.S. role in the system of whatever that grand strategy may be. Sir Michael Howard characterizes the ‘war on terrorism’ as more like a hunt than a war. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies will carry the primary burden internationally, supported by covert operations. The primary overt role of military forces is for short-notice and short-duration raids and strikes against enemy targets as they appear. The largest part of the enemy capability is organized as combat forces that U.S. forces should expect to encounter during peace operations in failing or failed states with significant Muslim populations. U.S. forces must be prepared for warfare in these asymmetric environments. Finally, consequence management is an ineluctable role for U.S. forces to play domestically.”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS29071> (PDF)

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/ancient/ancient.pdf> (PDF)

WAR POWERS LEGISLATION. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 8, 9, 24 & 25 March; 23 & 26 April; 14 May; 26 & 27 July; 6 October 1971. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. 873p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.F 76/2: W 19/3

“It is the purpose of this Act to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States, and ensure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the initiation of hostilities involving the Armed Forces of the United States, and to the continuation of such hostilities. Under article I, section 8, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also ‘all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.’ At the same time, the Act is not intended to encroach upon the recognized powers of the President, as Commander in Chief, to conduct hostilities authorized by the Congress, to respond to attacks of the imminent threat of attacks upon the United States, including its territories and possessions, to respond to attacks or the imminent threat of attacks against the Armed Forces of the United States, and, under proper circumstances, to rescue endangered citizens of the United States located in foreign countries.”

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 95th Congress, 13-15 July 1977. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 525p. [Hearing].

SuDoc# Y 4.F 76/2: W 19/4

“The effort to write war powers legislation in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s resulted from the excessive claim of Presidents of both parties of unilateral, inherent powers to commit the Nation to war to the exclusion of any congressional role in the decision-making process. With respect to Southeast Asia, our Nation has suffered a series of frustrating deceptions—from the Tonkin Gulf to the illegal secret bombing of Cambodia ... The bill that emerged from this committee in 1971 was premised on the central principle that the decision to go to war, under our Constitution, is a decision for Congress alone to make.”

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: A RATIONALE FOR CONGRESSIONAL INACTION. U.S. Department of Defense. Timothy S. Boylan and Glenn A. Phelps. *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly.* Vol. 31, No. 1, Spring 2001. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2001. p.109-124. [Article].

SuDoc# 101.72: 31/1

“Has Congress gotten what it wanted in 1973? In theory, Congress wanted to restore its role in war powers decisionmaking. It created legal and procedural mechanisms intended to put its own feet to the fire and force actions or responses that would ensure collective judgment when American troops are placed in harm’s way. In reality, however, the plan has failed ... In practice, the resolution has become something never intended nor envisioned by its proponents and framers: a shield from and a substitute for substantive action. Congress has satisfied itself with the show of participation without the attendant political risks. But it has forfeited

something much more significant and essential—the constitutional representative mandate. Restoring that power will not come through a revival or revision of the War Powers Resolution. Repeal of the resolution must precede any move of Congress to fulfill its aspiration of bringing collective judgment into issues of war and peace.”

Online

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01spring/boylan.htm>

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, REPORTS, CORRESPONDENCE. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, May 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. 267p. [Committee Print].

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/1: W 19/10/994

“A number of world events have taken place since May 1988 in which U.S. military forces have been involved in hostilities, and reports and documents related to these activities are included—military action in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1988; in Panama in December 1989; in Liberia in 1990; in Somalia in 1992 and 1993; in the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and 1994, and in Haiti and Rwanda in 1994. The most significant use of U.S. military power since the adoption of the War Powers Resolution was the U.S. led military action against Iraq following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 ... The reports that are included in this subcommittee print are only those that are relevant to the War Powers Resolution.”

WHAT’S NEXT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM? U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 107th Congress, 2nd Session, 7 February 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002. 45p. [Hearing]

SuDoc# Y 4. F 76/2: S.HRG.107-417

“The question is ... will our efforts take us next to countries like Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan, where governments lack either the ability or the will to crack down on terrorism? Or will it focus on countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, where governments may share our desire to root out terrorist groups and could be willing, may be willing, to cooperate with us if given the proper resources and diplomatic backing? ... Will future terrorists likely focus on chemical or biological weapons ... ? What methods of delivery will they most likely employ? Will they seek to acquire a radiological dirty bomb or a full-fledged nuclear weapon?”

Online

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19716>

<http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS19717> (PDF)

